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Chapter 1
Introduction
Democracy and terror are two important concepts of political economy. Explaining the
emergence of both has been at the center of the literature for an extended period of
time. Especially the literature dealing with terror has taken a flight since the tragic
attacks of September 11, 2001. This thesis sheds new light on various aspects of democ-
racy and terror, reviewing what has been found and extending existing theories. A
major contribution of the thesis is the rigorous and thorough empirical evaluation of
various proposed determinants of both democracy and terror while also contributing
new empirical findings to extend the research agenda.
Several key features will be reappearing throughout the whole work. One is the
empirical method of extreme bounds analysis (Sala-i-Martin, 1997). In some chapters it
will play a central role, e.g., chapter 2 while in some it will be used as a test of robustness.
A rigorous discussion of the method is presented in the chapters that follow. Briefly,
this method permutates covariates in order to examine the dependence of a particular
variable on the conditioning information set.
A second reappearing theme is the measurement of key variables, in particular, the
measurement of democracy. Numerous measures have been proposed as quantifications
for democracy. The three most popular are the Polity IV measure developed by Marshall
and Jaggers (2002), the annually published Freedom House indicators (civil liberties
and political rights), and finally the dichotomous measure developed by Przeworski et
1
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al. (2000). In each chapter we explain why a particular measure has been employed,
or we show the independence of the results with respect to the measure chosen. The
difference between the three indicators is in particular addressed in chapter 3.
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 we address the determinants of
democracy. Efforts to test the empirical implications of stories of democracy have pro-
duced a long list of variables, and there is little consensus over which variables have a
robust effect. We apply Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to test
the robustness of more than 55 various proposed factors. We assess both the emergence
and the survival of democracy. Our approach is extreme. In total, we evaluate over three
million regressions. A striking finding is that most variables do not survive the EBA.
We do not suggest that these factors are unimportant. Some variables, however, do
survive and are perhaps the most important determinants. Regarding the emergence of
democracy, we find that economic growth, fuel exports, and the share of the population
that is Muslim have robust negative effects. GDP per capita does not have a robust
relationship with the emergence of democracy. Regarding the survival of democracy,
GDP per capita has a positive significant effect. We also find that being surrounded by
democracies has a positive effect, while having an executive who comes from the mili-
tary has a negative effect. Finally, a past history of transitions cuts both ways, making
democracies and dictatorships less sturdy.
After exploring the determinants of democracies we continue by linking democracy
to an economic outcome. In particular we focus on the influence of the political regime
on international trade in chapter 3. Firstly, we develop a theoretical model that pre-
dicts that autocracies trade less than democracies. Secondly, we test the predictions of
the model empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for the years 1962 to
2000. In contrast to the existing literature, we use data on individual importing and
exporting countries, rather than a dyadic set-up. In line with the model, we find that
autocracies import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official
trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular set-up or
estimation technique.
3The next chapter turns to a topic which is currently in the focus of both politicians
and the public in general. We analyze what shapes environmental policies. Deindus-
trialization, stagnant real incomes of production workers and increasing inequality are
latter-day features of many economies. It is common to assume that such developments
pressure policy-makers to relax environmental standards. However, when heavily pol-
luting industries become less important economically, their political importance also
tends to diminish. Consequently, a regulator may increase the stringency of environ-
mental policies. Like some other studies, we find that declining industrial employment
translates into stricter environmental standards. In contrast to previous studies, but
consistent with our argument, we find that greater income inequality is associated with
policies that promote a cleaner environment.
Chapter 5 is the first chapter in which terror plays a central role. The chapter
presents a political economy model linking terror and governments’ respect for human
rights. Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1973-2002, we then empirically
analyze whether and to what extent terror affects human rights – measured by three
indices covering a wide variety of human rights aspects. According to our results, terror
significantly diminishes governments’ respect for basic human rights such as absence of
extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. To some extent, civil rights
are also restricted as a consequence of terrorism, while we find no effect of terrorism on
empowerment rights.
We continue to explore the interrelationship between democracy and terror in chapter
6. We examine whether cabinet duration is affected by the presence of terror. The
literature on cabinet duration argues that critical events may trigger cabinet dissolution.
In this chapter we empirically examine whether one specific critical event, i.e., terrorism,
can explain why some cabinets endure longer than others. Using different duration
models for a panel of more than 150 countries for the period between 1968 and 2002, we
find some evidence that terrorism affects the duration of governments. In particular, we
find that terrorists influence cabinet dissolution in countries that have unstable polities.
The following chapter examines a more specific question dealing with a very similar
topic. The role of terror for election outcomes. Put more explicitly, we examine the
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relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. Using conditional fixed
effects logit regressions and a dataset containing over 800 elections in 115 countries,
we find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent
government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the
terrorist attack.
Chapter 8 deals with the determinants of terror. We analyze the impact of political
proximity to the United States on the occurrence and severity of terror. Employing
panel data for 116 countries over the period 1975-2001 we find that countries voting in
line with the U.S. are victims of more and deadlier attacks.
The final chapter of this work briefly summarizes our findings.
Chapter 2
Extreme Bounds of Democracy
2.1 Introduction
There are many stories of democracy. Efforts to test the empirical implications of various
theories have produced a long list of variables that purportedly explain democracy.
There is, however, little consensus over which variables robustly determine democracy.
We address this issue by applying Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) extreme bounds analysis (EBA)
to test the robustness of more than 55 various proposed factors. We assess both the
factors leading to the emergence of democracy as well as the factors explaining the
persistence of democracy. To be clear from the outset, our approach is extreme. We
evaluate over 1.7 million regressions of the emergence of democracy, and over 1.4 million
regressions for the survival of democracy.
The most striking of our findings is that most of the variables suggested in the
literature do not survive the rigorous EBA robustness test. While many of the factors
we test have been shown elsewhere to produce significant effects in plausible and well-
specified models, when put to the rigors of being tested along with many other plausible
variables, the significance of their effects simply do not survive.
This chapter is an adapted version of Gassebner et al. (2007e).
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We do not suggest that this implies these factors are unimportant. Many of the
findings we build off of are valid within the confines of the original statistical model
proposed in the literature. In particular one has to bear in mind that our empirical
approach focuses on reduced form models. Moreover, to the extent that some variables
fail our test, this could be because they are poor proxies for otherwise strong theories
of democracy. The standard of surviving the test of EBA is just a very a high one, and
only the strongest of relationships survive it.
Some variables, however, do indeed survive. We suggest that these variables may
be the most important factors determining democracy. Regarding the emergence of
democracy, we find that economic growth has a robust negative effect. This finding,
standing in stark contrast to Modernization Theory, suggests that autocracies with
strong economic performance are unlikely to see democracy emerge. Instead, economic
contraction causes dictatorships to break down. Also in contrast to Modernization
Theory, but consistent with the argument of Przeworski et al. (2000), the level of GDP
per capita does not have a robust relationship with the emergence of democracy. The
only other variables that have a robust significant effect are fuel exports and the share
of the population that is Muslim. We suspect that the latter two findings are largely
driven by the Middle East and seek to pursue this possibility further.
Regarding the survival of democracy, GDP per capita has a positive significant effect.
The finding confirms Przeworski et al. (2000) and Przeworski (2005). We also find that
being surrounded by democracies increases the likelihood of staying a democracy, consis-
tent with Gleditsch (2002). In line with Cheibub (2006), we find that democracies with
executives who have a military background are more likely to experience a democratic
breakdown. Finally, we find that past transitions also reduce the survival probability
of democracies. It turns out that a past history of transitions cuts both ways, making
both democracies and dictatorships less sturdy, as Przeworski et al. (2000) argue.
The chapter proceeds as follows. We begin with a brief review of the literature. We
then introduce the EBA method in detail and then present the results. We conclude by
summarizing our findings and deriving policy conclusions.
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In an early large-n study of democracy, Almond and Verba (1963) propose a cultural
explanation of democracy. Using survey-based research in five countries, they argue that
a “participant” culture (as opposed to a “subject” or “parochial” culture) is required
for democracy. The “civic culture” argument is tested cross-nationally in the work of
Inglehart (1988), who finds that democracy is correlated with the percentage of peo-
ple reporting high levels of interpersonal trust, low levels of support for revolutionary
change, and high levels of life satisfaction. His findings are disputed by Seligson (2002),
who shows that the correlation disappears when one controls for level of economic devel-
opment. Przeworski et al. (2000) test a full range of other cultural variables, finding that
none has a robust relationship with democracy once one accounts for level of economic
development.
Economic explanations of democracy date back to Lipset (1959) who is often cited
as the first “modernization theorist.” Modernization Theory argues that as countries
develop economically, social structures become too complex for authoritarian regimes
to manage – technological change endows owners of capital with some autonomy and
private information, complex labor processes require active cooperation rather than
coercion, and civil society emerges. At some point in this process, dictatorship collapses
and democracy emerges as the alternative.
Huntington (1968) adds that sustainable democracy requires political development
along with economic development, but basically agrees that as a dictatorship experiences
economic development democratization becomes more likely. Without political devel-
opment, however, rapid economic development can also destabilize democracies. Thus
he proposes a “bell-shaped” pattern of stability of regimes with respect to economic
development.
In their expansive large-n study of democracy and development, Przeworski et al.
(2000) thoroughly explore the relationship. They begin with the observation that the
correlation between level of economic development and democracy is strong. They ques-
tion, however, the process by which this correlation is driven. They suggest, in contrast
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to modernization theorists, that this correlation is possible even if the emergence of
democracy is completely random with respect to economic development. The correla-
tion may be driven instead by a relationship between economic development and the
survival of democracy.
This is in fact what their book argues. The emergence of democracy has no relation-
ship with level of economic development; the correlation instead is entirely driven by
the survival of democracy. In other work, Przeworski (2005, p.253) argues that “democ-
racy prevails in developed societies because too much is at stake in turning against it.”
Conversely, in poor democracies, “the value of becoming a dictator is greater and the
accumulated cost of destroying capital stock is lower” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997,
p.166 fn.1).
It should be noted, however, that while Przeworski et al. (2000) show that transitions
to democracy are not well predicted by economic development and survival of democracy
is, the estimated effect of economic development on the transition to democracy is
statistically significant in their specification.1 We suspect (and show below) that it is
not a robust relationship.
Since the Przeworski et al. (2000) study, many large-n studies of democracy have been
pursued – too many to adequately review here. We present a summary of 14 published
empirical studies on the determinants of democracy in Table 2.8 in the Appendix.
The Przeworski et al. (2000) study ignores the oil rich countries of the Middle East.
As these scholars were originally interested in estimating the effect of regime on eco-
nomic growth, they chose not to include oil rich countries, whose process of augmenting
GDP per capita is much different from that of other countries. Nevertheless, these
countries present a real challenge to the Modernization Theory argument that should
be considered.
The argument of Boix (2003) provides a compelling answer.2 He argues that level
of economic development, income distribution, and – importantly – asset specificity
1The insignificant coefficient reported indicates that the difference between the coefficients for the
emergence and survival of democracy is not significant.
2See also Boix and Stokes (2003) on this matter.
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together impact the probability of the emergence of democracy. Where asset specificity
is high and the income distribution is highly skewed, such as in many oil-rich countries,
the rich face severe redistributional consequences for allowing popular sovereignty, and
they have no credible threat to flee the country taking their productive capacity with
them. Thus, it is in their interest to pay high costs of repressing democracy, maintaining
dictatorial rule. If assets are not highly specific, however, the rich have a credible
exit threat. If the rich flee the country, taking the productive capacity along with
them, they can severely harm the national economy. The credible threat restrains the
redistributional demands of the poor and may make democracy possible even in countries
with relatively low levels of economic development, such as India. Asset specificity aside,
if redistributional demands diminish at higher levels of economic development, Boix
argues that economic development should make democracy more likely both to emerge
and to survive.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also propose a theory of democracy where elites may
prefer dictatorship but must pay the costs of repression as the masses threaten disorder.
Where repression costs are high and elites cannot credibly promise concessions otherwise,
democracy can offer a compelling alternative under specific conditions. Factors identified
by their theory as determinants of democracy include measures of civil society, political
institutions, economic crises, income distribution, the structure of the economy, and the
forces of globalization.
Another story that addresses a regional pattern of regime such as found in the
Middle East is suggested by Gleditsch (2002). His thesis, summarized nicely by the
title of his book, is that all (international) politics are local. Diffusion theorists suggest
that through various forces that spill over borders – political, cultural, and economic –
regime in one country is likely to be correlated with regime in a neighboring country.
Thus we have solidly democratic regions, such as Europe, dictatorial regions, such as
the Middle East, and regions where countries tend to transition in waves, such as Latin
America.
A related story is suggested by Pevehouse (2002a,b), who argues that participation
in international organizations that are dominated by one regime or another influences
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both the emergence and survival of democracy. He develops an innovative mechanism by
which diffusion may operate – participation in regional organizations provides incentives
for countries to encourage democratic standards amongst the membership.
After briefly highlighting and describing the main variables we now turn to the
empirical section of the chapter. The motivation for the test presented in the following
section is as follows:
There is a vigorous debate on the determinants of democracy. Most papers, however,
present but a handful of potential specifications, controlling for very few of the possible
combinations of different variables. Of course, each paper presents valid theoretical
justifications for how the specifications are chosen. But looking across the vast literature,
there appears to be little consensus on the theory. Findings that are presented as
statistically significant in the presence of some variables may or may not be significant
in the presence (or absence) of other variables that other scholars have proposed. We,
therefore, suggest testing the bounds of the significance of previously proposed variables.
As a measure of democracy, we begin with the Przeworski et al. (2000) dichotomous
variable (which follows Schumpeter’s (1942) conception of regime): democracy is the
political system in which key government offices are filled through contested elections.
The definition has two parts: “key government office,” which they define as the executive
and the legislature; and “contested,” which implies that more than one party has some
probability of winning office through election.3 Elections must be associated with some
ex ante uncertainty, and be subject to ex post irreversibility. Put succinctly, “democracy
is a system in which incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules so dictate”
(Przeworski et al., 2000, p.54).
3Sometimes this is obvious, such as when incumbents lose elections and relinquish power (Przeworski
1991). Sometimes it is not, such as when incumbents successively win contested elections. Also see
Vreeland (2003).
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Since there are many studies that investigate the determinants of democracy, there is
a long list of potential explanatory variables.4 Studies often restrict their analysis to
certain subsets of these variables and often ignore the effects of any omitted variable
bias when other variables are not included. In addition to any model uncertainty, the
limited number of observations often restricts the power of statistical tests that rule out
irrelevant explanatory variables.
To address these issues we use extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed by
Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). EBA enables us to examine which ex-
planatory variables are robustly related to our democracy measure and is a relatively
neutral way of coping with the problem of selecting variables for an empirical model in
situations where there are conflicting or inconclusive suggestions in the literature.
We begin with a basic model of democracy which assumes that the probability of
observing democracy at time t (measured in years in our data) follows a first order
Markov process. Let D be a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is a democracy, and
0 otherwise. Then,
Pr (Dt|Dt−1) = (1−Dt−1) · Pr (Dt|Dt−1 = 0) + (Dt−1) · Pr (Dt|Dt−1 = 1) . (2.1)
As the likelihood function for this model is additively separable, it can be easily esti-
mated as two logistic functions, where the transition probabilities are defined as follows:
Pr (Dt|Dt−1 = 0) = Λ
(
βAD
′
xt−1
)
(2.2)
Pr (Dt|Dt−1 = 1) = Λ
(
βDD
′
xt−1
)
, (2.3)
where Λ is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, xt−1 is
the vector of (lagged) variables that determine democracy, βAD is a vector of coef-
4See Table 2.8 in the Appendix for a summary of 14 recent empirical studies.
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ficients capturing the effects of these variables on the probability of transition from
Authoritarianism to Democracy, and βDD is a vector of coefficients capturing the ef-
fects of these variables on the survival of democracy (“transitioning” from Democracy
to Democracy). While it is of course not necessary to assume that the same variables
determine both the emergence and survival of democracy, most scholars in practice do,
and we will be testing all variables in both setups.
To conduct an EBA, we define:
βAD
′
xt−1 = β
AD′
M Mt−1 + β
AD′
F Ft−1 + β
AD′
Z Zt−1 (2.4)
βDD
′
xt−1 = β
DD′
M Mt−1 + β
DD′
F Ft−1 + β
DD′
Z Zt−1, (2.5)
where M is a vector of “commonly accepted” explanatory variables for the emergence
of democracy; and F is a vector containing the variables of interest; and Z is a vector
containing up to three possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt,
1992) which, according to the broader literature, are related to the dependent variable.
The EBA test for a variable in F states that if the lower extreme bound for βF – i.e.,
the lowest value for βF minus two standard deviations – is negative, while the upper
extreme bound for βF – i.e., the highest value for βF plus two standard deviations – is
positive, the variable F is not robustly related to our democracy measure.
As it is common in the literature we use pooled logit regressions. We include all
time-invariant variables previously proposed in the literature to proxy for fixed country
effects. Including fixed country effects directly, reduces the sample size to only 200
observations which makes inference unreliable.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that this testing criterion is far too strong for hardly any
variable to ever pass it. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has both positive
and negative support, then a researcher is bound to find at least one regression model for
which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. Consequently,
we report the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is
statistically different from zero at the five percent significance level. Moreover, instead
of only analyzing the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular
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variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) recommended procedure and analyze the entire
distribution. Accordingly, we also report the unweighted parameter estimate of βF and
its standard error, as well as the unweighted cumulative distribution function, CDF(0).
The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative distribution function lying on
each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the larger of the areas under the density function
either above or below zero, i.e., whether this happens to be CDF(0) or 1 - CDF(0). So
CDF(0) always lies between 0.5 and 1.0. However, in contrast to Sala-i-Martin, we use
the unweighted, instead of the weighted, CDF(0).5
Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M and
in the Z vector is likely to be arbitrary. However, as pointed out by Temple (2000),
there is no reason why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down from a
general specification) cannot be used in advance to identify variables that are particularly
relevant. Furthermore, some variables are included in the large majority of studies and
are by now common in this branch of the literature.
In our view, the inclusion of GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parities)
in the M vector is the only non-contentious inclusion as a regressor. We are conscious
of not prejudging the importance of other explanatory variables for the outcome of
the EBA. Thus, we sort all other variables in the F vector and test their relevance
individually. The list of all variables, their definitions and sources is given in Table 2.1.
All variables (except the time-invariant) are included in the model with a lag of one
year. On the one hand, this mitigates potential endogeneity problems and on the other
hand this also allows us to interpret the relationships as being (Granger-)causal.
The basic idea of the EBA is to run many regressions continuously permutating
explanatory variables and to test how the variable in the center of attention “behaves”
(e.g., how often it is significant) with respect to the conditioning set. In the basic model
regression estimation equations include GDP per capita as well as combinations of up to
5Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the integrated likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0).
However, missing observations for some of the variables poses a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2002)
show that the goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is
the true model and that the weights constructed in this way are not invariant to linear transformations
of the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales could result in different outcomes and conclusions.
We therefore employ the unweighted version.
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three further variables. In the F vector regressions, GDP per capita is included as well
the variable in focus plus up to three additional variables out of the F vector. Overall, we
estimate a total of 1,776,379 specifications for the emergence of democracy and 1,492,029
specifications for the survival of democracy. As we use logit regressions we exclude
estimations with convergence problems as well as estimations where the optimizing
algorithm breaks down. Finally, we control our output variables by calculating medians.
However, these values are very similar to the calculated means.
Table 2.1: Variables – definitions, sources and previous studies
Variable Definition Source Proposed by
Africa Dummy variable for African
Countries
Easterly and
Sewadeh (2001)
Li and Reuveny
(2003); Lo´pez-
Co´rdova and Meiss-
ner (2005)
Arable land Arable land (hectares) World Bank
(2006)
Crenshaw (1995)
Bonds invest-
ment
Portfolio investment, bonds
(PPG + PNG) (NFL, current
US$)
World Bank
(2006)
Li and Reuveny
(2003)
Colony Dummy variable if ever in a
colonial relationship
CEPII (2006) Barro (1999); Boix
and Stokes (2003)
Employment
in Agriculture
Employment in Agriculture (%
of total employment)
World Bank
(2006)
Clague et (2001);
Crenshaw (1995)
Equity invest-
ment
Portfolio investment, equity
(DRS, current US$)
World Bank
(2006)
Li and Reuveny
(2003)
English speak-
ing
1 if English first language of at
least 9% of the population
CEPII (2006) Clague et al. (2001)
European set-
tlers 1900
Share of European settlers in
the country in 1900
Acemoglu
and Robinson
(2006)
Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006)
FDI net in-
flows
Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (% of GDP)
World Bank
(2006)
Li and Reuveny
(2003)
French colony 1 if ever in colonial relationship
with France
CEPII (2006) Barro (1999)
French speak-
ing
1 if French first language of at
least 9% of the population
CEPII (2006) Clague et al. (2001)
continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Source Proposed by
Fuel exports Fuel exports (% of merchandise
exports)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) World Bank
(2006)
Boix and Stokes
(2003); Fidrmuc
(2003); Li and
Reuveny (2003);
Muller (1995)
GDP p.c.
growth
GDP per capita growth (annual
%)
World Bank
(2006)
Pevehouse (2002a,b)
GDP p.c.,
PPP
GDP per capita, PPP (current
international $)
World Bank
(2006)
Acemoglu et
al.(2005); Boix
and Stokes (2003);
Crenshaw (1995);
Gleditsch and Ward
(2006); Muller
(1995); Nieswiadomy
and Strazcich (2004)
Globalization KOF Index of Globalization Dreher (2006a) This chapter
Income taxes Taxes on income, profits and
capital gains (% of total taxes)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
Industry em-
ployment, fe-
male
Employees, industry, female (%
of female employment)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
Industry em-
ployment,
male
Employees, industry, male (%
of male employment)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
Inequality Industrial pay-inequality based
on UNIDO’s database of pay-
ments
UTIP (2001) Barro (1999); Cren-
shaw (1995)
Infant mortal-
ity
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000
live births)
World Bank
(2006)
Barro (1999);
Nieswiadomy and
Strazcich (2004)
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual
%)
World Bank
(2006)
Li and Reuveny
(2003)
IO score Highest democracy score of par-
ticipated International Organi-
zation, calculated as average
across all members’ Polity IV
score excluding the own value
Pevehouse
(2002a,b)
Pevehouse (2002a,b)
continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Source Proposed by
IO score,
change
First difference of IO score (see
above)
Pevehouse
(2002a,b)
Pevehouse (2002a,b)
Land area Land area (hectares) World Bank
(2006)
Lo´pez-Co´rdova and
Meissner (2005)
Latin America Dummy variable for Latin
American countries
Easterly and
Sewadeh (2001)
Lo´pez-Co´rdova and
Meissner (2005)
Life ex-
pectancy
Life expectancy at birth, total
(years)
World Bank
(2006)
Barro (1999); Clague
et al. (2001);
Nieswiadomy and
Strazcich (2004);
Ross (2001)
Literacy Literacy rate, adult total (ages
15 and above)
World Bank
(2006)
Clague et al. (2001)
Metal exports Ores and metals exports (% of
merchandise exports)
World Bank
(2006)
Crenshaw (1995);
Ross (2001)
Middle East Dummy for Countries from the
Middle East
Easterly and
Sewadeh (2001)
Li and Reuveny
(2003)
Military ex-
penditure
Military expenditure (% of
GDP)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
Military
leader
Executive leader is a former
military officer
Gandhi and
Przeworski
(2006)
Cheibub (2006)
Military per-
sonnel
Military personnel, total World Bank
(2006)
Crenshaw (1995);
Ross (2001)
Muslim share Share of Muslim population Przeworski et
al. (2000)
Barro (1999); Boix
and Stokes (2003);
Clague et al. (2001);
Muller (1995) ; Ross
(2001)
Neighboring
democracies
Share of surrounding democra-
cies
Own calcula-
tions
Gleditsch and Ward
(2006); Pevehouse
(2002a)
Number of
past transi-
tions
Number of previous transitions
between autocracy/democracy
Przeworski et
al. (2000)
Boix and Stokes
(2003)
OECD mem-
ber
Dummy variable for OECD
membership
OECD (2007) Ross (2001)
Oil exporter Dummy variable for exporters
of fuel/oil
Easterly and
Sewadeh (2001)
Barro (1999); Lo´pez-
Co´rdova and Meiss-
ner (2005)
continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Source Proposed by
OPEC mem-
ber
Dummy variable for OPEC
membership
OPEC (2007) Nieswiadomy and
Strazcich (2004)
Openness Trade (% of GDP) World Bank
(2006)
Li and Reuveny
(2003); Lo´pez-
Co´rdova and Meiss-
ner (2005)
Population
(log)
log of total population World Bank
(2006)
Acemoglu et al.
(2005); Barro (1999);
Lo´pez-Co´rdova and
Meissner (2005);
Nieswiadomy and
Strazcich (2004)
Population
share 0-14
Population ages 0-14 (% of to-
tal)
World Bank
(2006)
Acemoglu et al.
(2005)
Population
share 15-64
Population ages 15-64 (% of to-
tal)
World Bank
(2006)
Acemoglu et al.
(2005)
Population
share 65+
Population ages 65 and above
(% of total)
World Bank
(2006)
Acemoglu et al.
(2005)
Portfolio
investment
Portfolio investment, excluding
LCFAR (BoP, current US$)
World Bank
(2006)
Li and Reuveny
(2003)
Portuguese
colony
1 if ever in colonial relationship
with Portugal
CEPII (2006) Barro (1999)
Portuguese
speaking
1 if Portuguese first language of
at least 9% of the population
CEPII (2006) Clague et al. (2001)
Service em-
ployment,
female
Employees, services, female (%
of female employment)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
Service em-
ployment,
male
Employees, services, male (% of
male employment)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
Settler mortal-
ity (log)
log of historical mortality rates
of potential European settlers
Acemoglu
and Robinson
(2006)
Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006)
Socialist 1 if present or former socialist
country
Easterly and
Sewadeh (2001)
Muller (1995)
Spanish
colony
1 if ever in colonial relationship
with Spain
CEPII (2006) Barro (1999)
Spanish
speaking
1 if Spanish first language of at
least 9% of the population
CEPII (2006) Clague et al. (2001)
Tax revenue Tax revenue (% of GDP) World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Source Proposed by
Telephone
mainlines
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000
people)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
TV sets Television sets (per 1,000 peo-
ple)
World Bank
(2006)
Ross (2001)
U.K. colony 1 if ever in colonial relationship
with United Kingdom
CEPII (2006) Barro (1999); Boix
and Stokes (2003);
Clague et al. (2001);
Crenshaw (1995)
Urban popula-
tion
Urban population (% of total) World Bank
(2006)
Barro (1999);
Nieswiadomy and
Strazcich (2004);
Ross (2001)
World democ-
racy
Global share of democracies Own calcula-
tions
Boix and Stokes
(2003); Gleditsch
and Ward (2006)
2.4 Results
The results of our empirical analysis are summarized in Tables 2.2 to 2.5. They read
as follows: Avg. Beta and Avg. S.E. give the unweighted averages over all regressions
of the coefficient and the standard error, respectively. %Sign. gives the percentage of
regressions in which the respective coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. CDF(0) is the unweighted cumulative distribution function which reports the
larger of the areas under the density function either above or below zero (as described
above). All variables are sorted according to this criterion and the cutoff point for a
variable to be considered robustly linked to our dependent variable is a CDF(0) value
of 0.9 or higher following Sala-i-Martin (1997). Regres. represents the number of re-
gressions run for each variable tested, and Avg. Obs. reports the average number of
observations for these regressions.
Table 2.2 contains the results for the transitions from autocracies to democracies –
the emergence of democracy. The first result to note is that GDP per capita does not
explain democratic transitions. This confirms the Przeworski et al. (2000) critique of
the Modernization Theory literature. Furthermore, the very low value of the CDF(0)
indicates that this result is not even a “borderline” variable.
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Table 2.2: Results EBA – transition from autocracy to democracy (robust variables)
Avg. Avg. Avg.
Variable Beta S.E. %Sign. CDF(0) Regres. Obs.
Base Model
GDP p.c., PPP (log) -0.166 0.360 12.8 0.6041 32,558 894
Extended Model
Number of past transitions 0.535 0.207 87.5 0.9750 30,708 887
OECD member 2.359 0.986 82.1 0.9673 28,263 939
Muslim share -2.112 1.235 68.9 0.9494 30,860 820
Fuel exports -0.058 0.041 67.5 0.9472 30,758 543
GDP growth -0.064 0.041 65.0 0.9267 30,900 878
Notes: ‘Avg. Beta’ and ‘Avg. S.E.’ give the unweighted averages over all regressions of the coefficient
and the standard error, respectively. ‘%Sign.’ gives the percentage of regressions in which the respective
coefficient is statistically significant at the five percent level. ‘CDF(0)’ yields the result of the CDF
criterion as described in the previous section. All variables are sorted according to this criterion. The
cut-off value for a variable to be considered robustly linked to our dependent variable is 0.9. Finally,
‘Regres.’ and ‘Avg. Obs.’ report the number of regressions run for testing each variable and the average
number of observations for each regression. The results are derived using logistic regressions conditional
on being autocratic the year before.
Turning to the other variables we see that the variable with the highest score on the
CDF criterion is the number of previous transitions. Having had experience with regime
changes increases the probability of becoming a democracy. One could describe this as
having obtained the knowledge of how to change a system. Being an OECD member
also increases the likelihood of a change towards a democracy. We included this variable
following Ross (2001) and confirm his finding.
We find that democratic transitions are less likely in Muslim countries, as measured
by the percentage of the population that is Muslim. We are not convinced from this
finding that Islam is incompatible with democracy – the result calls for further investiga-
tion. Our variable is time-invariant, so this could be picking up on other country-specific
characteristics. It would be good to get a more nuanced measure.
One possibility is that several Muslim countries are fuel exporters. We find the larger
the share of fuel exports the less likely a country is to become a democracy. This is in
part driven by the Arabic oil-producing countries which all have a long non-democratic
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tradition. The finding is consistent with the resource-curse literature (e.g., Ross, 2001;
Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004).
The final variable fulfilling the CDF criterion is annual GDP growth. Countries that
are doing better are less likely to engage in a political transformation as in good time the
“need” for a change might not be felt in the population and autocratic rulers can justify
their position. This may seem intuitive, but it defies a basic idea in Modernization
Theory that as a country develops, democracy should become more likely. All other
variables tested do not pass the CDF criterion (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Results EBA – transition from autocracy to democracy (non-robust variables)
Avg. Avg. Avg.
Variable Beta S.E. %Sign. CDF(0) Regres. Obs.
Openness -0.014 0.012 57.1 0.8969 30,889 852
Military expenditure -0.371 0.232 47.5 0.8859 30,847 377
European settlers 1900 0.021 0.016 64.1 0.8854 30,872 837
Military leader 0.913 0.589 61.4 0.8833 30,601 754
French colony -0.877 0.677 33.2 0.8778 28,782 934
GDP p.c. growth -0.041 0.043 55.5 0.8706 30,900 877
Spanish colony 0.976 0.720 52.7 0.8602 29,761 909
FDI net inflows -0.109 0.098 37.0 0.8574 30,893 850
Spanish speaking 1.014 0.729 51.8 0.8570 29,801 909
Latin America 0.912 0.725 54.6 0.8505 29,758 849
Population (log) 0.194 0.172 37.6 0.8399 30,895 882
Employment in agriculture 0.026 0.035 25.6 0.8394 30,790 233
Service employment, male -0.036 0.070 9.1 0.8232 30,640 181
Neighboring democracies 0.922 0.849 48.6 0.8204 30,890 823
Portuguese speaking 1.487 0.950 18.0 0.8188 22,758 1,088
Colony -0.922 0.711 38.5 0.8055 29,956 845
Population share 65+ 0.131 0.232 48.3 0.8034 30,888 877
Oil exporter -1.119 0.919 27.9 0.8014 26,309 920
Literacy 0.015 0.016 30.1 0.7968 30,882 756
World democracy 2.931 3.345 44.3 0.7900 30,864 883
IO score 0.045 0.064 42.0 0.7858 30,773 768
French speaking -0.622 0.676 13.4 0.7822 29,142 925
Military personnel 0.000 0.000 4.2 0.7765 30,909 435
Settler mortality (log) 0.365 0.403 19.4 0.7759 30,712 628
Population share 0-14 -0.032 0.115 31.8 0.7661 30,889 877
Tax revenue 0.042 0.085 16.7 0.7468 30,350 212
continued on next page...
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Avg. Avg. Avg.
Variable Beta S.E. %Sign. CDF(0) Regres. Obs.
IO score, change 0.019 0.222 27.3 0.7411 30,589 770
Bonds investment 0.000 0.000 8.9 0.7225 30,903 786
Socialist -0.366 0.757 13.0 0.7112 26,998 870
Life expectancy 0.071 0.085 12.0 0.7021 30,489 262
Service employment, female -0.013 0.036 3.9 0.7012 30,728 181
Population share 15-64 0.034 0.130 18.4 0.6968 30,890 877
Inequality 0.048 0.082 9.0 0.6782 30,632 475
Telephone mainlines -0.005 0.010 3.4 0.6634 30,900 857
Africa -0.269 0.684 13.0 0.6615 30,727 827
Land area 0.000 0.000 3.7 0.6579 30,913 878
Metal exports 0.009 0.032 3.5 0.6534 30,615 572
Portuguese colony -0.060 0.938 3.7 0.6279 22,121 1,095
U.K. colony -0.153 0.516 7.0 0.6253 30,801 884
Infant mortality -0.009 0.274 0.4 0.6141 30,301 170
OPEC member 0.042 0.831 10.1 0.6131 26,452 986
Portfolio investment 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.6104 30,910 725
Arable land 0.000 0.000 17.3 0.5989 30,913 878
TV sets -0.001 0.013 3.7 0.5975 30,898 845
Income taxes 0.010 0.055 4.0 0.5882 30,395 210
Industry employment, female -0.018 0.058 0.1 0.5819 30,769 180
Middle East -0.164 0.699 1.8 0.5805 28,785 870
Globalization -0.004 0.034 7.0 0.5772 30,845 722
Urban population 0.004 0.019 3.8 0.5741 30,886 871
Industry employment, male -0.025 0.066 3.6 0.5377 30,619 181
English speaking 0.016 0.517 2.9 0.5254 30,743 886
Inflation 0.004 0.016 14.0 0.5220 30,874 865
Equity investment 0.000 0.000 4.3 0.5026 30,885 816
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 for the explanation of the abbreviations used. The results are derived
using logistic regressions conditional on being autocratic the year before.
Table 2.4 presents the results for the probability of staying a democracy – democ-
racy’s survival. GDP per capita plays a central role. Richer countries are more likely to
remain democracies. This confirms the findings in the previous literature.
Of the remaining variables we find having a (former) military leader to score highest
on the CDF criterion. The result implies that countries which have a leader with a
military background have a lower probability of sustaining a democracy.
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Table 2.4: Results EBA – remaining a democracy (robust variables)
Avg. Avg. Avg.
Variable Beta S.E. %Sign. CDF(0) Regres. Obs.
Base Model
GDP p.c., PPP (log) 1.504 0.953 68.6 0.9285 31,316 1,014
Extended Model
Military Leader -2.590 1.657 77.1 0.9558 22,181 836
Neighboring democracies 2.903 1.999 49.4 0.9294 27,681 821
Number of past transitions -0.630 0.497 59.2 0.9140 29,012 1,020
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 for the explanation of the abbreviations used. The results are derived
using logistic regressions conditional on being democratic the year before.
Our finding with respect to the neighboring democracy variable indicates that there
are positive spillover effects from democracies as the probability of remaining a democ-
racy increases in the number of democratic neighbors.
Very interesting is the result for the previous transitions variable, which is the only
variable that passes the CDF criterion in both models. Previous transitions increase
the chances of democratic failure. Taking the result of Table 2.2 also into account, we
can summarize that previous transitions increase the instability of the political system.
Again, all remaining variables fail to pass the CDF criterion (see Table 2.5).
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Table 2.5: Results EBA – remaining a democracy (non-robust variables)
Avg. Avg. Avg.
Variable Beta S.E. %Sign. CDF(0) Regres. Obs.
Colony
1.824 1.238 52.5 0.8884 27,970 965
GDP p.c. growth 0.094 0.133 51.3 0.8159 29,278 1,009
Openness 0.022 0.178 38.5 0.8114 29,361 1,004
English speaking 0.864 1.000 25.1 0.8090 27,983 1,039
Telephone mainlines 0.031 0.513 0.8 0.8065 29,178 1,007
Muslim share -0.718 2.730 33.7 0.7912 28,901 935
Industry employment, male 0.267 0.298 0.3 0.7904 23,129 602
U.K. colony 0.738 1.051 14.6 0.7846 27,980 1,039
Spanish colony -0.876 1.079 15.0 0.7759 23,693 1,140
Bonds investment 0.000 0.000 0.1 0.7702 30,360 579
Industry employment, female 0.191 0.300 0.1 0.7701 26,406 568
GDP growth 0.022 0.143 47.5 0.7693 29,244 1,010
Population share 65+ 0.353 0.697 0.3 0.7558 29,420 982
Infant mortality -0.007 0.305 0.4 0.7447 21,627 413
Service employment, female 0.081 0.274 0.2 0.7419 24,304 594
Spanish speaking -0.731 1.141 7.5 0.7406 23,692 1,140
IO score, change 0.390 0.608 0.6 0.7384 26,107 752
French colony 0.619 0.986 7.0 0.7371 20,309 1,150
Tax revenue 0.256 0.442 0.2 0.7342 21,504 311
World democracy 0.741 7.494 38.3 0.7294 29,324 1,012
Inequality -0.163 0.209 3.3 0.7220 26,598 685
Military expenditure -0.172 0.421 1.2 0.7157 28,761 559
IO score -0.007 0.282 2.5 0.7056 27,054 744
Middle East -0.976 1.314 5.8 0.6972 26,138 1,008
Inflation 0.085 0.173 20.3 0.6967 29,599 996
Arable land 0.000 0.000 5.0 0.6902 30,489 960
Population (log) -0.354 0.477 4.7 0.6867 29,182 1,015
OECD member -0.664 1.249 2.9 0.6786 15,225 1,352
Income taxes 0.017 0.386 1.3 0.6783 21,947 300
FDI net inflows 0.116 0.231 0.2 0.6654 29,419 978
Urban population 0.042 0.087 5.2 0.6622 29,174 1,013
Fuel exports 0.461 0.533 0.1 0.6608 28,233 898
Military personnel 0.000 0.007 3.3 0.6437 30,401 633
Employment in agriculture -0.049 0.369 2.8 0.6431 23,979 683
Globalization 0.003 0.079 0.7 0.6414 29,197 954
Metal exports 0.714 0.795 11.2 0.6401 28,240 936
TV sets 0.009 0.782 0.5 0.6393 29,737 989
continued on next page...
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Avg. Avg. Avg.
Variable Beta S.E. %Sign. CDF(0) Regres. Obs.
French speaking -0.486 0.903 1.2 0.6316 20,550 1,144
Life expectancy -0.153 0.579 0.0 0.6145 20,474 494
Population share 0-14 -0.158 0.262 0.5 0.5929 29,484 981
Literacy 0.012 0.144 2.6 0.5888 29,100 616
Land area 0.000 0.000 0.8 0.5879 30,407 962
Equity investment 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.5842 30,210 586
OPEC member 0.737 1.286 10.1 0.5755 15,115 1,290
Settler mortality (log) -0.105 0.924 1.6 0.5752 28,785 589
Oil exporter -1.466 1.346 10.7 0.5672 15,124 1,202
Portfolio investment 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.5585 30,497 902
Socialist 0.062 1.192 0.1 0.5580 16,248 1,051
European settlers 1900 0.006 0.026 0.4 0.5566 23,701 1,090
Service employment, male 0.013 0.153 0.9 0.5509 23,479 603
Population share 15-64 -0.169 0.350 0.7 0.5331 29,431 982
Africa -0.233 1.020 2.8 0.5083 22,400 1,038
Latin America 0.112 1.131 1.1 0.5027 23,691 1,059
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 for the explanation of the abbreviations used. The results are derived
using logistic regressions conditional on being autocratic the year before.
To test whether the results of the EBA itself are robust and in order to get a point
estimate of the magnitude for each variable we estimate “final” models including all
variables which fulfilled the CDF criterion. The results are presented in Tables 2.6
and 2.7. Our model predicts that the probability of a democratic transition taking
place is 2 percent if all our explanatory variables are assigned their mean value.6 Given
this low probability, it is quite remarkable that each additional prior transition increases
this chance by roughly 1%. While each percentage point of GDP growth reduces this
probability by roughly 0.1%.
The probability of remaining a democracy is (at the mean of our variables) 99.8
percent.7 This also explains why basically all marginal effects are insignificant, except for
GDP. Note, however, that in the estimation the number of past transitions is significant
at the 5% level.
6The unconditional transition probability in our sample is 2.1 percent.
7The unconditional survival probability in our sample is 98.2 percent.
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Table 2.6: Final models – transition from autocracy to democracy
Marginal Variable
Variable Coefficient Effect Mean
Number of past transitions 0.5542 0.0111 0.3921
(5.05)∗∗∗ (4.10)∗∗∗
OECD member 1.1230 0.0386 0.0307
(2.19)∗∗ (1.40)
Muslim share -1.1606 -0.0232 0.3247
(1.91)∗ (2.06)∗∗
Fuel exports -0.0066 -0.0001 20.3009
(0.86) (0.87)
GDP growth -0.0711 -0.0014 4.4324
(2.69)∗∗∗ (2.70)∗∗∗
Constant -3.2960
(13.28)∗∗∗
Observations 1,464
Pseudo R-squared 0.1204
Predicted Probability 0.0204
Notes: The table shows the logistic regressions including the variables which passed the CDF criterion.
The Marginal Effect is given in the respective column. The marginal effects were calculated at the
sample means of each variable, given in the respective column. The predicted probability gives the
probability predicted by the model for a transition from an autocracy to a democracy if all variables
are assigned their mean value.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute t-values are given in parentheses.
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Table 2.7: Final models – remaining a democracy
Marginal Variable
Variable Coefficient Effect Mean
GDP p.c., PPP (log) 1.8440 0.0033 8.5822
(3.78)∗∗∗ (1.61)∗
Military leader -0.8219 -0.0022 0.0414
(1.04) (0.65)
Neighboring democracies 1.3768 0.0025 0.6718
(1.17) (0.99)
Number of past transitions -0.7277 -0.0013 0.7029
(2.39)∗∗ (1.54)
Constant -9.8800
(3.07)∗∗∗
Observations 966
Pseudo R-squared 0.3060
Predicted probability 0.9982
Notes: The table shows the logistic regressions including the variables which passed the CDF criterion.
The Marginal Effect is given in the respective column. The marginal effects were calculated at the
sample means of each variable, given in the respective column. The predicted probability gives the
probability predicted by the model for a democracy to remain a democracy if all variables are assigned
their mean value.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute t-values are given in parentheses.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we summarize the vast literature on the determinants of democracy.
From our literature overview, we gather 55 variables that have been previously proposed
as determinants of democracy. Using dynamic logit regressions in combination with
extreme bounds analysis, we test the robustness of these factors as determinants of
both the emergence and survival of democracy, which we define, following Schumpeter
(1942) as the political system that determines leadership through contested elections.
We find a humbling result: only five variables robustly determine the emergence of
democracy while just four are reliable predictors of the survival of democracy. One cen-
tral variable proposed is GDP per capita. In contrast to Modernization Theory we find
that richer countries are not more likely to become democratic. They are, however, more
likely to remain democracies. Both findings are in line with Przeworski et al. (2000).
The other key finding is that previous political transitions destabilize the political sys-
tem and facilitate future changes. This finding might be able to explain the frequent
changes in the political landscape of Latin America. We find that previous transitions
on the one hand increase the likelihood of a move towards democratization but on the
other hand also reduce the survival probability. Learning cuts both ways: people learn
how to set up democracy, but also how to subvert it. We have an interesting finding
for economic growth, which makes dictatorships more likely to survive and lower the
chances for democracy to emerge. This stands in stark contrast to Modernization The-
ory. As for the survival of democracy, we have one additional finding. The “democratic
neighborhood,” that is, the number of other countries in the region that are democracies
increase the probability of a country’s democracy surviving. The additional variables
which help to explain democratic transitions are mainly country specific and beyond the
control of parties involved in the political process (Muslim share, OECD membership
and fuel export share). Furthermore, leaders with a military background reduce the
survival probability of a democracy.
Our standard of robustness is a strong one: Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) version of the
extreme bounds analysis. Other variables that we test may be significant in specific
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theoretical models, but they do not survive the rigors of our tests. This does not imply
that they are unimportant, but it does imply that the variables that do survive may
be the most important factors on which to base policy, since we can be most certain of
their effects.
So what are the policy conclusions we can draw from our analysis? International
organizations and Western countries often want to support democratization processes
around the world. Our results imply that giving aid or other forms of transfers in
order to increase a country’s wealth might not be a good idea prior to a democratic
transition. Only after a country democratizes from the inside such monetary help might
be beneficial for ensuring the survival of a newly founded democracy. Money may be
best spent targeting poor democracies. Transfers should be designed to help make the
payoffs for complying with the rules of democracy more lucrative than the payoffs from
subverting the regime, even in the face of poor economic conditions.
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Table 2.8: Summary of previous empirical studies on the determinants of democracy
Democracy
Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Crenshaw 1980 83 83 Bolen Democracy index, 1965 ∼ - OLS
(1995) Real GDP p.c., log + ++
Secondary school enrollment + +
British colony + +
Military personnel - ∼
Agricultural density, log + +
Demographic inheritance + ++
Agricultural inequality + -
Income inequality, 1970 - -
Semiperiphery dummy - +
Periphery dummy - -
Commodity concentration - -
Foreign capital penetration, log + -
Muller (1995) 1980 58 58 Bolen Democracy index, 1965 + ∼ OLS
Real GDP p.c., log + ++ reject non-linear
GDP growth + - relationship of
Income inequality - + GDP
Top 20% income share - ++
Communist dummy - +
British colony + ++
Protestant share - -
Muslim share - -
Years of continuous popular elections, log + -
continued on next page...
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Democracy
Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Barro (1999) 1960-1995 103 103 Freedom 5-year lag of dependent variable + ++ SUR
House 10-year lag of dependent variable + +
GDP, log + ++
Bollen Years of primary schooling + +
Gap between male and female primary - ++
Urban population - +
Population, log + ∼
Oil country dummy - ++
Life expectancy at birth, log + -
Infant mortality rate - -
Years of upper schooling - -
Income inequality - -
Share of middle class in income + -
Educational inequality - -
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization - +
Rule-of-law index + -
Former colony - -
British colony - -
French colony - -
Spanish colony + -
Portuguese colony + -
Dummy for other colony - -
Muslim share - -
Protestant share + -
Hindu share + -
Buddhist share + -
Miscellaneous eastern religion share - -
Jewish share + -
Nonreligion share - +
Other religion share - -
continued on next page...
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Democracy
Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Ross (2001) 1971-1997 113 2,183 Polity IV Oil (export value) - ++ pooled OLS
Minerals (export value) - ++
GDP + ++
Muslim share - ++
OECD dummy + ++
Food (export value) + +
Agriculture (export value) + -
Large states + +
Mideast - ++
Sub-Saharan Africa - ++
Arabian Peninsula - ++
Taxes + ++
Government consumption - ++
Government/GDP - ++
Military expenditure - -
Military personnel - +
Ethnic tensions - -
Industry employment, male + ++
Industry employment, female + ++
Services employment, male + ++
Services employment, female - ++
Secondary enrollment, male + -
Secondary enrollment, female + -
Tertiary enrollment - -
Telephone mainlines - ++
TV sets - -
Life expectancy + -
Urban population - -
continued on next page...
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Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Clague et al. 1960-1994 146 146 Clague Former British colony + ++ two-sided tobit
(2001) Island dummy + ∼ period averages
Freedom Muslim share - ++
House Labor force in agriculture - ∼
European ancestry population share + ++
Share of native speakers of Colonizer + +
Language penetration by British colonizer + +
Language penetration by democratic colonizer + +
Ethnic homogeneity + +
Autocratic minority rule dummy - +
Literacy rate + +
Life expectancy, 1962 log + ++
Pevehouse 1950-1992 76 1,552 Polity IV > 6, GDP p.c. + + Cox hazard
(2002a) 52 805 duration GDP p.c., change + ∼ model
IO score + - Weibull hazard
Gasiorowski, IO score, change + + model
duration Share of neighboring democracies + - (here all signs are
Previous democratic breakdown - - multiplied by -1)
Disputes in region + -
Dummy for political violence ∼ -
Dummy for presidential or mixed system ∼ -
Dummy for established democracies ∼ -
continued on next page...
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Democracy
Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Pevehouse 1950-1992 106 2,776 Polity IV > 6 GDP p.c. - - logit
(2002b) 86 2,299 GDP p.c., change ∼ -
Gasiorowski IO score + ++
IO score, change ∼ -
Number of democracies in region + +
Previously democratic + ++
Disputes in region - ∼
Dummy for political violence + ++
Dummy for military control - ++
Years of independence + -
Boix and 1950-1990 135 3,991 Przeworski GDP p.c. + ++ dynamic probit
Stokes (2003) 1850-1990 6,143 GDP growth + -
Turnover rate of chief executives - ++
Religious fragmentation - ++
Share Catholic + -
Share Protestant + -
Share Muslim - -
Former colony + -
Previous democratic breakdowns - ++
British colony + ++
World democracy + +
Education index + ∼
Percentage of family farms + -
Occupational diversification - -
continued on next page...
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Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Fidrmuc (2003) 1990-2000 25 250 Freedom Economic liberalization, t-1 - - pooled OLS
House Democracy, t-1 + ++ Granger causality
GDP growth + +
GNP per capita, log + +
War dummy - -
Distance from Brussels - ++
Central planning - +
Li and Reuveny 1970-1996 127 2,021 Polity IV Openness - ++ pooled OLS
(2003) Net inflows of FDI + + fixed effects
Freedom Net inflows of portfolio investment + + random effects
House Democracy, t-1 + ++
Democratic countries in region + +
Inflation (GDP deflator) + +
Real GDP p.c., log + ++
Real GDP growth + -
Time trend + ++
Time trend · FDI - +
Time trend · portfolio - +
Time trend · inflation - +
Time trend · GDP pc - ++
Memberships in international NGOs + ++
Semiperiphery · GDP pc ∼ ∼
Periphery · GDP pc - -
Europe + -
Middle East - +
Africa - +
Asia - -
continued on next page...
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Democracy
Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Nieswiadomy 1972-2001 136 136 Freedom Common law + ∼ Tobit
and Strazcich House Muslim law - ++ period averages
(2004) Resources - ++
Education + +
Economic freedom + +
Ethno linguistic diversity - -
GDP p.c. + -
Infant mortality rate + -
Life expectancy - -
Population + -
Urban population - -
OPEC - -
Acemoglu et 1960-2000 150 3,701 Freedom Democracy, t-1 + + pooled OLS
al. (2005) 1840-2000 27 662 House Real GDP p.c., log ∼ ∼ fixed effects
Population, log ∼ ∼ Anderson-Hsiao
Bollen Education ∼ ∼ Arellano-Bond
Polity IV Labor share of value added + - 2SLS
Trade-weighted world democracy - - annual, 5-year and
Age structure (0 to 15, 15 to 30, 30 to 45, 45 to
60, and 60 and above)
∼ ∼ 10-year intervals
Crisis dummy (growth rate drop exceeding 3%;
4%; 5%, respectively)
+ ++
continued on next page...
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Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Lo´pez-Co´rdova 1870-2000 ? 4,184 Polity IV, Openness + ++ OLS
and Meissner change Population + + 2SLS
(2005) Land area ∼ ∼
Landlocked ∼ ∼
No boarders - +
Same language ∼ +
Democracy, t-1 + ++
instruments Distance Equator + ++
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization + ++
Primary commodity exporter - ++
Petroleum exporter ∼ ∼
East Asia - ++
Eastern Europe/CIS states - ++
Middle East/North Africa - ++
South Asia - ++
Western Europe - +
Sub-Saharan Africa - ++
Latin America/Caribbean - +
continued on next page...
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Democracy
Author Period Cntr. Obs. Measure Explanatory Variables Effect Sign. Method
Gleditsch 1951-1998 ? 6,159 Polity IV > 6 GDP p.c., log + ++ dynamic probit
and Ward Neighboring democracies + ++
(2006) Civil war ∼ -
Years of peace ∼ ∼
GDP growth ∼ ∼
World democracy + ∼
Neighboring transition to democracy + ++
Years of democracy + ++
Years of autocracy - -
Notes: ‘Cntr.’ and ‘Obs.’ report the number of countries and observations, respectively. A ‘?’ identifies that the respective number is not given
in the study. ‘Effect’ yields the sign of the coefficient: ∼ indicates changing signs. ‘Sign.’ identifies the significance of each coefficient: ++
is significant at the 1% level, + significant at the 10% level, ∼ indicates changing significance level, i.e., sometimes significant sometimes not.
‘Polity IV’ stands for the democracy measure developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2000); ‘Bollen’ is taken from Bollen (1993), ‘Freedom House’
represents Freedom House (2006), ‘Gasiorowski’ refers to Gasiorowski (1996) and ‘Przeworski’ comes from Przeworski et al. (2000).
Chapter 3
Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
3.1 Introduction
After addressing the determinants of democracy we turn our focus to its economic
consequences. Is there a systematic relationship between economic and political lib-
eralization? Does the political regime of a country systematically affect how involved
that country is in international trade? The first question has received a lot of recent
attention in the economic literature with studies of the determinants of democracy (as
documented in the previous chapter) and economic freedom (Boockmann and Dreher,
2003; Bjørnskov, 2006; Dreher and Rupprecht, 2007) as well as studies of the relation-
ship between democracy and economic freedom (Sturm and de Haan, 2003; Giavazzi
and Tabellini, 2005).1 The second, more specific question, is, in contrast, much less
well researched and the purpose of this chapter is to provide some new answers to the
question.
This chapter is an adapted version of Aidt and Gassebner (2007).
1Recently convergence and contagion trends of the two variables have also been studied
(Nieswiadomy and Strazicich, 2004; Gassebner et al., 2007a). Furthermore, the influence of both
measures on macroeconomic variables is attracting great interest (e.g., de Haan and Siermann, 1996;
de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Sturm and de Haan, 2001; Bjørnskov, 2005).
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Existing knowledge about how political regimes may influence international trade
comes from the political science literature. Two seminal papers in this literature find
that democracy encourages trade. Mansfield et al. (2000) stress the importance of the
congruence between the political regime of pairs of trading countries. They show that
pairs of democratic countries trade more than pairs consisting of a democracy and an
autocracy.2 Milner and Kubota (2005) test whether democratization leads to trade
policy liberalizations in a sample of developing countries and show that democratic
political institutions are one of the main determinants of trade policy in these countries.
We add to this literature in two related ways. First, we argue that the theoretical
foundations of the previous studies (discussed in more detail in the next section) over-
look the importance of differences in political accountability and how these differences
induce societies to build more or less effective bureaucratic control mechanisms. The
lack of political accountability makes it possible for political leaders to extract rents
by imposing restrictions on international trade. Moreover, within a hierarchical gov-
ernment structure, the lack of effective control and monitoring mechanisms makes it
less likely that political leaders choose to build a bureaucratic structure that reduces
trade-distorting red tape and other unofficial trade barriers. Our theoretical contribu-
tion, therefore, predicts that autocracies – societies with weak political accountability
and control structures – trade less with the rest of the world than democracies – so-
cieties with strong political accountability and well-developed control structures – for
two reasons: democracy limits the scope for rent extraction via trade restrictions and
encourages institutional reforms that reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies.
Second, the existing empirical literature focuses on dyads of countries, and for this
reason it does not elude on how the political regime affects the trade performance of
particular countries. Do autocracies trade less than democracies? We answer in the
affirmative. By doing so we move the focus away from dyads of countries to individual
countries. Furthermore, we use a much larger data set, with a longer time horizon and
a deeper country coverage than previous studies. Finally, our empirical design allows
2Especially with their theoretical considerations and the inclusion of mixed and autocratic pairs
they enhance previous work by Morrow et al. (1998) who only include pairs of democracies in their
empirical analysis. Morrow et al. also find that democracies trade more with each other.
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us to demonstrate that regime differences in trade policy, while playing a role, cannot
fully account for the observed differences in trade flows. Both the observation that
autocracies trade less and the observation that they trade less conditional on trade
policy are consistent with our theoretical model.
Some authors have argued that international trade encourages democratization (e.g.,
Rigobon and Rodrik, 2004, Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meisner, 2005; O’Rourke and Taylor,
2007). This possibility obviously is a concern when trying to estimate the impact of
regime type on trade flows: countries that are not involved in international trade could
be autocracies for that reason. We attempt to deal with this issues partly by allowing for
unobserved country and time fixed effects in our empirical specification, partly by lagging
the empirical indicators used to capture institutional differences between countries and
partly by using instrumental variables.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model,
contrasts it to existing models and develops the two hypotheses that govern the empirical
investigation. Next, we develop our empirical strategy. In section 3.4, we present our
main result. After that, an extensive set of tests of robustness, including IV estimates,
is presented. In section 3.6, we provide some concluding remarks.
3.2 A Model of Political Regimes and Trade Flows
In this section, we present a model that illuminates two new channels through which
regime types affect trade flows. One channel is the accountability channel: it is harder
for citizens in autocratic countries to hold their rulers accountable because of deficient
political institutions and, as a consequence, rulers are relatively free to use trade taxes
to extract rents. The other channel is the bureaucracy channel: as we will show, the
monitoring technology is weak in autocratic societies. As a consequence it is not in the
interest of the ruler to build bureaucratic structures that weed out red tape and other
distortionary unofficial trade obstructions introduced by the customs services. Both of
these channels suggest that, ceteris paribus, autocracies trade less than democracies and
that this continues to be true conditional on similar official trade policies.
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Both of these channels are novel. The existing theoretical work on the link between
political regime types and trade flows or policy have either focused on the role of inter-
national agreements or on the effect of an extension of the voting franchise.3 The first
approach is taken by Mansfield et al. (2000). They study how the incentives to enter a
trade agreement differ between pairs of countries with different political regimes. The
difference between democracy and autocracy is that the executive in a democracy is
constrained by the fact that any trade agreement must be ratified by the legislature
while the executive in an autocracy is free of such constraints. With the additional
assumptions that the legislature is more protectionist than the executive and that trade
negotiations take place sequentially as suggested by Putnam (1988), it follows that pairs
of democracies agree on a more lenient trade policy than mixed pairs of autocracies and
democracies. The reason is that a trade war is worse for a pair of democracies. While
this prediction is robust to a range of different bargaining structures, the model is mute
on how much pairs of autocracies trade relative to pairs democracies.4 Our model shares
the notion that the critical difference between autocracies and democracies is the lack
of effective constraints on the executive in the former, but departs in three important
ways. Firstly, we focus on a single country and thus on unilateral trade policy. This al-
lows us to make predictions about how democracy/autocracy – the regime type – affects
trade flows and trade policy. Secondly, we focus explicitly on the incentives that the
threat of replacement provides for rulers and politicians in different types of political
regimes. Moreover, our model has the advantage that democracy and autocracy can be
conceptualized along a continuum controlled by three simple parameters. Thirdly, we
combine an explicit economic structure with a stylized political structure.
3There is, of course, also a large literature on the political economy of trade protection (e.g., Hillman,
1982; Mayer, 1984; Hillman, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Aidt, 1997). The aim of this literature
is to explain trade protection within the context of competitive political systems often embodied in some
form of democratic institutions rather than to explain differences between broad regimes types such as
autocracy and democracy.
4Dai (2002) criticizes the theoretical findings of Mansfield et al. (2000) and argues that their main
proposition depends on the preferences of the executives and that it is therefore not generally true that
democratic pairs trade more than mixed pairs. However, as pointed out by Mansfield et al. (2002)
this critique is only valid if the two-level game structure of international negotiations is replaced by a
structure in which the legislature of a democracy negotiates directly with its counterpart or with the
dictator if paired with an autocracy.
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The other approach is taken by Milner and Kubota (2005). In particular, they
maintain that the link between democratization and freer trade is an enlargement of the
constituency of government that yields a shift of the median voter/supporter. Under au-
tocracy the constituency of government is typically a small group of individuals who are
well-endowed with capital. Under democracy with universal suffrage, the median voter
is a worker with a low capital endowment. In countries with an advantage in the pro-
duction of labor-intensive goods (e.g., in developing countries), the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem implies that the median voter benefits from trade liberalization both as a con-
sumer and as a laborer. Our model is complementary to this. While we ignore the effect
that political transitions may have on the constituency of government and the role that
special interests may play both in an autocracy and in a democracy, we highlight that
the degree to which rulers/politicians can be held accountable for their actions and their
incentives to invest in “good” institutions varies systematically across regime types.
3.2.1 The Economy
We consider a small open economy that produces two goods and has an infinite time
horizon. Good 0 is a numeraire good produced with constant returns to scale with labor
as the only input and with an input-output coefficient of 1. Good 1 is produced by labor
and sector-specific capital. The profit function is π(p) where p is the domestic price of
the good; p∗ is the international price. Domestic supply is ∂π
∂p
= y(p). Labor can move
freely between sectors and consequently the wage rate in the private sector is wp = 1.
The economy has two types of private agents. A tiny fraction of the population owns
the sector-specific capital and they spend all profit income on good 0. A continuum of
workers with measure 1 earns wage income as each supplies one unit of labor inelastically
to the labor market. Workers consume both goods. Their utility function is x0 + u(x1).
Optimization subject to the budget constraint yields individual demands, x1 = d(p)
and x0 = w
p − pd(p), and the indirect utility v(p, wp). All utilities are discounted with
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the factor β ∈ (0, 1). Good 1 is traded internationally and net imports are m (.) =
d(p)− y (p).5
Trade flows are distorted by two types of policy interventions. Firstly, the ruler of
the country (the government) can levy a trade tax τ on good 1. If τ > 0 and good 1
is imported (exported) then τ is a tariff (export subsidy) and if τ < 0 and good 1 is
imported (exported) then τ is an import subsidy (export tax). To be concrete, we shall
refer to τ as a tariff and thus assume that the country imports good 1.6 Secondly, the
bureaucracy in charge of regulating international trade can introduce various unofficial
trade barriers, which we shall refer to as red tape. The per-unit cost of this is denoted
by θ and we can, therefore, define the effective trade distortion, τ + θ, as the difference
between the domestic and the foreign price, i.e., τ + θ = p− p∗. The revenues from the
trade tax are
r(τ, θ) = τm(τ, θ) (3.1)
where ∂m(τ,θ)
∂τ
< 0, i.e., an increase in τ pushes up the domestic price which reduces
domestic demand and increases domestic production. This means that r(τ, θ) is a Laffer
curve. Moreover, since ∂m(τ,θ)
∂θ
< 0, red tape reduces the tax revenues raised for each
value of τ .
3.2.2 Politics
The society is governed by a ruler. The ruler can either be a dictator or a democratically
elected politician. We assume that the objective of the ruler is to extract rents from the
5We note that individual and aggregate demand for good 1 is identical.
6It will be clear from the objective function of the ruler that imports or exports are never subsidized.
If good 1 is exported, the ruler will impose an export tax and if it is imported he will protect domestic
production with a tariff. From the point of view of workers either is equally bad, so it is without loss
of generality that we focus on tariffs.
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economy which are spend on the numeraire good and that his utility is uR = r(τ, θ).
7
The ruler must, however, employ a bureaucracy to run the customs services. The task
of the appointed bureaucrat is to collect tariffs, which are handed over to the ruler, but
in the process he might create red tape θ. We assume that the bureaucrat benefits from
red tape, e.g., because it allows him to collect bribes or because it gives the customs
service more power. Red tape can either be low (absent) or high, i.e., θ ∈
{
0, θ
}
where
θ > 0. The rent that the bureaucrat gets from introducing red tape is θB where B is
a positive constant. For simplicity, we assume that the bureaucrat only holds office for
one period and that he consumes good 0 only.8 Red tape is not in the interest of the
ruler as it reduces trade flows (and hence tariff revenues), so he might want to design
incentives for the bureaucrat to avoid red tape. We focus on two control instruments:
monitoring and efficiency wages.
While we take monitoring to be an exogenous feature of the institutional envi-
ronment, the public sector wage is endogenous. The monitoring technology discovers
malfeasance with probability 1− z in case of which the bureaucrat is immediately fired
and he loses his wage income from the public sector and the rent from red tape and
returns to the private sector where he receives wp starting from next period onwards.
With probability z, he is not discovered and he keeps the public sector wage in the cur-
rent period and any rent from creating red tape and returns to the private sector in the
subsequent period. We can write the expected utility of a bureaucrat who introduces
red tape in period t as
z
(
wt + θB
)
+
βwp
1− β
(3.2)
7We could extend the model to include a public good. In this case, the ruler can only keep the
difference between what is spend on public goods and total tax revenues. All our results are essentially
unaffected and we prefer, for simplicity, to stick to Leviathan assumption as in Brennan and Buchanan
(1980). More importantly, we do not want to assume that the intrinsic objectives of “rulers” in auto-
cracies and democracies are different; rather we want to argue that it is the quality of institutions that
forces democratically elected rulers to behave differently from dictators. There is ample evidence that
rulers in particular in societies with weak institutions can extract significant rents (see, e.g., Olken,
2006).
8This is not important for the results and it is straight forward to extend the model to allow
bureaucrats to hold office forever.
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and that of a bureaucrat who refrains from doing so as wt +
βwp
1−β
where w is the public
sector wage.9 The second control instrument is the public sector wage which is endoge-
nous and designed by the ruler and financed out of tariff revenues. As suggested by
Becker and Stigler (1974), the ruler may offer an efficiency wage that effectively ensures
that no red tape is introduced:
we =
z
1− z
θB. (3.3)
Faced with the public sector wage w, the optimal choice of the bureaucrat in office in
any period t can be summarized as follows:
θt (wt) =


0 if wt ≥ w
e
θ if wt < w
e
. (3.4)
In the absence of moderating incentives, rulers design a trade policy (τ) and a wage
structure for the bureaucracy (wt) to extract the maximum rent each period. To avoid
this, societies develop political institutions that moderate the behavior of rulers. These
institutions partly allow citizens to hold their rulers accountable and to replace the
incumbent if he extracts too much rent and partly improves the monitoring capacity
of the government (z). In a fully democratic society, elections serve the first purpose
(Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, chapter 3), but even in autocracies and
dictatorships, rulers may be constrained by the threat of a coup or a popular revolt
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Formally, at the beginning of each period, workers
announce a performance standard that the ruler has to satisfy to get “reappointed” at
the end of the period. Workers base their performance standard on the level of utility
they get from the policies implemented by the ruler and the bureaucrat. We denote
the performance standard announced at the beginning of period t by v̂t. The standard
requires the ruler to introduce a policy package (τt, wt) that yields at least the utility
level v̂t in order to be considered for reappointment. We assume that only workers have
political voice (set standards). This assumption is made for simplicity. We can think
9To ensure a positive supply of bureaucrats we assume that θB > 1.
3.2 A Model of Political Regimes and Trade Flows 47
of it as a situation in which the ruler needs to please the masses; an assumption that
makes sense in a democracy, but also in many cases in autocracies.10
In a well-functioning democracy, a ruler (politician) who complies with the standard
is guaranteed reappointment while a ruler (politician) who does not comply is certain
of dismissal. These promises are, however, not equally credible in all societies, and in
autocracies or dysfunctional democracies intimidation of the opposition, electoral fraud
etc. can significantly reduce the degree of accountability. We make a distinction between
two types of governance failures:
Definition 3.1. (p-failure) Workers can only promise to reappoint a ruler who satisfies
v̂t in period t with probability p ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 3.2. (q-failure) Workers can only promise to dismiss a ruler who does not
satisfy v̂t in period t with probability 1− q ∈ [0, 1].
A p-failure arises when workers cannot promise for sure to reward good behavior with
reappointment. This type of problem, typically, arises in situations with volatile voter
turnout or general apathy among the electorate, but otherwise strong democratic insti-
tutions. A q-failure arises when citizens cannot, in all cases, dismiss under-performing
rulers, and a society with q close to 1 can be interpreted as a dictatorship. Together with
the monitoring technology z, these failures capture exogenous variations in the quality
of institutions and, as we shall see, allow us to define the difference between autocracies
with weak institutions (low p, high q, high z) and democracies with strong institutions
(high p, low q, low z).
The interaction between rulers, bureaucrats and workers can be summarized as fol-
lows. At the beginning of each period, a new bureaucrat enters office and workers
announce a performance standard. Next, the ruler decides on the tariff and the public
wage for the period. After that the bureaucrat decides how much red tape to introduce
and the monitoring technology determines if he is fired prematurely. At the end of the
period, workers observe their utility levels, judge the performance of the ruler against
10The model could be extended to allow the owners of specific capital to lobby (offer bribes to) the
ruler. This could be done along the lines of Aidt and Dutta (2004), but a formal analysis would distract
from our current purposes.
48 3. Do Autocratic States Trade Less?
the utility standard and decide if they want to reappoint the incumbent ruler or not.
This together with random events, as captured by p and q, determines whether the
incumbent is, in fact, replaced by another ruler. After this the sequence of events is
repeated.
3.2.3 Analysis and Results
Given a sequence of standards {v̂t}
∞
t=0, the ruler faces the choice between complying
and hoping to stay in power (which allows him to collect rents in the future) or not
complying and collecting the maximum rent now.
If the ruler decides not to comply at time t (i.e., to deviate (D)), he sets
{
τDt , w
D
t
}
= argmax
τt,wt
r(τt, θ (wt))− E(wt). (3.5)
In doing so, he anticipates how the public wage affects the choices of the bureaucrat. It
is costly to provide wage incentives and the expected wage bill is
E(wt) =


zwt if wt < w
e
wt if wt ≥ w
e
. (3.6)
The bureaucrat acknowledges that he only has to pay the wage if the bureaucrat is not
discovered adding red tape. Clearly, either wDt = 0 or w
D
t = w
e is optimal. In the
former case, the optimal tariff is
τD1 = argmax
τt
r(τt, θ) (3.7)
and the rent is r
(
τD1, θ
)
for all t, and in the later case, it is
τD2 = argmax
τt
r(τt, 0)− w
e (3.8)
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and the rent is r(τD2, 0) − we for all t. In either case, the workers attempt to replace
the ruler at time t+ 1 but with probability q fail to do so. The ruler’s expected payoff
is
Vt(D) = max
{
r(τD1, θ), r(τD2, 0)− we
}
+ βqV ∗t+1, (3.9)
where V ∗t+1 is the continuation value of holding office at the beginning of period t + 1.
The optimal deviation policy depends on the quality of the monitoring institutions as
described by Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. (The Optimal Deviation Policy) Let
∆RD ≡
r(τD2, 0)− r(τD1, θ)
θB
> 0
Then
1. If z
1−z
≥ ∆RD, then
(
τD1, 0
)
is optimal.
2. If z
1−z
< ∆RD, then
(
τD2, we
)
is optimal.
Proof. The Lemma follows from a straight forward comparison of the net rents collected
by the ruler in each case using equation (3.3).
We note that the quality of monitoring (z) effectively determines if it is in the
interest of the ruler to maintain strong wage incentives for the bureaucrat or not. If
the monitoring technology is effective (z is low), it is cheap to pay efficiency wages and
optimal to weed out red tape even for a ruler that has decided to disregard the demands
of his citizens. If, on the other hand, the monitoring technology is ineffective (z is high),
then it is better for the ruler to accept red tape and focus on maximizing tariff revenues
subject to that.
If the ruler decides to comply (C) in period t, he selects the policy package
{
τCt , w
C
t
}
= argmax
τ,w
r(τt, θ(wt))− E(wt) (3.10)
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subject to v(τt, θt) ≥ v̂t. Again, the ruler either sets w
C
t = 0or w
C
t = w
e and we note
that
τC1(v̂t) = argmax
τt
r(τt, θ) (3.11)
subject to v(τt, θ) ≥ v̂t is optimal in the former case and that
τC2(v̂t) = argmax
τt
r(τt, 0)− w
e (3.12)
subject to v(τt, 0) ≥ v̂t is optimal in the later. Since v(τ, θ) is decreasing in τ , the
ruler must reduce the tariff below the respective rent maximizing levels to satisfy the
constraints. The expected payoff is
Vt(C) = max
{
r(τC1(v̂t), θ), r(τ
C2(v̂t), 0)− w
e
}
+ βpV ∗t+1. (3.13)
As shown by the next Lemma, the quality of the monitoring institutions also plays a
key role for the choice between the two possible compliance strategies.
Lemma 3.2. (Within Period Optimal Compliance). Suppose that
v̂t ≥ max
{
v
(
τD1, θ
)
, v(τD2, 0)
}
and let
∆RCt ≡
r
(
τC2 (v̂t) , 0
)
− r
(
τC1 (v̂t) , θ
)
θB
> 0.
Then
1. If z
1−z
≥ ∆RCt , then the optimal compliance policy is
(
τC1 (v̂t) , 0
)
.
2. If z
1−z
< ∆RCt , then the optimal compliance policy is
(
τC2 (v̂t) , w
e
)
.
Proof. The Lemma follows from a straight forward comparison of the net rents collected
by the ruler in each case using equation (3.3).
The sequence of performance standards is incentive compatible if and only if at all t
Vt(C) ≥ Vt(D). (3.14)
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Workers select the sequence of standards that yields the highest lifetime utility subject
to incentive compatibility. The structure of the model implies that the optimal choice
is stationary; that is, v̂t = v̂
∗ for all t where v̂∗ is defined by
max
{
r(τC1(v̂∗), θ), r(τC2(v̂∗), 0)− we
}
(3.15)
=
1− βp
1− βq
max
{
r(τD1, θ), r(τD2, 0)− we
}
.
Incentive compatibility requires that p > q; otherwise, institutions are so bad that no
ruler would ever comply with any standard other than the rent maximizing one. It
is also clear from equation (3.15) that workers’ welfare is increasing in the quality of
institutions, i.e., that ∂v̂
∗
∂p
> 0 and ∂v̂
∗
∂q
< 0.
We are interested in why the volume of international trade is different in autocracies
and democracies. To study this, we shall make a comparison between two extremes. At
one end of the spectrum, we have a society with well-functioning democratic institutions
and an effective monitoring technology: p = 1, q = 0and z = 0. At the other end, we
have a society with seriously dysfunctional institutions: p ≤ q and z = 1. We shall refer
to the former as a “democracy” and to the later as an “autocracy” acknowledging that
in the real world most societies fall somewhere in between these extremes. The following
Proposition states the main implications of the model.
Proposition 3.1. (Regime Type and the Volume of Trade).
1. The effective trade distortion is higher in autocracies than in democracies and as
a consequence, autocracies trade less with the rest of the world than democracies.
2. For given official trade policy ( τ), autocracies trade less with the rest of the world
than democracies because of differences in red tape and other unofficial trade dis-
tortions.
Proof. Consider an autocracy with p ≤ q and z = 1. Lemma 3.1 implies that the
optimal deviation entails wD = 0 and τD = τD1, while Lemma 3.2 implies that the
optimal compliance policy is wC = 0 and τC = τC1 for all t. However, since p ≤ q,
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equation (3.15) implies that incentive compatibility fails and so, the ruler implements
τ = τD1 = τC1(v
(
τD1, θ
)
) and w = 0 each period until he is replaced by a new ruler who
behaves likewise. Workers get v
(
τD1, θ
)
and the effective trade distortion is τD1 + θ.
Consider, next, a democracy with p = 1, q = 0 and z = 0. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 imply
that wD = wC = we and that τD = τD2 and τC = τC2 at all t. The effective trade
distortion is τC2. Let v∗∗ denote equilibrium utility of a worker. Equation (3.15) implies
that the best incentive compatible standard under democracy v∗∗ entails higher utility
than v
(
τD1, θ
)
. It follows that τD1 + θ > τ
C2(v∗∗) and thus, as stated in part 1 of
the Proposition, that autocracies trade less. Part 2 follows from the observation that
autocracies allow red tape while democracies do not.
The first part of the Proposition shows that autocracies trade less than democracies.
The source of this result is differences in the quality of institutions. These differences
affect trade flows through two channels. First, autocracies have weak political institu-
tions as captured by p and q. This allows autocratic rulers to extract more rents than
politicians in a democracy. The implication is higher trade taxes under autocratic rule
and consequently less imports (or exports). An improvement in accountability (better
institutions) reduces trade taxes and encourages more trade. Second, autocracies also
have weak monitoring institutions (as captured by z). As a consequence of this, auto-
cratic rulers have little incentive to weed out red tape and other distortionary unofficial
trade obstructions introduced by the bureaucrats in the customs services.11 In contrast,
in a democracy with a more effective monitoring system, it is cheap to pay efficiency
wages. It is optimal for rulers to enhance institutional quality of the bureaucracy and
this reduces red tape and encourages trade flows. The second part of the Proposition
shows that precisely because of differences in the incentives for rulers to pay efficiency
wages in the two types of societies, autocracies trade less than democracies for a given
official trade policy.
11This notion corresponds to the findings of Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007). Focusing
on the Ukraine, they find that although public sector employees receive approximately 30% lower wages
as compared to those in the private sector their level of consumer expenditures and asset holdings is
essentially identical. This indicates that bureaucrats receive “unofficial payments” of sizable amounts.
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3.3 Empirical Specification
We want to estimate the relationship between the political regime of a country and its
involvement in international trade thereby testing the two implications of our model
listed in Proposition 3.1. To this end, we employ a standard gravity model of trade for
a sample of up to 130 countries covering the years from 1962 to 2000. As the dependent
variable, we use real import of country i from country e in year t rather than bilateral
trade flows between pairs of countries.12 Through this choice, we avoid what Baldwin
(2006) calls the “silver-medal of gravity mistakes”; the problem that regressions with
average bilateral trade flows as the dependent variable are subject to a sizable upward
bias when trade is unbalanced.13 More specifically, our baseline specification is the
following panel model:
ln(real import)iet = β1regime it−1 + β2regimeet−1 + β3ln(gdpit) + (3.16)
β4ln(gdpet) + β5landlocked iet + β6ln(distance iet) +
λXiet + αi + γe + δt + εiet,
where (real import)iet is real imports of country i from country e in year t, regime it−1 and
regimeet−1 are lagged values of particular measures of regime type (democracy/autocracy)
of the importing and exporting country, respectively (to be discussed below), gdpit and
gdpet are real GDP, in US dollars, of the importing and exporting country, respectively,
landlocked iet is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if at least one trading partner is
land locked, distance iet is the distance between the most populated cities of the trading
pair and εiet is an error term with zero mean. The vector Xiet contains a number of
dummy variables that proxy the bilateral relationship between the trading partners. In
12Data on nominal import flows are taken from Feenstra (2000) and are converted into real import
flows using the US GDP deflator. This is possible because nominal world trade is measured in dollars.
Alternatively, we have also deflated nominal trade by each countries GDP deflator separately. Other
than reducing the sample size due to missing data this does not change our findings.
13This follows from the fact that the log of the average is not equal to the average of the logs if the
import and export flows are not identical in magnitude (Jensens’s inequality). For a formal proof, we
refer to Baldwin (2006, 18-19).
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particular, the following variables are included: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the two
trading partners share the same official language (common language), a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the trading partners have a common border (common border), a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the trading partners were ever in a colonial relationship (colonial
ties), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trading partners share a common colonizer
post 1945 (common colonizer), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the trading partners were
in a colonial relationships post 1945 (colony post 1945 ), and a dummy taking the value
of 1 if the trading partners are or were in the past the same nation (same country).
Our choice of gravity variables follows Rose (2004) and we have no interest in these
variables except as control variables.14,15 We list the sources and exact definitions of all
the variables used in our analysis in Table 3.1.
It is important to notice that our panel model allows us to estimate the effect of
regime type on trade flows separately for an importing and for an exporting country.
This allows us to test the theoretical implications of our model which would not be
possible within the pair wise set-up of Morrow et al. (1998), Mansfield et al. (2000) and
others.
Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable quantitative measures of regime type, we use
three different indicators as proxies. They capture different aspects of the institutional
environment and all have their own flaws and advantages. The first indicator is the Polity
IV index constructed by Gurr et al. (2003).16 The index is measured on a scale from -10
(autocracy) to 10 (democracy). In order to make the results obtained with this indicator
comparable to those obtained with the two other indicators that we use, we re-code the
variable such that higher values indicate that a society is more autocratic. The second
indicator is the average of two indicators called “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties”
14For further details on the gravity model, we refer to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
15However, we may note that they are all significant and have the correct sign.
16The Polity IV index or more accurately the “polity2” index summarizes different indicators of
political authority patterns to measure three key aspects of a country’s political system. The three
aspects are: i) competitiveness and openness in the process of executive recruitment; ii) constraints on
the chief executive and iii) competitiveness and regulation of political participation. A weighted sum
of the components is used to construct two summary variables, measuring democracy on a scale from
0 to 10 and autocracy from -10 to 0. The Polity IV index is the sum of these two sub-indexes.
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Table 3.1: Variables – definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
nimp nominal imports in dollars (for 1962-2000) Feenstra (2000)
(for 2001-2003) Comtrade (2006)
defl US GDP deflator (2000 = 1) IMF (2005)
log of real imports ln (nimp/defl) own calculations
Polity IV⋆ inverse of “polity2” indicator: 1 = most
democratic, 21 = most autocratic
Gurr et al. (2003)
Freedom House⋆ average of “political rights” and “civil liber-
ties” indicators: 1 = most democratic, 7 =
most autocratic
Freedom House
(2006)
Przeworski et al.⋆ dummy variable taking the value of 1 for au-
tocratic states
Alvarez et al. (1996);
Przeworski et
al. (2000); Cheibub
and Gandhi (2004)
log GDP⋆ ln (GDP) (constant 2000 US$) World Bank (2006)
landlocked dummy for at least one trading partner being
landlocked
CEPII (2006)
common language dummy for both trading partners sharing an
official language
CEPII (2006)
common border dummy for common border CEPII (2006)
colonial ties dummy for pairs ever in colonial relationship CEPII (2006)
common colonizer dummy for common colonizer post 1945 CEPII (2006)
colony post 1945 dummy for pairs in colonial relationship post
1945
CEPII (2006)
same country 1 if countries were or are the same country CEPII (2006)
log distance ln of simple distance (most populated cities,
km)
CEPII (2006)
restriction index⋆ sub-index economic restrictions of the KOF
Index of Globalization; combines data on hid-
den import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes
on international trade (in percent of current
revenue) and capital account restrictions
Dreher (2006a)
log GDP per capita⋆ ln (GDP/population) (constant 2000 US$) World Bank (2006)
log population ln (total population) World Bank (2006)
common currency dummy for pairs with a common currency Rose (2004)
generalized system
of preferences
dummy for pairs with a generalized system of
preferences (GSP)
Rose (2004)
regional trade dummy for pairs that are a member of the Rose (2004)
agreement same regional trade agreement
WTO membership⋆ dummy for WTO/GATT members WTO (2007)
⋆ for these variables i and e indicate the values of an importing and exporting country, respectively.
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constructed by Freedom House (2006). The resulting indicator runs from 1 to 7 with
higher values indicating that a society is more autocratic. The third indicator is the
regime type indicator constructed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000)
and updated until 2000 by Cheibub and Ghandi (2004). Democracy is essentially defined
as a political system in which incumbents can lose elections and are forced to comply
with the results of elections. More specifically, a country is classified as a democracy if
the executive and the legislature is filled through contested elections, where more than
one party has a chance of winning. The resulting dummy variable takes the value of 1
for autocracies and zero for democracies.
It is hard to say which of the indicators is the “best.” They have all drawn critique.
The Polity IV index has been criticized for the way values are assigned to its various
subcomponents. Freedom House sometimes draws critique because its indicators are
completely survey based. Przeworski’s regime type indicator uses the most clear-cut
definition of the three, but has the disadvantage of being a dummy variable without
“scales of gray.” Furthermore, the three indicators focus on slightly different aspects of
political institutions and can therefore perhaps best be viewed as complements rather
than substitute measures of democracy/autocracy. The Polity IV index is basically a
measure of political competition that ignores how widely extended the voting franchise
is and other aspects of popular participation in politics.17 The Freedom House index
focuses more on political rights and civil liberties than on de facto political competition
and participation. Przeworski et al. (2000) focus on a combination of political partici-
pation and contestability of political power. The complementarity of the three measures
is another good reason to use all three indicators in the analysis. Finally, as argued by
Milner and Kubota (2005), it takes time for changes in political institutions to affect
trade patterns and the effects of democratic transitions are likely to be long-lasting. For
this reason, we enter the three institutional indicators either with a one year lag or as the
average of the five preceding years. This also mitigates potential endogeneity problems
arising if international trade encourages the development of democratic institutions.
17See Aidt and Eterovic (2007) for a discussion of this.
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All regressions include fixed effects for the importing and exporting country (αi, γe)
as well as year fixed effects (δt). This is a variant of the approach adopted by Feenstra
(2004) who introduced the notion of country-specific effects as multilateral resistance
terms. The country effects control for unobserved country characteristics that are fixed
over time with the subtlety that we allow these unobservable effects to differ between
importers and exporters, even if the same country is involved in import and export. The
importance of correcting for these importer, exporter and time fixed effects is pointed
out by Baltagi et al. (2003) as well as Baldwin (2006) who calls the omission of these
effects the “gold-medal of gravity mistakes.”
The baseline model allows us to test the first implication of the model, i.e., that
autocratic countries trade less. The second implication of our model is that autocratic
countries trade less conditional on official trade policy. To test this, we need to extend
the baseline model with a proxy for trade policy. Given the many different forms that
trade restrictions can take and the well-known difficulties in measuring trade policy
(see, e.g., Milner and Kubota, 2005), we opt to include a multidimensional index. In
particular, we employ the restriction sub-index from the KOF Index of Globalization
(see Dreher, 2006a). This restriction index combines publicly available information on
non-tariff import barriers, mean tariff rates, other taxes on international trade, and
capital account restrictions. It ranges from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating fewer
restrictions.
3.4 Main Empirical Results
The results of the estimation of equation (3.16) are shown in Table 3.2. We may begin by
noting that all control variables have the correct sign and are highly significant with the
exception of the landlockedness dummy variable. Given the numerous existing gravity
studies, we shall refrain from interpreting the coefficients on these covariates.18
First and foremost, it is apparent that all three regime type indicators yield the same
result: autocracies trade significantly less. Generally, the coefficients for importing and
18See, e.g., Rose (2004) for interpretations.
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Table 3.2: Results OLS – dependent variable: ln(real imports)
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
autocracyi t−1 -0.018
∗∗∗ – -0.055∗∗∗ – -0.237∗∗∗ –
(17.56) (11.21) (16.33)
autocracye t−1 -0.012
∗∗∗ – -0.050∗∗∗ – -0.202∗∗∗ –
(12.03) (10.21) (14.17)
average autocracyi (t-1–t-5) – -0.023
∗∗∗ – -0.079∗∗∗ – -0.286∗∗∗
(18.53) (12.56) (16.09)
average autocracye (t-1–t-5) – -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.046∗∗∗ – -0.218∗∗∗
(11.07) (7.15) (12.48)
log GDPi 1.327
∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗ 1.272∗∗∗
(67.33) (58.22) (50.15) (39.72) (67.13) (57.07)
log GDPe 1.277
∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗
(66.76) (61.37) (50.53) (43.46) (66.71) (61.08)
landlocked -0.069∗∗ 0.031 -0.168∗∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.002
(2.04) (0.82) (4.72) (1.62) (2.97) (0.06)
common language 0.421∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(33.12) (29.49) (30.85) (26.00) (34.44) (30.32)
common border 0.468∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(17.96) (13.97) (12.84) (7.90) (16.56) (12.35)
colonial ties 0.596∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(18.32) (17.32) (18.00) (16.83) (20.23) (19.28)
common colonizer 0.636∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗
(31.37) (24.36) (25.20) (17.46) (33.15) (26.47)
colony post 1945 1.123∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗
(27.04) (25.52) (23.13) (22.14) (26.62) (24.83)
same country 0.917∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(25.32) (20.37) (17.43) (6.97) (24.75) (19.60)
log distance -1.021∗∗∗ -0.998∗∗∗ -1.096∗∗∗ -1.068∗∗∗ -1.041∗∗∗ -1.021∗∗∗
(164.59) (152.55) (165.70) (148.52) (170.99) (157.87)
Observations 188,163 140,393 154,975 106,446 195,507 144,585
Importers 126 122 133 128 133 128
Exporters 126 123 133 129 133 129
R-squared 0.7247 0.7421 0.7317 0.7541 0.7259 0.7424
Notes: average autocracy(t-1–t-5) represents the average of the five years prior to the observation; i and
e indicate importing and exporting country, respectively. Polity IV is the Variable “poliy2” from Gurr
et al. (2003), Freedom House is the average of the “civil liberties” and “political rights” indicators from
Freedom House (2006), higher numbers reflect higher levels of autocracy in both cases. Przeworski et
al. is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for autocratic states. It is taken from Alvarez et
al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub and Ghandi (2004).
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specific fixed effects all of which are significant
at the 1% level. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute t-values are given in
parentheses.
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exporting countries have roughly identical magnitudes. The results have one more factor
in common. The estimated coefficients on the regime type indicators are largest in the
specifications that use five years averages. This indicates that the effect of regime type
on trade is persistent; a finding that is in line with that of Milner and Kubota (2005).
Furthermore, it suggests that changes in the trade flows take place gradually after a
regime change.
Given its dichotomous nature, Przeworski’s regime type indicator is the easiest to
interpret. According to this indicator, democracies which turn into autocracies expe-
rience an average decrease of 23.7-28.6 percent imports and 20.2-21.8 percent exports,
ceteris paribus. Given that the fixed effects setup does not allow to capture the effect
of non-regime changing countries these figures are likely to underestimate the effect of
autocracies. A glance at the data supports this notion. Nigeria transformed from being
a democracy in 1982 to an autocracy in 1983. This shift yielded a decline of 37 percent
of its imports and 26 percent of its exports.
Both the Polity IV and the Freedom House index are measured on an ordinal scale.
On the 21 points scale of the Polity IV index, a one point move towards autocracy
reduces imports by 1.8-2.3 percent and exports by 1.2-1.4 percent, ceteris paribus. This
means that if a hypothetical country were to undergo a transition from full democracy
to complete autocracy, it would lose about 36 percent of its imports and about 24
percent of its exports. On the 1 to 7 scale of the Freedom House index, a hypothetical
country that went through the same transition would lose about a third of its imports
and about 30 percent of its exports. To give a more concrete example. Imagine that the
political regime of Switzerland was transformed into that of Myanmar in the year 2000.
The consequence would be a reduction of imports and exports of 29.6 percent and 20.4
percent according to the Polity IV index and 33 percent and 30 percent according to
Freedom House index, ceteris paribus. Although there are differences, it is striking how
similar the results obtained with the three different indicators are.
Milner and Kubota (2005) show in a sample of developing countries that democra-
cies have lower tariff rates than autocracies. Thus, the results reported in Table 3.2
– autocracies trade less – could simply be a result of this effect. To investigate this,
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we add the restriction index, introduced in the previous section, to the specification in
equation (3.16) and re-run the estimation. The results are shown in Table 3.3. Not
surprisingly, the restriction index has a positive impact on trade flows and is highly
significant for importing countries. This indicates that a country with few trade restric-
tions imports more. For exporting countries, the coefficients on the restriction index is
positive and significant in some specifications. This finding is in line with standard trade
and macroeconomic theory. This could, additionally, be interpreted as a “reward,” i.e.,
a country exports more if it lowers its import barriers.
More importantly, we see from Table 3.3 that the main finding from the baseline
model persists: autocracies trade less, even after controlling for differences in trade
policy. The coefficients on the Polity IV index and on Przeworski’s regime type indicator
are somewhat lower than those reported in Table 3.2, but they are still highly significant.
The coefficients on the Freedom House index remain virtually unchanged. This finding
shows that the tariff channel, as identified by Milner and Kubota (2005), is not the only
transmission mechanism. Our model points to two alternative transmission channels
(the accountability channel and the bureaucracy channel) and our findings are consistent
with the presence of both.
3.5 Robustness Analysis and IV Estimates
To see whether the results reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are sensitive to changes in
the specification and estimation method, we have conducted an extensive set of tests of
robustness. We use the specification including the restriction index as the baseline (as
reported in Table 3.3).
Firstly, we extend the model with additional control variables that have been pro-
posed by, e.g., Rose (2004) as determinants of international trade flows. These variables
are: log of GDP per capita, log of population, a dummy variable indicating a common
currency, a dummy variable indicating a generalized system of preferences, a dummy
variable taking on the value 1 if the trading partners are members in the same regional
trading agreement, a dummy indicating WTO/GATT membership, and, finally, all of
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Table 3.3: Results OLS with restriction index – dependent variable: ln(real imports)
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
autocracyi t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.054∗∗∗ – -0.161∗∗∗ –
(8.98) (8.54) (8.42)
autocracye t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.063∗∗∗ – -0.180∗∗∗ –
(9.13) (10.12) (9.59)
average autocracyi (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.082∗∗∗ – -0.215∗∗∗
(11.94) (10.29) (9.82)
average autocracye (t-1–t-5) – -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.055∗∗∗ – -0.179∗∗∗
(8.44) (6.91) (8.31)
restriction indexi 0.109
∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(10.71) (10.12) (11.86) (12.46) (11.61) (10.61)
restriction indexe 0.020
∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.015 -0.014 0.026∗∗ 0.020∗
(1.95) (2.16) (1.48) (1.28) (2.57) (1.95)
log GDPi 1.185
∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗
(41.95) (40.39) (36.92) (28.50) (41.34) (39.01)
log GDPe 1.316
∗∗∗ 1.339∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗
(47.50) (48.15) (41.98) (34.54) (46.99) (47.34)
landlocked -0.077 -0.053 -0.066 -0.063 -0.090∗ -0.096∗
(1.45) (0.97) (1.22) (1.13) (1.69) (1.76)
common language 0.395∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(22.99) (20.78) (22.02) (16.64) (22.78) (20.38)
common border 0.137∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(3.91) (3.08) (3.63) (4.05) (3.17) (2.32)
colonial ties 0.442∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(10.82) (10.74) (9.61) (8.99) (10.58) (10.53)
common colonizer 0.333∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(11.58) (10.75) (11.25) (8.39) (12.52) (11.41)
colony post 1945 0.900∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗
(12.68) (13.60) (12.09) (12.25) (12.47) (13.12)
same country 0.668∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(13.42) (10.53) (11.84) (4.63) (13.57) (10.49)
log distance -1.095∗∗∗ -1.050∗∗∗ -1.107∗∗∗ -1.063∗∗∗ -1.107∗∗∗ -1.063∗∗∗
(132.76) (126.43) (131.96) (120.51) (134.16) (127.26)
Observations 92,417 77,660 86,640 62,131 94,050 78,827
Importers 75 74 77 75 77 75
Exporters 75 75 77 76 77 76
R-squared 0.7247 0.7421 0.7369 0.7562 0.7337 0.7423
Notes: See notes to Table 3.2 for the explanation of the autocracy data. The trade restriction index is
taken from Dreher (2006a).
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specific fixed effects all of which are significant
at the 1% level. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute t-values are given in
parantheses.
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the above at the same time.19 The results of this are presented in Table 3.4. To save
space, we only display the coefficients on the regime type indicators (autoc) in the ta-
ble. We see that the results are not much affected by the inclusion of these additional
variables. The significance level remains unchanged and the changes in the size of the
coefficients are minuscule.
Secondly, to further elaborate on the robustness of the baseline results, we have
employed different estimation techniques that reduce the risk that outliers are driving
the results. Again, the specification of Table 3.3 is used as the starting point and
the results are presented in the top of Table 3.5 and we only report the results for
the regime type indicators. As a first step, we re-estimated the model using re-weighted
least squares (RLS). This robust regression technique weighs observations in an iterative
process.20 Starting with OLS, estimates are obtained through weighted least squares
where observations with relatively large residuals get smaller weights. We see that the
coefficients remain highly significant although their magnitudes are somewhat reduced.
Comparing the coefficients reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.5, we see that the coefficients
on the political regime indicator of importing countries are approximately halved, while
the coefficients for exporting countries change only minimally. Next, we used the least
absolute value estimator, which minimizes the sum of the absolute deviations from the
median.21 Although the magnitude of the coefficient on the regime type indicator of
importing countries is somewhat smaller, the results are comparable to those obtained
with the RLS estimator and the regime type effect remains highly significant.
Thirdly, we have altered the sample and tested whether this has consequences for the
results. First, we have extended the sample up to the year 2003 using trade data taken
from the United Nations Statistical Division Commodity Trade Data Base (Comtrade,
2006).22 Doing so does not change the results much. Second, Milner and Kubota
19Due to perfect collinearity it is not possible to include log(GDP), log(GDP per capita) and
log(population) in the same regression. The results in Table 3.4 show the outcome without popu-
lation. Of course, the results do not change if log(GDP per capita) is substituted by log(population).
20In this context we use the term “robust” as robustness with respect to the dependent variable.
21This is also known as mean absolute deviation (MAD) or L1 norm regression.
22Feenstra’s (2000) data is based on this data source. He used additional data to augment the raw
Comtrade data. Thus, for consistency reasons, we focus on his dataset for the main analysis.
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Table 3.4: Results OLS additional variables – dependent variable: ln(real imports)
Additional
Variable(s) Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
log GDP autoci t−1 -0.012
∗∗∗ – -0.055∗∗∗ – -0.159∗∗∗ –
per capita autoce t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.065∗∗∗ – -0.178∗∗∗ –
(i and e) autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.079∗∗∗ – -0.214∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.053∗∗∗ – -0.179∗∗∗
log population autoci t−1 -0.012
∗∗∗ – -0.055∗∗∗ – -0.159∗∗∗ –
(i and e) autoce t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.065∗∗∗ – -0.178∗∗∗ –
autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.079∗∗∗ – -0.214∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.053∗∗∗ – -0.179∗∗∗
common autoci t−1 -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.054∗∗∗ – -0.173∗∗∗ –
currency autoce t−1 -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.060∗∗∗ – -0.188∗∗∗ –
autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.020
∗∗∗ – -0.083∗∗∗ – -0.232∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.052∗∗∗ – -0.197∗∗∗
generalized autoci t−1 -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.053∗∗∗ – -0.173∗∗∗ –
system of autoce t−1 -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.060∗∗∗ – -0.189∗∗∗ –
preferences autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.020
∗∗∗ – -0.082∗∗∗ – -0.233∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.051∗∗∗ – -0.198∗∗∗
regional autoci t−1 -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.053∗∗∗ – -0.173∗∗∗ –
trade autoce t−1 -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.059∗∗∗ – -0.188∗∗∗ –
agreement autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.081∗∗∗ – -0.228∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.050∗∗∗ – -0.193∗∗∗
WTO autoci t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.054∗∗∗ – -0.160∗∗∗ –
membership autoce t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.063∗∗∗ – -0.179∗∗∗ –
(i and e) autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.082∗∗∗ – -0.215∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.054∗∗∗ – -0.178∗∗∗
all of the autoci t−1 -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.054∗∗∗ – -0.170∗∗∗ –
above a autoce t−1 -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.060∗∗∗ – -0.186∗∗∗ –
autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.077∗∗∗ – -0.226∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.014
∗∗∗ – -0.048∗∗∗ – -0.192∗∗∗
Notes: autoc t−1 represents the one year lagged autocracy score while autoc (t-1–t-5) is the average of
the five years prior to the observation; i and e stand for importing and exporting country, respectively;
(i and e) indicate separate variables for importing and exporting countries. See notes to Table 3.2 for
the explanation of the autocracy data. Only the results for the autocracy variables are shown in the
table. However, the base specification is taken from Table 3.3.
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specific fixed effects all of which are significant at
the 1% level. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level.
a Due to perfect collinearity population is excluded in the estimation.
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Table 3.5: Results tests of robustness – dependent variable: ln(real imports)
Technique /
Sample Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski et al.
reweighted autoci t−1 -0.008
∗∗∗ – -0.033∗∗∗ – -0.072∗∗∗ –
least squares autoce t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.059∗∗∗ – -0.161∗∗∗ –
(RLS) autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.012
∗∗∗ – -0.046∗∗∗ – -0.110∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.047∗∗∗ – -0.172∗∗∗
least absolute autoci t−1 -0.004
∗∗∗ – -0.033∗∗∗ – -0.043∗∗∗ –
value (LAV autoce t−1 -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.060∗∗∗ – -0.171∗∗∗ –
aka MAD) autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.009
∗∗∗ – -0.042∗∗∗ – -0.080∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.013
∗∗∗ – -0.055∗∗∗ – -0.176∗∗∗
extended autoci t−1 -0.012
∗∗∗ – -0.047∗∗∗ – -0.162∗∗∗ –
sample up to autoce t−1 -0.011
∗∗∗ – -0.061∗∗∗ – -0.181∗∗∗ –
2003 autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.019
∗∗∗ – -0.064∗∗∗ – -0.209∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.054∗∗∗ – -0.183∗∗∗
importer is autoci t−1 -0.005
∗∗∗ – -0.045∗∗∗ – -0.088∗∗∗ –
developing autoce t−1 -0.021
∗∗∗ – -0.083∗∗∗ – -0.289∗∗∗ –
autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.015
∗∗∗ – -0.072∗∗∗ – -0.166∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.020
∗∗∗ – -0.066∗∗∗ – -0.282∗∗∗
exporter is autoci t−1 -0.020
∗∗∗ – -0.051∗∗∗ – -0.247∗∗∗ –
developing autoce t−1 -0.002 – -0.038
∗∗∗ – -0.070∗∗∗ –
autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.024
∗∗∗ – -0.070∗∗∗ – -0.306∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.004
∗∗ – -0.030∗∗∗ – -0.075∗∗∗
Instrumental autoci t−1 -0.048
∗∗∗ – -0.265∗∗∗ – -0.757∗∗∗ –
Variables autoce t−1 -0.012 – -0.064 – -0.260 –
Sargan-Hansen 0.136 – 0.715 – 0.236 –
autoci (t-1–t-5) – -0.068
∗∗∗ – -0.367∗∗∗ – -1.004∗∗∗
autoce (t-1–t-5) – -0.010 – -0.116
∗∗ – -0.266
Sargan-Hansen – 0.041 – 0.106 – 0.126
Notes: See notes to Tables 3.2 and 3.4 for explanations on the autocracy data and the abbreviations
used. Only the results for the autocracy variables are shown in the table. However, the base specification
is taken from Table 3.3. In the Instrumental Variables regressions Sargan-Hansen reports the p-values
for the test of overidentification. We instrument the autocracy variables by average party age, amount
of checks and balances as well as voting in line with the G7 in the UN General assembly. The first
stage F-statistic, indicating the power of the instruments, easily passes the threshold of 10 as proposed
by Staiger and Stock (1997) in all specifications.
All regressions contain importer-, exporter- and time-specific fixed effects all of which are significant at
the 1% level.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level.
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(2005) focus on developing countries only and to allow for a more direct comparison,
we restricted the sample to include only developing countries, either as importers or as
exporters, respectively.23 We see that this reduces the magnitude of the estimated effect
of regime type on trade, but with the exception of one regression, the effect remains
significant. So, even within the group of developing countries, more autocratic countries
trade less conditional on trade policy.
Fourthly, although we use lags of the three regime type indicators, this might not
be enough to avoid all endogeneity problems and one concern about our results is that
they may be contaminated by feedback effects from trade to democracy. As argued by,
e.g., Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meisner (2005), involvement in international trade may foster
democracy. If so, the coefficients on the regime type indicators reported so far might be
biased. To deal with this issue, we re-estimate the model using instrumental variables
(IV) techniques. In choosing the instruments, we largely follow the existing literature.
Milner and Kubota (2005) use the average age of the parties in the political system as an
instrument for regime type.24 As a second instrument, we use an ordinal index of checks
and balances constructed by Keefer and Stasavage (2003). Finally, we use the percentage
of votes cast in line with the Group of 7 (G7) countries in the United Nations General
Assembly in the IV regressions. Dreher and Sturm (2006) show that more democratic
countries vote more in line with the G7. We contend that neither of these variables are
correlated with the error term in equation (3.16). We report a summary of the results
using all three instruments simultaneously in Table 3.5. In all specifications, the first
stage F-statistic, indicating the relevance of the instruments, easily passes the threshold
of 10 as proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). We also report the p-value of the Sargan-
Hansen test for over-identification and note that the test fails to reject at the 10 percent
level in all, but one, specification. All specifications basically show the same pattern,
namely that our previous results if anything under-estimated the effect of autocracy on
23We follow the WTO convention of coding the following countries as developed: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, USA. All other countries are coded as developing countries.
24The source for this data is Beck et al. (2001).
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imports. All coefficients on the regime type indicators for importing countries remain
significant at the one percent level and significantly increase their (absolute) size. In
contrast, the coefficients on the regime type indicators for exporting countries hardly
change their size but are no longer significant at conventional levels, with the exception
of the specification with the five year average of the Freedom House index. Based on
the IV estimates, we conclude that our previous results can be interpreted as a lower
bound of the effect of autocracy on imports, while our baseline results on the impact of
regime type on exports cannot be considered robust.
3.6 Conclusions
The question that motivates this chapter is a simple one: does the political regime of
a country systematically affect how involved the country is in international trade? Our
theoretical model provides two reasons why the answer to this question is likely to be
yes. In contrast to previous theoretical work, we argue that the root cause of regime
differences in trade flows is differences in political accountability. These differences af-
fect trade flows directly through the impact on trade taxes (which are more prevalent
in autocracies than in democracies), but they also work through a more subtle indirect
channel. Rulers of societies with weak accountability institutions have no incentive to
build up bureaucratic control structures that reduce red tape and other largely unob-
served trade distortions introduced by the customs service. As a consequence, the theory
suggests that not only do autocracies trade less but that they trade less conditional on
official trade policy.
We test the implications of the model within the framework of a standard gravity
model of international trade. This design allows us to distinguish between the effects of
the political regime of an importing and of an exporting country. We find that autoc-
racies trade significantly less than democracies, even after controlling for differences in
trade policy. The magnitude of the effect is substantial: according to our most conserva-
tive estimates, autocracies have between 4.3 percent and 23.3 percent less imports and
between 16.1 percent and 19.7 percent less exports, ceteris paribus. These results are
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robust to a battery of different estimation techniques including instrumental variables
estimates. The latter show that the relationship with respect to the exports cannot
be considered completely robust. Overall, our analysis shows that autocracies import
less (and maybe export less) and that this effect is not driven by differences in trade
policy. We propose that it can be explained by systematic differences in the degree of
political accountability. In other words, a democracy trades more with the rest of the
world because democratically elected politicians are less tempted to use trade taxes to
extract rents and because these politicians face the right incentives to build institutions
that weed out trade-distorting red tape in the customs service.
Chapter 4
Relief for the Environment? The
Importance of an Increasingly
Unimportant Industrial sector
4.1 Introduction
Among the more controversial views about economic growth and globalization is that
both will eventually benefit the environment (Arrow et al., 1995). In part, this view is
predicated on the nature of structural changes that are normally associated with trade
liberalization and economic development. More specifically, economic growth and the
shift of production away from polluting sectors and “dirty” technologies help to arrest
the deterioration in the environment. In addition, environmental quality is a normal
good and wealthier economies will invest more heavily in environmental improvements
and clean-up. According to this line of argument, another implication is that developing
countries inevitably focus first on manufacturing production and basic forms of produc-
tion, while tolerating some degradation in the quality of the environment. Compounding
This chapter is an adapted version of Gassebner et al. (2007b).
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this feature is the fact that the political pressures associated with industrialization are
also likely to be influential. The factor owners employed in manufacturing industries
lobby for less regulation of polluting activities. This accelerates the decay of the envi-
ronment.
With the inevitable economic decline of basic manufacturing activities in more ma-
ture economies, the declining significance of basic manufacturing in industrialized coun-
tries may very well create social pressures that reduce the demand for pollution abate-
ment. For instance, it has been argued that greater inequality of wealth and income
could be bad news for the environment (see Boyce, 1994 and Torras and Boyce, 1998).
Other studies show that the pattern of sectoral resource ownership matters and that
greater income inequality can yield either stricter or weaker environmental policies. For
example, McAusland (2003) shows that the owners of clean factors of production may be
less green voters because they may bear the burden of pollution taxes through adverse
terms of trade effects on the production of “clean goods.” However, in this chapter we
propose the argument that associated with falling industrial wages may be declining
political influence exercised by the factor owners in the polluting manufacturing indus-
tries of the economy. These latter features are likely to be manifested in the political
process, i.e., voting for change and a cleaner environment. In other words, structural
change may not only involve less reliance being placed on the use of polluting inputs
but also may have the signal virtue of altering the demand for environmental policies.
More liberalized trade and the rapid onset of skill-biased technological change have
been linked with the declining real incomes received by production workers in man-
ufacturing industries.1 Free trade raises national income which, in aggregate terms,
increases the value placed on the environment. Political economic considerations are
therefore likely to lead to a cleaner environment. Trade liberalization, which some au-
thors continue to associate with increasing income inequality in OECD countries, may
therefore be a “pro-environment” policy (see Grossman and Krueger, 1993 and Bommer
and Schulze, 1999, for instance).
1There are many excellent surveys of the enormous literature on international trade and labor market
outcomes, e.g., Johnson and Stafford (1999).
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Associated with this relatively sanguine view has been an empirical relationship
– in the form of an inverted U-shaped curve – between per capita income and various
measures of environmental degradation. The relationship, or the environmental Kuznets
curve, has been investigated for a wide variety of environmental indicators (e.g., Shafik,
1994; Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Dinda, 2005). For any
country, the implication is that economic growth will be associated with environmental
degradation until a “critical” level of per capita income is attained; from that point,
there will be an improvement in environmental conditions.
Of course, the turning points in the relationship between economic growth and en-
vironmental quality can be affected by the policies implemented by decision-makers
(Shafik, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Consequently, different political processes
do not all imply that societies will grow their way out of environmental problems or
that policies that promote economic growth can substitute for environmental policies.
This chapter is also indirectly related to the political economy literature that deals
with the effect of income inequality on redistributive policies and economic growth (e.g.,
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini; 1994; Saint Paul and Verdier, 1996).
A standard argument is that when income is more unequally distributed, the median
voter is likely to be relatively less endowed with capital, either physical or human, and
to thus favor a higher rate of capital taxation. A similar argument may well apply
to pollution abatement policies. For instance, if the median voter is a low income
worker who receives their livelihood from supplying labor to the basic manufacturing
or pollution-intensive sectors, then greater income inequality may be associated with
damage to the environment because it reduces the demand for pollution abatement.
However, while environmental policies are shaped by the importance of potentially
affected constituencies, the relative political importance of different constituencies is
likely to change over time. The idea of an interaction between industry decline and
endogenous policy formation is not a novel one, of course (e.g., Cassing and Hillman,
1985). However, the perspective explored here is that the declining economic signifi-
cance of polluting sectors in a developed economy is likely to be associated with greater
income inequality. In turn, this is likely to reduce the “political clout” of the factor own-
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ers in the polluting sectors. In particular, as the workers in these sectors of the economy
become less important economically, as reflected by their falling real incomes and falling
employment levels, they also become less influential politically.2 Consequently, a regula-
tor, motivated by political considerations, will increase the stringency of environmental
regulations. Of course, dynamic comparative advantages dictate that mature, developed
economies shift resources away from basic manufacturing activities.
In the next section, we set out a simple model and derive some results that high-
light the relationship between the sectoral decline of manufacturing and the stringency
of environmental policies. In section 4.3, we present different types of empirical evi-
dence to test the key findings of our model. First, we show that deindustrialization
may have a “silver lining” in terms of reducing emissions from basic manufacturing ac-
tivities. Specifically, we show that organic water pollution and industrial employment
levels are close complements. Secondly, we investigate whether labor market institu-
tions that have traditionally supported blue-collar interests and lowered the inequality
of earnings are associated with tougher environmental regulation of industry.3 We show
that a greater degree of union coordination of wage bargaining is strongly linked to
the observed pattern of environmental taxation of industry relative to households. We
conclude section 4.3 with a careful econometric study of panel data. In particular, we
use extreme bounds analysis to examine whether countries with greater income inequal-
ity and declining manufacturing employment have more stringent environment policies.
The last section concludes.
2This implies that “economic power” and political power are both unequally distributed (see Barro,
1999b, p.4).
3As unionization has declined, there is some evidence that wage inequality has increased (e.g.,
Freeman, 1998).
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4.2 The Model
Consider an economy with two types of jobs: “blue-collar” and “white-collar”, say. Fur-
ther, assume that pollution creates blue-collar jobs (e.g., manufacturing) only.4 All other
jobs are white-collar (e.g., services, high-tech). Pollution aﬄicts all workers, however.
A policy-maker must reconcile the conflict between blue-collar jobs and environmental
quality, while also seeking the support of both groups of workers.
To make matters transparent, assume that the economy has a unit mass of each
of two types of worker - blue-collar workers, indexed by b, and white-collar workers,
indexed by w. For expositional purposes, we assume that white-collar workers are always
employed. Blue-collar workers can be in one of two states at time t, employment (e) or
unemployment (u). Workers receive income yi,et if they work, i = b, w. If unemployed,
blue-collar workers receive income yb,ut . We assume that the {y
i,j
t } are deterministic
processes beyond the decision-maker’s control.5 If worker i supplies one unit of labor
inelastically each period, yi,et can be interpreted as the wage rate in period t for worker
i.
At time t, manufacturing generates a residual called pollution, st. Pollution and
blue-collar labor are complementary inputs (see Cropper and Oates, 1992). If the policy-
maker wants industry to create more blue-collar jobs, he must allow greater production
- and pollution. The demand for blue-collar workers given by lbt = f(y
b,e
t , st), with
∂f(yb,et , st)
∂yb,et
= fyt < 0,
∂f(yb,et , st)
∂st
= fst > 0 and
∂2f(yb,et , st)
∂s2t
= fstst < 0.
The pollution stock, pt, decays at rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. The transition equation is
pt+1 = (1− δ)pt + st.
4In many developed countries, the combination of advanced pollution abatement technologies, as
well as the toxic waste generated from office-situated photocopiers, suggests that it may not be entirely
appropriate to classify blue-collar work as polluting and white-collar work as not.
5Apart from adding some largely irrelevant parameters to the model, allowing a dependence of
income on emission flows adds very little.
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Equating δ to 1 gives the classic case of a pollutant that dissipates immediately; δ = 0
is the case for a pollutant that never dissipates. The utility for worker i is given by the
concave function U(yit, pt), for i = b, w. That is, all workers suffer from pt.
In traditional political economy models it is assumed that the policy-maker maxi-
mizes a weighted average of the welfare of constituents over his career. The policy-maker
might be a politician who considers voter welfare to win elections, or he might be a reg-
ulator, who considers constituent welfare to win promotions. In the current context,
the political weights that a policy-maker assigns to the welfare of blue- and white-collar
workers may reflect the relative political influence of the two types of workers. Different
weights may be attributed to interest groups according to the degree of organization or
unionization or may simply vary with size of membership, for instance.
The common agency model developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and ap-
plied by Grossman and Helpman (1994), provides microeconomic foundations for the
political weights that are assigned to each interest group in a society. Grossman and
Helpman show that if policy-makers, when choosing a policy (s, say) care about interest
groups’ welfare (V j(s)) on one hand and about campaign contributions on the other
hand, then they actually end up maximizing a weighted sum of the interest groups’
objective functions. That is, the policy-maker will choose a policy s to maximize
V g(s) =
∑
j∈I
(Ij + αj)V j(s), (4.1)
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where V g(s) denotes the policy-maker’s welfare function, I is the set of all interest
groups, the indicator function, Ij, equals 1 if the interest group is engaged in lobbying
activities; Ij = 0 otherwise.6
Grossman and Helpman concentrate on studying the distortionary effects of lobbying
and assume that each group is originally given the same weight αj = α, j ∈ I. From
equation (4.1), it is clear that, “despite” the presence of lobbying, the outcome will
be equal to the efficient solution selected by the utilitarian social planner that would
assign equal weights to everybody. The political system creates inefficiencies when some
groups in the economy do not lobby. Naturally, the policy-maker more heavily weights
the policy preferences of the interest groups that do lobby (see Potters and Sloof, 1996
and Aidt, 1998). In the spirit of Grossman and Helpman, we analyze cases in which both
or either of the blue- and white-collar workers may organize lobbies to help attain their
preferred environmental policy settings, perhaps, via a trade union and an environmental
lobby, respectively.
The welfare of all workers is assumed to be adversely affected by greater pollution-
intensive production. However, blue-collar workers also benefit from higher pollution.
While white-collar workers always prefer smaller production and less pollution; the
interests and the lobbying stance of blue-collar workers depends on the elasticity of
employment with respect to pollution emissions as well as the reservation utility if they
6If policy-makers derive utility from a weighted sum of campaign contributions and aggregate social
welfare, i.e., V G(s) ≡
∑
i=W,E,K
[αV i(α) + IiCi(s)], by applying Lemma 2 in Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that they actually end up maximizing a weighted sum
of the interest groups’ objective functions, i.e., equation 4.1). The application of the common agency
framework by Grossman and Helpman to model the political decision-making process is not without its
limitations. As a practical matter, political contributions by organized lobby groups are illegal in some
countries. From a theoretical viewpoint there is a two-sided moral hazard problem associated with
either politicians reneging on their policy promises after contributions are received or lobbies reneging
on promised contributions once preferred policies are locked in place. However, note that the objective
described by equation (4.1) is quite general and could be alternatively motivated by a linear, additive
version of a political-support function (Hillman, 1982).
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were to be unemployed. Consequently, the relative position of the two interest groups
is generally antithetical.7
Returning to the problem at hand, the decision-maker’s problem is
max
st
∞∑
t=0
(1 + ρ)−t
(
(Ibt + α)W
b
t + (I
w
t + α)W
w
t
)
(4.2)
subject to pt+1 = (1− δ)pt+ st, p0 given, where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference and
W it = l
i
tU(y
i,e
t , pt) + (1− l
i
t)U(y
i,u
t , pt), for i = b, w.
8
Letting pt be the state and st be the control, Bellman’s equation is
Vt(pt) = max
{
θbtW
b
t + θ
w
t W
w
t + βVt+1(pt+1)
}
, (4.3)
where β = (1 + ρ)−1 and θi ∈ {α, (1 + α)}, i = b, w.
Standard solution techniques yield the Euler equation (see Appendix for details),
θbfst∆t+β
(
θbt l
b
t+1U
b,e
pt+1
+ θbt (1− l
b
t+1)U
b,u
pt+1
+ θwt U
w
pt+1
)
− (1−δ)βθbtfst+1∆t+1+βεt+1 = 0,
(4.4)
where ∆t = U(y
b,e
t , pt)− U(y
b,u
t , pt).
In general, it is difficult to find closed-form solutions for the optimal st (or pt+1)
sequence. However, a simple perfect foresight example does illustrate some of the fun-
damental driving forces. For example, consider U(yit, pt) = y
i
t − γpt, γ > 0, i = b, w
and f(yb,et , st) = ln(1+ st)−κ ln y
b,e
t , κ > 0. By appropriate substitutions into equation
(4.4) and solving the difference equation, we obtain
st =
(1− (1− δ)β)xt
βγ(1 + ψ)
− 1, (4.5)
7More specifically, since yw is deterministic and for a threshold p¯w ≥ p0, then white-collar workers
will always lobby when the stock of pollution reaches this threshold value. On the other hand, blue-
collar workers lobby for laxer industry regulation until the marginal effect of higher pollution on the
probability of being employed falls below the marginal disutility of greater pollution emissions.
8By the law of large numbers lbt
(
(1−lbt )
)
can be interpreted as the fraction of employed (unemployed)
blue-collar workers. Recall that white-collar workers are always employed, i.e., lwt = 1.
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where xt = y
b,e
t − y
b,u
t and ψ =
θw
θb
.
To highlight the effects of changing real wages for blue-collar employees we suppose
that xt = ωg
−t, where g > (<) 1 if wages are shrinking (growing) exponentially.9 From
equation (4.5), it follows that
st =
(ρ+ δ)ω
γ(1 + ψ)gt
− 1. (4.6)
The comparative dynamic effects are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that blue-collar income is given by xt = ωg
−t, then the
stringency of environmental regulations falls in
(a) blue-collar income, ω;
(b) the policy-maker’s discount rate, ρ;
(c) the pollution decay rate, δ.
Environmental regulations are stricter
(d) the higher is the rate of diminution of blue-collar income, g;
(e) the higher is the marginal disutility of pollution, γ;
(f) when blue-collar workers do not lobby the policy-maker.
Proof. Differentiating equation (4.6) yields parts (a) through (e). As for part (f), note
that if only blue-collar workers lobby, then ψb = α
1+α
, if only white-collar workers lobby,
then ψw = 1+α
α
, and if both groups lobby, then ψb,w = 1. Clearly, ψb < ψb,w < ψw.
Finally, note that environmental quality improves in ψ.
There are some transparent implications. For example, if the policy-maker discounts
the future more heavily, then this is associated with deteriorating environmental quality.
Congleton (1992) shows that autocratic countries are inclined to select less stringent
9Alternatively, g may represent a direct measure of wage inequality between white- and blue-collar
workers. For example, define yw,et
/
yb,et = gt and y
b,u
t = 0.
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environmental regulations. He argues that dictators tend to have shorter time horizons
(i.e., higher ρ) and are less likely to adopt pro-environment policies, since the benefits
of doing so are likely to accrue only after they have left office, whereas the costs are
incurred earlier.10 A higher pollution decay rate, δ, also increases pollution. This
somewhat counter-intuitive result occurs because worker utility depends on pt, and not
on pt+1, so that the policy-maker is likely to take a less conservative attitude with
a pollutant that dissipates immediately, as opposed to the case for a pollutant that
never dissipates. Consistent with this finding is that policy-makers are more likely to
be “policy-active” for the types of pollutants with short-term and local impacts (see
Emerson and Pendleton, 2004).
Higher income for workers in pollution-producing industries (ω) is associated with
an increasing amount of economic importance attached to the polluting sector of the
economy. However, if this economic “weight” falls, then because environmental qual-
ity is a normal good, the stringency of environmental regulations rises over time and
consequently, so too does the quality of the environment. Strictly speaking, it is not
just the continued erosion of the earnings of blue-collar workers that beneficially im-
pacts pollution emissions. More generally, it is the falling relative earnings of working
in the polluting sector. For example, if the income while unemployed increases more
rapidly than the income while employed in the polluting sector, then the same benefit
to the environment results. Thus, some authors have argued that more generous un-
employment benefits and changes to cash transfer and income tax systems have arisen
to ensure worker acquiescence to potentially disruptive microeconomic reforms, such as
trade liberalization (e.g., Rodrik, 1998). Hence, while the earned income distribution
may have widened in many OECD countries, the same is not true for the post-tax and
post-government transfer distribution of income (see, e.g., Smeeding and Gottschalk,
1995).
Recall that when each interest group receives an equal political weight that this is
equivalent to the utilitarian social planner’s problem. However, if a lower political weight
10For reasons other than the expected shorter duration of dictatorships, Olson (1993) argues that
dictators wish to maximize tax revenues and thus oppose any policies that would reduce revenue, e.g.,
those that result from increased pollution abatement expenditures.
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is attached to blue-collar worker interests (ψ), then less importance is attached to the
polluting sectors of the economy. As noted above, the increased likelihood of free-riding
in larger political constituencies poses problems for a straightforward interpretation of
the political weights attached to interest groups by policy-makers. In democratic coun-
tries, government officials may favor groups with more members. Larger groups are also
likely to have greater electoral resources. However, groups with more members tend
to be prone to free-riding problems. In addition, larger groups are likely to be costlier
to organize, more difficult to develop a coherent and consistent platform for, and to
involve greater difficulties in ensuring the political participation of all members. Pot-
ters and Sloof (1996) provide a fairly comprehensive survey of the empirical effects of
group size on political outcomes. Overall, they conclude that free-riding is, in fact, a
serious problem for larger, unorganized groups. On the other hand, larger, organized
groups, such as trade unions, for example, wield greater influence. In deindustrializing
economies, the reduction in blue-collar power has in part been manifested by the declin-
ing influence of trade unionism (see Freeman, 1993). Clearly, deunionization is likely
to reinforce the declining political significance attached to the blue-collar interests in
relaxing environmental standards.11
4.3 Empirical Implications and Evidence
In this section we present evidence to examine the predictions of the model. More infor-
mally, in the next two sub-sections we present some simple tabulations and correlations.
First, we show that industrial employment and polluting activity go hand-in-hand. Sec-
ondly, we show that more unionized economies, which also tend to have more equitable
earnings distributions, favor the imposition of eco-taxes on consumers rather than on
industry. Finally, and more importantly, we present a formal econometric analysis using
panel data to investigate the determinants of the stringency of environmental policy.
11Fredriksson and Gaston (1999) show that the stance taken by the trade union movement on the
environmental policies is far from unambiguous. Among other things, union “environmentalism” may
depend on the risk of unemployment for their members as well as the presence of unemployed, non-
unionized “outsiders.”
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4.3.1 Deindustrialization and the Environment
A key feature of the model is that deindustrialization is associated with a cleaner environ-
ment. This occurs for two reasons – an economic one and a political one. The economic
reason involves the trade-off between a cleaner environment and the production of ba-
sic manufacturing goods. In turn, higher employment in this sector is associated with
greater pollution emissions.
Political pressures also imply a positive correlation between manufacturing employ-
ment levels and pollution emissions. For example, if underlying economic growth and
dynamic comparative advantages reduce production and employment in basic manufac-
turing activities, then the remaining workers in these sectors are likely to receive smaller
consideration in the political process. Consequently, policy-makers weigh more heavily
the preferences of workers (and voters) involved in the production of “cleaner” goods.
Doing so, of course, simply reinforces the decline in basic manufacturing industry.
To provide a visual perspective of the relationship between industrial employment
and pollution emissions, we present plots for organic water pollutants and industrial
employment for seven countries in Figure 4.1. The data are from a study of industrial
emissions for a limited number of countries by Hettige et al. (1998). Data on water
pollution are more readily available than other emissions data because most industrial
pollution control programs start by regulating organic water emissions. Such data are
also fairly reliable because sampling techniques for measuring water pollution are more
widely understood and much less expensive than those for air pollution. The emissions
estimates represent biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) in kilograms per day for each
country and year.12 The employment data are from the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO). The data series for each country are for 1975
12Emissions of organic pollutants from industrial activities are a major source of water quality degra-
dation. The Hettige et al. (1998) data are based on measurements of plant-level water pollution in a
number of countries. The focus is on organic water pollution as indicated by the presence of organic
matter, metals, minerals, sediment, bacteria and toxic chemicals. The pollution is measured by bio-
chemical oxygen demand, BOD, because it provides the most plentiful and reliable source of comparable
cross-country emissions data. BOD measures the strength of an organic waste in terms of the amount
of oxygen consumed in breaking it down. A sewage overload in natural waters exhausts the water’s
dissolved oxygen content. Wastewater treatment, by contrast, reduces BOD. (The previous discussion
is drawn from World Bank (1999, p.143).)
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to 1992 (or 1993). For ease of comparison, the emissions and employment data were
converted to indices (with 1975 as the base year).
A couple of observations are immediate. First, changes in industrial employment
and water pollution are strongly complementary.13 For instance, Canada suffered very
steep reductions in its manufacturing employment in the late 1980s and early 1990s due
to an unexpectedly severe recession and to the, somewhat more debatable, effects of
the passage of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (see Gaston and Trefler, 1997).
In non-OECD countries in which manufacturing employment has grown rapidly (e.g.,
Singapore) there has been a corresponding increase in pollution emissions.14
In those countries that have experienced the most marked deindustrialization (see
Baldwin and Martin, 1999), e.g., the United Kingdom, pollution emissions have steadily
fallen as employment in manufacturing industry has declined over the entire time pe-
riod. In the relatively few developed countries that have not deindustrialized as rapidly,
emissions have remained relatively unchanged.15
4.3.2 Unions and the Environment
Next, we examine a subsidiary implication of the model developed in section 2. Specifi-
cally, as the political institutions that have traditionally supported blue-collar interests
have declined in importance, associated environmental regulations have toughened.
Portney (1982) argues that increasing unemployment pressures policy-makers to ease
environmental standards.16 By implication, political pressure brought to bear on envi-
13Obviously, one cannot imply causation from this graphical analysis. However, as Gassebner et
al. (2006) show, industrial employment is indeed a determinant of water pollution.
14In the case of Ireland, the growing disparity between the two indices may reflect the rapid increase
in the service sector industries associated with Ireland’s “green tiger.” We are grateful to an anonymous
referee for this observation.
15Baldwin and Martin (1999) note that the “first wave” of globalization (pre-WW1) which gen-
erated rapid economic development for many countries was characterized by rapid industrialization.
In contrast, the “second wave” of globalization (since 1960), which generated rapid income growth for
many developed countries, has been characterized by a process of deindustrialization and the associated
steady decline in industrial employment.
16In reference to the stance taken by European labor unions on environmental regulation, Klepper
(1992, p.253) notes that the primary objective of securing or increasing employment was thought to be
threatened by environmental policies.
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Figure 4.1: Water pollution and industrial employment
Australia
70
80
90
100
110
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Ye ar
Organic water pollutant emissions index
Industrial employment index
Canada
90
100
110
120
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Y ear
 
Netherlands
60
70
80
90
100
110
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Y ear
Singapore
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Y ear
 
United Kingdom
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Y ear
United States
90
100
110
120
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Y ear
 
 
Ireland
80
90
100
110
120
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Y ear
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Hettige et al. (1998).
4.3 Empirical Implications and Evidence 83
ronmental policy-makers is greater when industrial employment levels fall. Fredriksson
and Gaston (1999) have noted that unions lobbying on behalf of unemployed members
may encourage policy-makers to respond favorably to calls for easing environmental re-
strictions. Yandle (1983) found that state expenditures on environmental regulation in
the United States were negatively related to the number of workers in polluting indus-
tries and positively related to the percentage of the manufacturing industry workforce
that was unionized. He interpreted the former relationship as evidence that policy-
makers operate according to an environmental quality versus jobs trade-off and the
latter relationship as evidence of union rent-seeking.17
Overall, one expects that the decline of unionization in many countries has helped
the passage of more stringent environmental regulations that affect industry. On the sur-
face, the evidence on this point is somewhat mixed. According to Tobey’s (1990) indices
of environmental stringency, two of the three countries with the strictest environmental
standards (the United States and Japan) have among the lowest rates of union mem-
bership in the world (as well as the lowest percentage of workers covered by collective
bargaining agreements). However, the third, Sweden, has among the highest rates of
unionization in the world. Fredriksson and Gaston (1999) explain this phenomenon by
noting that the ambiguous stance of the trade union movement on environmental poli-
cies depends on the exposure to unemployment of their own members. It needs to be
emphasized that it is the actual level of industrial employment, rather than the rates of
unionization of a presumably smaller pool of manufacturing workers in deindustrializing
economies, that may be of greater significance for policy-makers.
In this chapter, special interest groups, representing blue-collar and white-collar
interests, help to determine the stringency of environmental policy. In most countries,
trade unions are the most visible advocates of blue-collar interests.18 If blue-collar
17Endersby and Munger (1992) found that union contributions were given disproportionately to
members of Congress who were members of committees with legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over
activities that would affect labor.
18Of significance, for the purpose of this chapter at least, is that countries with encompassing labor
market institutions (i.e., large unionized sectors with centralized bargaining) are characterized by lower
wage inequality (see e.g., Rowthorn, 1992; Freeman, 1993; OECD, 1997).
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Table 4.1: Total taxes as percent of end-user price for automotive fuels, 1994
Country Household Use Industrial Use Ratio Union co-
(1) (2) (2)÷(1) ordination index
Denmark 68.0 41.5 0.61 3
Sweden 76.5 48.3 0.63 3
Norway 67.3 46.0 0.68 3
Austria 63.9 49.1 0.77 3
Belgium 74.2 57.3 0.77 2
Netherlands 75.9 59.7 0.79 2
France 80.8 65.1 0.81 2
Portugal 73.5 59.4 0.81 2
Germany 76.9 62.5 0.81 2
Spain 68.6 56.9 0.83 2
Canada 50.0 41.6 0.83 1
Italy 76.1 65.1 0.86 2
U.K. 73.5 63.6 0.87 1
Switzerland 71.3 68.9 0.97 1
U.S.A. 34.4 39.6 1.15 1
Sources: Columns (1) and (2): OECD (1995), Table 2, p.48. Last column: Layard et al. (1994), Table
6, p.78. values represent: 3 = High (National coordination); 2 = Intermediate; 1 = Low (firm-level or
uncoordinated).
workers perceive a trade-off between environmental regulations and jobs, unions are
likely to oppose policies that threaten manufacturing employment.
Many OECD countries have recently introduced, or are considering implementing,
fiscal instruments or “eco-taxes” for environmental management. Consider Table 4.1,
which illustrates a specific example of an “eco-tax.” The data in columns (1) and (2)
contain data on tax rates for household-use and industrial-use fuel for a number of
OECD countries. A number of features are apparent. For example, the household use
tax rate is highest in France and the industrial use tax rate is highest in Switzerland
and both tax rates are lowest for the United States. The differences in tax rates across
countries reflect a number of influences, including such disparate factors as the political
importance of community environmental concerns as well as fiscal considerations.
Of more interest is the difference between the rates of taxation for industrial and
household use. Column (3) indicates that the tax rate on industrial use fuel is 61 percent
of the tax rate on household use fuel in Denmark; in the United States, the industrial
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use tax rate is 15 percent higher than the household use tax rate. Once again, there are
likely to be a number of determinants of these cross-national differences. However, these
differences are also likely to reflect the importance of industry concerns (i.e., shareholders
and workers). Environmental and community concerns are likely to be reflected in the
tax rate levels. On the other hand, national differences in the relative tax rates for
industrial and household fuels are likely to reflect the relative influence of industry vis-
a-vis households in the political process in which tax rates are determined. Moreover,
institutional features of the labor market are important determinants of industry and
union lobbying incentives, and consequently, the observed pattern of environmental
policy.
Consider the last column of Table 4.1 – “Union coordination index.” Layard et
al. (1994, pp.80-81) argue that when unions have a national focus (designated by an
index of ‘3’), they take into account the common interests of the workforce in full
employment “rather than bargaining as atomistic groups of insiders” (designated by
an index of ‘1’). The data reveal that bargaining at the national level is negatively
related to the tax rate disparity (the ‘Ratio’ column). Of course, this correlation may
be purely coincidental. On the other hand, it appears that a strong coordinated union
movement is associated with relatively higher tax burdens on households (i.e., which
comprise blue-collar and white-collar workers) as opposed to industry (which primarily
employ the blue-collar workers). Overall, unionization does appear to be strongly linked
to the observed pattern of environmental taxation of industry relative to households.
4.3.3 Inequality, Industrial Employment and Environmental
Regulation
To conclude the empirical section, we present a formal econometric analysis of the
determinants of environmental policy. As much as possible, we follow the empirical
specifications previously suggested in the literature. The major innovation, of course, is
the introduction of variables suggested by our own model. Another major step forward
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is our use of extreme bounds analysis to isolate the determinants of environmental
regulation which are the least sensitive to specification changes.
Data and variables
To proxy environmental stringency we use the lead content of gasoline. This measure
has been used in previous research (e.g., Damania et al., 2003); its major advantage is
that the data are available as a panel for the period from 1982 to 1992 and for up to
48 countries. We transform the series by taking the logarithm of it and multiplying it
by (−1). It is denoted by LREGS.19
Our primary focus is examining the importance of blue-collar workers for the political
process that shapes the environmental policy. Damania et al. (2003) use the percentage
of the labor force employed in industry (INDSHEMP) to proxy political pressure by
industrial workers.20 This pressure is also central to our model’s predictions. Since
environmental regulations may increase employment uncertainty, industrial workers use
their political power to prevent stricter regulations. The other variable important in
our model is wage inequality. The stringency of environmental regulations is predicted
to increase as blue-collar income declines. If wages fall exogenously (e.g., due to skilled-
labor biased or sector-biased technological change that favors white-collar workers), then
we predict a more stringent environmental policy (i.e., a lower lead content of gasoline).
In a recent paper, McAusland (2003) argues that greener pollution policies could be
associated with either greater or smaller income inequality. In earlier research, inequality
has often been associated with an intensification of polluting activities (e.g., Boyce,
1994; Torras and Boyce, 1998). Our model’s predictions point in precisely the opposite
direction. That is, as an economy deindustrializes income inequality may increase as the
wages paid to manufacturing workers in low-tech, pollution-intensive industries fall. As
19A rise in the transformed LREGS therefore represents a higher level of environmental stringency.
Hilton and Levinson (1998) and Octel (1982-92) provide a more detailed description of these data.
20Unless stated otherwise, all data is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2003).
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it does so, the influence of blue-collar workers in the policy-making process declines.21
To measure income inequality we use the Gini coefficient data recently updated and
re-calculated by Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2005).22
Needless to say, a large number of other variables have been proposed as determinants
of the level of environmental stringency. Cole et al. (2006) use the urban population
share (URBAN ) to test whether a greater exposure to industrial pollution by a larger
number of citizens increases environmental stringency. Cole et al. (2006) also argue that
the demand for environmental quality increases with per capita income (LGDPPC ).
On the other hand, Congleton (1992) emphasizes that the effect of per capita income
is theoretically indeterminate (even though he estimates a positive relationship in his
study). He argues that despite the fact that the demand for environmental quality is
likely to be increasing with personal wealth, voters and tax-payers also have to bear a
higher share of the costs associated with environmental regulations. These costs reduce
national income. A similar ambiguity is predicted for the effect of population density
(LPOPDENS ). Congleton argues that population also serves as a proxy for a country’s
human capital resources.
Damania et al. (2003) contend that more open economies will have higher environ-
mental standards. McAusland (2003) shows that trade openness and the pattern of
factor ownership are important determinants of the preference for pollution standards.
If an economy is small and open then environmental policies have no effects on the terms
of trade. Hence, if the poor have a larger relative stake in the production of dirty goods,
then they may vote for weaker policies when the economy is open because there are no
beneficial terms of trade effects associated with environmental regulations. We therefore
use trade intensity (TRADE ), measured by the ratio of trade flows to GDP. Another
commonly used openness measure is foreign direct investment, which we measure as the
21Consistent evidence is provided by Taylor (1998). He uses data for State expenditures per capita in
the United States for hazardous waste in the 1980’s and for air pollution in the 1960’s and rejects the
hypothesis that there is a trade-off between future environmental quality and current manufacturing
jobs.
22These authors address measurement error problems in the well-known World Bank inequality
dataset of Deininger and Squire (1996) and produce a new dataset of consistent inequality series.
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ratio of the net inflows of FDI to GDP (FDIGDP).23 As a final proxy for openness we
employ the KOF Index of Globalization (GLOBAL) (see Dreher, 2006a).24
Congleton (1992) argues that autocratic countries have lower environmental stan-
dards because their rulers have shorter time horizons. Consequently, the incentives to
invest in environmental protection are lower. Following Congleton, we also include a
dictatorship dummy (DICT ) which takes the value one if the executive index of electoral
competitiveness is smaller than three (see Beck et al., 2001). In addition, we employ
POLFREE which we measure as the average of the Freedom House (2005) indices for
civil liberties and political rights. Another included variable is LEFT, which measures
whether the chief executive has a left-wing orientation or not.25 Neumayer (2003) ar-
gues that a left-wing executive is traditionally more likely to care for the interests of
blue-collar workers. As they work mostly in dirty sectors this may reduce environ-
mental stringency (see also Fredriksson and Gaston, 1999). However, Neumayer notes
that left-wing governments might also be more amenable to policies that protect the
environment.26
Damania et al. (2003), Fredriksson et al. (2003) and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003)
emphasize the role that corruption might play in affecting the political agenda. Accord-
ingly, we include CORRUPT to measure the level of government corruption. This
variable is the “Government Honesty” variable reported by the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG).27 For a summary of all variables, their sources, their descriptions
as well as the study that originally proposed them see Table 4.2; Table 4.3 gives the
descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables.
23Fredriksson and Gaston (2000) argue that greater capital mobility weakens the incentive for capital
owners to lobby, and ceteris paribus, may lead to stricter environmental policies.
24This index incorporates economic as well as the political and social dimensions of globalization.
25This variable is taken from Beck et al. (2001).
26Neumayer argues that blue-collar workers are likely to be among the first exposed to the effects of
environmental degradation.
27For details see Knack and Keefer (1995).
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Table 4.2: Variables – definitions, sources and hypotheses
Variable Source Description Sign Proposed by
LREGS Octel (1982-1992) Log of lead content of gaso-
line, multiplied by (–1)
Damania et al.
(2003)
CORRUPT ICRG “Government Honesty”,
higher values indicate less
corruption
+ Damania et al.
(2003)
DICT Beck et al. (2001) Dummy variable for dictator-
ship (executive index of elec-
toral competitiveness < 3)
- Congleton
(1992)
FDIGDP World Bank
(2003)
Net inflows of foreign direct
investment (% of GDP)
+ Cole et al.
(2006)
GLOBAL Dreher (2006) KOF Index of Globalization + This chapter
INDSHEMP World Bank
(2003)
Employment in industry sec-
tor (% of total employment)
- Damania et al.
(2003)
INEQUAL Francois and
Rojas-Romagosa
(2005)
Gini coefficient – household
income
+ This chapter
LEFT Beck et al. (2001) Dummy variable for the chief
executive’s party being left-
wing
? Neumayer
(2003)
LGDPPC World Bank
(2003)
Log of GDP per capita (in
constant 1995 $US)
? Congleton
(1992)
LPOPDENS World Bank
(2003)
Log of population per
hectare
? Congleton
(1992)
POLFREE Freedom House
(2005)
Average of “Civil Liberties”
and “Political Rights”
+ Congleton
(1992)
TRADE World Bank
(2003)
Trade intensity ((imports +
exports)/GDP)
+ Damania et al.
(2003)
URBAN World Bank
(2003)
Urban population (% of to-
tal)
+ Damania et al.
(2003)
Notes: ‘Sign’ refers to the expected sign of the variable according to the literature ‘+/-’ indicates a
positive/negative sign while ‘?’ represents an a priori indeterminate effect.
90
4
.
R
el
ie
f
fo
r
th
e
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t?
Table 4.3: Variables – descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) LREGS -0.37 0.95 341 0.418 -0.225 -0.047 0.528 0.349 -0.439 -0.110 0.490 0.285 -0.396 0.101 0.383
(2) CORRUPT 3.49 1.55 328 328 -0.360 0.190 0.769 0.533 -0.381 0.130 0.707 -0.208 -0.540 0.340 0.608
(3) DICT 0.22 0.42 341 328 341 -0.138 -0.357 -0.264 0.471 -0.167 -0.537 -0.062 0.635 -0.172 -0.372
(4) FDIGDP 1.17 1.71 324 311 324 324 0.250 0.127 0.087 0.068 0.131 -0.240 -0.182 0.504 0.060
(5) GLOBAL 1.91 0.74 310 310 310 293 310 0.502 -0.582 0.053 0.865 -0.013 -0.706 0.438 0.771
(6) INDSHEMP 26.18 8.03 194 194 194 192 193 194 -0.399 0.180 0.724 0.037 -0.527 0.096 0.565
(7) INEQUAL 43.37 10.49 57 57 57 57 57 52 57 -0.159 -0.428 -0.365 0.516 -0.429 -0.037
(8) LEFT 0.36 0.48 332 319 332 315 302 188 55 332 -0.104 -0.193 -0.040 -0.143 -0.212
(9) LGDPPC 7.78 1.76 335 322 335 324 304 194 57 326 335 0.017 -0.797 0.327 0.869
(10) LPOPDENS -0.45 1.36 330 319 330 313 310 194 57 322 324 330 -0.110 0.187 -0.058
(11) POLFREE 3.32 1.92 341 328 341 324 310 194 57 332 335 330 341 -0.248 -0.670
(12) TRADE 49.28 27.30 333 320 333 322 302 194 57 324 333 322 333 333 0.235
(13) URBAN 52.34 25.74 341 328 341 324 310 194 57 332 335 330 341 333 341
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and the standard deviation (S.D.) of each series; the upper-right part of the remaining table
reports correlation coefficients, the main diagonal gives the number of observations for each variable, while the lower left shows the number of
observations used to calculate the correlation coefficients.
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Extreme Bounds Analysis
Since there are several studies that investigate the effects on environmental stringency,
there is a long list of potential explanatory variables. Studies often restrict their analysis
to certain subsets of these variables and often ignore the effects of any omitted variable
bias when other variables are not included. In addition to any model uncertainty, the
limited number of observations often restricts the power of statistical tests that rule out
irrelevant explanatory variables.
In order to address these issues we use extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed
by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992). EBA enables us to examine which
explanatory variables are robustly related to our stringency measure and is a relatively
neutral way of coping with the problem of selecting variables for an empirical model in
situations where there are conflicting or inconclusive suggestions in the literature.
To conduct an EBA, equations of the following general form are estimated
Y = βMM + βFF + βZZ + υ (4.7)
where Y is the dependent variable, M is a vector of “commonly accepted” explanatory
variables and F is a vector containing the variables of interest. The vector Z contains up
to three possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt, 1992) which,
according to the broader literature, are related to the dependent variable. The error
term is υ. The EBA test for a variable in Fk states that if the lower extreme bound for
βFk – i.e., the lowest value for βFk minus two standard deviations – is negative, while the
upper extreme bound for βFk– i.e., the highest value for βFk plus two standard deviations
– is positive, the variable Fk is not robustly related to Y .
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that this testing criterion is far too strong for any variable
to ever pass it. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has both positive and
negative support, then a researcher is bound to find at least one regression model for
which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. Consequently,
in what follows we not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the
regressions in which the coefficient of the variable Fk is statistically different from zero.
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Moreover, instead of only analyzing the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient
of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) recommended procedure and
analyze the entire distribution. Accordingly, we also report the unweighted parameter
estimate of βFk and its standard error, as well as the unweighted cumulative distribution
function, CDF(0). The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative distribution
function lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the larger of the areas under the
density function either above or below zero, i.e., whether this happens to be CDF(0)
or 1 - CDF(0). So CDF(0) always lies between 0.5 and 1.0. However, in contrast to
Sala-i-Martin, we use the unweighted, instead of the weighted, CDF(0).28
Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M and
in the Z vector is likely to be arbitrary. However, as pointed out by Temple (2000),
there is no reason why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down from a
general specification) cannot be used in advance to identify variables that are particularly
relevant. Furthermore, some variables are included in the large majority of studies and
are by now common in this branch of the literature.
In our view, the inclusion of LGDPPC in the M vector is the only non-contentious
inclusion as a regressor. In the literature on the environmental Kuznets curve the rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and environmental quality has been widely discussed.
Therefore, this variable may also play an important role in determining the stringency of
environmental policy. While it is tempting to include our central variables (INDSHEMP
and INEQUAL) in the M matrix, we are conscious of not prejudging the importance of
our model and the outcome of the EBA.
The results
As a preliminary to the EBA, we ran a first regression using LGDPPC as well as our
central variables and conducted specification tests to test whether we have to correct
28Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the integrated likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0).
However, missing observations for some of the variables poses a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2002)
show that the goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is
the true model and that the weights constructed in this way are not invariant to linear transformations
of the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales could result in different outcomes and conclusions.
We therefore employ the unweighted version.
4.3 Empirical Implications and Evidence 93
for country- and/or time-specific effects in our panel setup. As a result of these tests we
include random country-effects in all equations.29
Table 4.4 depicts the results of the EBA.30 The criterion for considering a variable to
be robustly related to stringency is the CDF(0) value. Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggested
considering a variable to be robust if the CDF(0) criterion is greater than 0.90. Instead
we follow Sturm and de Haan’s (2005) proposal to use a stricter threshold value of 0.95,
due to the two-sided nature of the test.
Table 4.4: Results EBA – dependent variable: ln(stringency)
Variable Lower Upper %Sign. Unwght. Unwght. Std. Impact
Bound Bound CDF(0) β Error Rank
Base Model
LGDPPC -0.482 3.861 83.55 0.9878 1.513 0.445 3
Extended Model
INDSHEMP -0.189 0.023 95.43 0.9813 -0.079 0.034 4
LEFT -1.398 0.150 93.14 0.9779 -0.626 0.285 1
URBAN -0.193 0.035 74.29 0.9651 -0.069 0.035 2
INEQUAL -0.029 0.130 70.86 0.9575 0.053 0.029 6
LPOPDENS -1.115 3.579 34.29 0.9194 0.753 0.508 11
POLFREE -0.292 0.583 33.14 0.8756 0.121 0.096 7
FDIGDP -0.112 0.275 9.71 0.8625 0.077 0.065 8
GLOBAL -1.685 2.893 40.57 0.8501 0.866 0.665 5
TRADE -0.044 0.026 10.86 0.8066 -0.010 0.010 9
DICT -1.272 1.157 14.29 0.7807 0.218 0.277 10
CORRUPT -0.648 0.438 2.86 0.5707 -0.046 0.145 12
Notes: Results based on 231 (base model) and 175 (extended model) regressions, respectively, using
country-specific random effects. ‘%Sign’ refers to the percentage of the regressions in which the respec-
tive variable is significant at the 10% significance level. ‘Impact Rank’ lists the variables in descending
order according to the impact of a one standard deviation shock. The standard deviation is calculated
after de-meaning each variable to correct for country-specific effects. Variables are sorted according to
the CDF(0) criterion.
29For readability, the results of the specification test of the EBA are not shown. (However, they are
available from the authors upon request).
30Since there are substantial differences in the number of observations for each variable, which po-
tentially could influence our results, we opt to restrict our sample based on our inequality measure and
hence ensure a more homogeneous sample.
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Turning to the results of the EBA we see that real GDP per capita (LGDPPC )
is robustly and positively linked to the level of stringency.31 This result is also found
in the existing empirical literature. Therefore, to some extent it resolves the potential
theoretical ambiguity which Congleton (1992) highlighted.32
We now turn to the extended model. Here each of the variables takes the role of
the F vector once with the other 11 variables used in 175 combinations to test the
robustness of this particular variable. The variable LEFT, representing a left-wing
chief executive, is usually considered to be negatively related to stringency. A left-wing
executive traditionally cares for the interest of industrial workers and might therefore be
reluctant to increase environmental stringency. The share of the urbanized population
(URBAN ) has a negative relationship with stringency. Hence, citizens living in urban
areas tolerate lower levels of environmental stringency.
From the viewpoint of our simple model, the most important findings of our analysis
are the results for INDSHEMP and INEQUAL.33 According to the EBA the former
variable is robustly negatively related to the measure of stringency.34 Therefore, just
as our theory suggests, a declining blue-collar labor force is associated with diminished
blue-collar political power and leads to more stringent environmental regulations. Our
result for inequality is the more novel finding, however. Greater dispersion in incomes
is associated with a more, and not less, stringent environmental policy. While this
finding stands in stark contrast to previous research, it is consistent with our model. All
other variables that are proposed in the literature, as being an influencing factor for the
stringency of environmental agenda setting, clearly fail to meet the robustness criterion
31This result is based on 231 regressions.
32We also tested for a potential non-linear relationship by including the squared term into the model.
However, this is not supported by the data.
33Note, we also tested for potential non-linearities of both variables by adding a squared term. In
both cases it turns out to be insignificant.
34We employ panel estimations which use the within and between variation of the variables in focus
and thus estimate coefficients which describe how the dependent variable reacts to changes of the
explanatory variables. Moreover, in our regression model the estimated coefficients represent semi-
elasticities. Hence, a one unit change in the level of both variables implies a beta percentage change in
the level of the dependent variable. As INDSHEMP is measured in percentages, a one percent increase
in the percentage employed in the industry sector leads to a beta percentage change in the dependent
variable.
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of a CDF(0) value above 0.95. This is another major finding of the EBA, although
obviously a rather negative one with respect to the extant literature.
In order to evaluate the relevance of the variables we also estimate the magnitude
of the impact that all variables have on the policy stringency measure. We do this by
calculating the effect that a shock of one standard deviation of each variable has on
LREGS. We therefore multiply the average EBA coefficient with the standard deviation
of the respective variable and rank them in descending order according to absolute
value.35 The resulting ranking is included in Table 4.4 in the column “Impact Rank.”
The five variables that exhibit a robust relation with the measure of stringency are among
the six variables which have the biggest impact on the dependent variable. In addition
we report the histograms of the coefficients of our two central variables. Figure 4.2
reveals that the estimated coefficients of the key variables are distributed close to their
respective means and that there are no major outliers.
Figure 4.2: Histograms of the EBA coefficients
INEQUAL INDSHEMP
Notes: The frequency distributions summarize the coefficients of the 175 regressions of the EBA for
the respective variable. The number beneath each bar indicates the upper bound of the bin.
Concerning the robustness of our results we use the five variables that the EBA
suggests are robustly linked to environmental stringency and estimate our final model.
The results are contained in Table 4.5.
35Since the estimation results include country-specific random effects we de-mean all variables. Failing
to do so could seriously bias the results since the country-specific effects that were already taken into
account would again contribute to the result.
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Table 4.5: Results final model – dependent variable: ln(stringency)
Random Fixed
effects effects
LGDPPC 3.652∗∗∗ 4.363∗∗∗
(0.519) (0.629)
INDSHEMP -0.098∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033)
LEFT -0.713∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.253)
URBAN -0.107∗∗∗ -0.080∗
(0.035) (0.049)
INEQUAL 0.062∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.024) (0.027)
Constant -24.221∗∗∗ -
(3.472)
Observations 50 50
R-squared 0.944 0.925
Hausman test 2.863 -
(H0: random effects, H1: fixed effects)
F-test 4.573∗∗∗ -
(significance of country-specific random effects)
LR-test - 107.7∗∗∗
(H0: pooled OLS, H1: country-specific fixed effects)
Notes: Both regressions contain country-specific effects. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1%-level.
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Based on purely statistical criteria, it is the preferred model. Again, the specification
tests lead us to include country-specific random effects.36 However, we also present the
results when adding time-specific effects as a further robustness check.37 Potentially
worrisome is the relatively small number of observations (due to the list-wise deletion
of missing observations on key variables). In order to test whether our results are
driven by the small sample we linearly interpolate our inequality measure to create more
observations. The results of these estimations are summarized in Table 4.6. Except for
URBAN, in the case of country- and time-specific fixed effects all variables are robust
to the estimation technique, the inclusion of time effects and the sample size, i.e., they
are statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, the results of the EBA are
reinforced.
To summarize, there is obviously strong support for the argument forwarded in this
chapter. Namely, that declining economic significance is associated with a decline in
political significance. Both of these factors reinforce one another and lead to more
stringent environmental regulation.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has emphasized that political and economic considerations interact to help
explain the observed relationship between measures of economic development and envi-
ronmental quality. Deindustrialization, falling real incomes of production workers and a
greater dispersion of income are increasingly prominent features in many industrialized
countries. From a political economy perspective, such features can also explain observed
environmental policies.
When the social and economic consequences of either high unemployment or falling
incomes in manufacturing industries are high, policy-makers may be tempted to ease en-
vironmental regulations. Symmetrically, as deindustrialization proceeds, as reflected by
declining industrial employment and the falling wages and incomes for workers in basic
36For comparison, Table 4.5 also contains the results for country-specific fixed effects.
37We also estimated model specifications that included a time trend. There were no changes to the
results.
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Table 4.6: Results tests of robustness – dependent variable: ln(stringency)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
LGDPPC 3.724∗∗∗ 4.821∗∗ 3.405∗∗∗ 1.883∗∗∗
(0.533) (2.141) (0.479) (0.466)
INDSHEMP -0.100∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗
(0.030) (0.046) (0.030) (0.028)
LEFT -0.702∗∗∗ -0.970∗∗∗ -0.378∗ -0.478∗∗
(0.239) (0.344) (0.232) (0.234)
URBAN -0.106∗∗∗ -0.116 -0.100∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗
(0.036) (0.076) (0.037) (0.029)
INEQUAL 0.063∗∗ 0.057∗ - -
(0.025) (0.031)
INEQUAL-interpolated - - 0.060∗∗ 0.041∗
(0.029) (0.026)
Constant -24.872∗∗∗ - -0.378∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(3.595) (0.232) (0.026)
Observations 50 50 102 102
R-squared 0.941 0.913 0.921 0.934
Hausman test 0.841 - 2.965 0.891
(H0: random effects, H1: fixed effects)
F-test 4.812∗∗∗ - 12.960∗∗∗ 18.815∗∗∗
(sign. of country-specific random effects)
F-test 1.329 - - 4.840∗∗∗
(sign. of time-specific random effects)
LR-test - 120.0∗∗∗ - -
(H0: pooled OLS, H1: country and time-
specific fixed effects)
Notes: Columns (a) and (d) contain country- and time-specific random effects, (b) includes country-
and time-specific fixed effects, and (c) incorporates country-specific random effects. Standard errors
are displayed in parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-level.
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manufacturing and pollution-intensive industries, environmental stringency increases.
That is, as these sectors of the economy become less important economically, they are
also likely to carry less weight politically. Consequently, a regulator optimally increases
the stringency of environmental regulations. The argument is simple and straightfor-
ward. Dynamic comparative advantages dictate that mature, developed economies shift
resources away from basic manufacturing activities. Environmental policy simply rein-
forces this movement.
To some readers, the argument developed in this chapter may seem overly optimistic
from the point of the view of the environment and overly cynical from a social equity
perspective. The risk of being over-cynical is particularly acute for those who believe
that a sense of social justice should prevail during times of rapid deindustrialization and
falling blue-collar worker incomes. In turn, the social and political pressures may be
thought to help override the demand for increased regulatory stringency. If this were
in fact the case, it would be expected that environmental policies are least stringent in
those industrialized and democratic countries in which income inequality is greatest. The
evidence presented here is consistent with the exact opposite view. That is, countries
with the strictest environmental standards tend to be those with the greatest dispersion
in their incomes.
4.5 Appendix
Derivation of the Euler Equation
The first-order condition for the maximization of Bellman’s Equation is
θb
∂W bt
∂st
+ θw
∂Wwt
∂st
+ βV
′
t+1(pt+1) = 0.
Rearranging and simplifying we have
θbfst∆t + βV
′
t+1(pt+1) = 0 (4.8)
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where ∆t = U(y
b,e
t , pt)− U(y
b,u
t , pt). Differentiating the value function yields
V
′
t (pt) = θ
b∂W
b
t
∂pt
+ θw
∂Wwt
∂pt
+ (1− δ)βV
′
t+1(pt+1).
After simplifying we have
V
′
t (pt) = θ
blbtU
b,e
pt
+ θb(1− lbt)U
b,u
pt
+ θwUwpt + (1− δ)βV
′
t+1(pt+1). (4.9)
Substituting (A-2) into (A-1) yields
θbfst∆t + (1− δ)
−1
(
V
′
t (pt)− θ
blbtU
b,e
pt
− θb(1− lbt)U
b,u
pt
− θwUwpt
)
= 0,
or
V
′
t (pt) =
(
θblbtU
b,e
pt
+ θb(1− lbt)U
b,u
pt
+ θwUwpt
)
− (1− δ)θbfst∆t. (4.10)
Substituting (4.10) into (4.8) yields the Euler equation (i.e., equation (4.4) in the
text).
Chapter 5
Does Terror Threaten Human
Rights? Evidence from Panel Data
5.1 Introduction
Governments’ respect for human rights has opposing effects on national security. On
the positive side, granting inalienable rights such as the freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, the guarantee of impartial treatment in court, the protection from invasion of
privacy and – even more importantly – the absence of torture, extrajudicial killings and
political imprisonment enables citizens to live in freedom and safety, and to express
potential political critique in non-violent form. But on the negative side, greater human
rights increase a country’s vulnerability to external and internal threats. Consequently,
the net effect of human rights on national security is not obvious.
In Western democracies, the majority of leading politicians seems to endorse the
negative view on the consequences of human rights, at least concerning the threat of
fundamentalist religious terror. After terror attacks, politicians tend to suggest restrict-
ing human rights as a means to improve national security. U.S. President Bush, for
This chapter is an adapted version of Dreher et al. (2007).
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instance, explicitly formulated objections against a legislation in 2005 which prohibits
torture and inhumane treatment of detainees anywhere in the world, as this would ham-
per the ability of U.S. authorities to obtain information, especially in the “war against
terror” (Amnesty International, 2006). Until the U.S. Supreme Court rendered this
practice unconstitutional, prisoners in Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba, were neither treated as
prisoners of war nor as “ordinary” prisoners.1 They were denied all basic human rights
as well as treatment according to the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, as reported by
Risen and Lichtblau (2005), President Bush authorized the National Security Agency
to eavesdrop telephone and email communication between the U.S. and abroad without
warrants starting in 2002, severely violating basic human rights.
In the U.K., the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 allows government ministers to
issue control orders restricting the liberty, movement and activities of people purportedly
suspected of terrorism-related activity. In Australia, similar legislations have recently
been enacted. Thus, anecdotal evidence suggests that countries respond to terrorism
and threat to their Western values by diminishing those very rights they wanted to
protect in the first place.2
However, though anecdotal evidence abounds, systematic analysis is lacking.3 The
question whether terrorism systematically reduces human rights is yet unsettled. This is
the question this chapter addresses. Specifically, we employ panel data for 111 countries
over the period 1973–2002 to analyze whether and to what extent terror does – on
average – affect human rights.
To anticipate our main results, we find that terror diminishes governments’ respect
for basic human rights such as the principle of absence of extrajudicial killings, polit-
ical imprisonment, and torture. To some extent, civil rights are also restricted as a
consequence of terrorism. Our basic results are extremely robust as to how we spec-
1Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, U.S. Supreme Court, June 29, 2006; 548 U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 2749(2006).
2Restrictive anti-terror laws have been passed not only in Western societies. According to Amnesty
International (2006), for instance, China and India have recently passed even stricter human rights-
restricting anti-terrorism laws.
3This seems to be true for the literature on human rights in general. In the words of Kaufmann
(2004, p.2) “the literature on human rights is overwhelmingly prose-rich and data-poor.” For a recent
exception see Dreher et al. (2006a).
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ify our model, as extreme bounds analysis with almost 23,000 regressions shows. We
find no effect of terror on empowerment rights, i.e., “positive rights,” such as political
participation and freedom of movement or religion.
We continue as follows. The next section presents our basic theoretical model. We
introduce our hypotheses in section 5.3 and our measures of human rights and terror in
section 5.4. We proceed by explaining our method of estimation. Section 5.6 presents
the results, while we test the robustness of these results in section 5.7. The final section
concludes.
5.2 Basic Model
Let there be a finite number of citizens i. Every citizen i has the same basic preferences
over the publicly provided goods “security,” labeled st, and “human rights,” labeled ht,
which is given by:
uit = u
i (st, ht) (5.1)
We assume positive but decreasing marginal utility in both goods. Individuals face a
constant trade-off between security and human rights respect, which is given by si(ht),
with ∂si(ht)/∂ht < 0. The importance of security is determined by the true probability
of a terror attack. However, as citizens do not know the true probability of a terror
attack, they are forced to derive subjective probabilities, labeled pit = P
i (terrort),
which gives the expected probability of a terror attack in period t of citizen i. Therefore,
citizens differ in their subjective expectations about the probability of a terror attack and
by the perceived trade-off between security and human rights. The assumed preferences
can, for instance, be expressed by:
uit =
[
si (ht)
]pit · h1−pitt (5.2)
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That is, the subjective probability functions as the utility elasticity of security, and
the counter-probability as the utility elasticity of human rights respect. The optimal
level of human rights, labeled hit, is then determined by:
ηsi(ht),ht (ht) ≡ −
∂si (ht)
∂ht
ht
si (ht)
=
1− P i (terrort)
P i (terrort)
(5.3)
That is, if the subjective probability of a terror attack is very high, the citizen will
demand much security relative to the level of human rights, respectively, low human
rights respect relative to security. Moreover, the more human rights are perceived to
reduce security, the less human rights are demanded. Hence, citizens are willing to pay a
prize in terms of lower human rights to enjoy a lower threat of terror.4 Thus, the optimal
combination of human rights and security of a citizen is determined by the individual
belief concerning the trade-off between security and human rights, and by the subjective
probability of a terror attack.
Having described the behavior of the citizens, we now turn to the behavior of gov-
ernments. Similar to the median voter model (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957; Persson and
Tabellini, 2000, chap. 3), we assume that governments want to remain in power. In order
to achieve this goal, a country’s government has to win support of a particular fraction
π ∈ (0, 1] of society. We assume that providing human rights involves costs to the gov-
ernment, so that governments have no incentive to provide more human rights than the
level required ensuring the support of fraction π of society. Given our assumptions, pref-
erences are single-peaked, so that, applying the logic of the median voter theorem to our
issue, there exists a pivotal citizen, whose bliss point represents a platform that cannot
lose against any other competing platform (the proof in Mueller, 2003, p.86, directly
applies to our generalized model). The equilibrium level of human rights, denoted by
h∗t , is determined by the subjective probability of a terror attack of the pivotal citizen,
i.e. the citizen who completes the critical mass of citizens, π.5
4Of course, not all types of human rights are likely to reduce national security, some may even
improve it. However, considering the aggregate level of governments’ respect for human rights, our
assumption appears plausible.
5Suppose, for instance, we consider a democracy ruled by majority voting, that is, pi = 1/2. Then
the pivotal citizen is equivalent to the median voter.
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In nondemocratic regimes, the governments compete with the opposition for the
support of the citizens, as it is threatened by potential revolution and uprisings (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2001). In order to stay in power, it has to please a critical mass of
the society, which can be any fraction π ∈ (0, 1]. Consider, for instance, an autocratic
regime requires the support of a fraction π = 1/3 to remain in power, because otherwise
the opposition would be able to organize a successful uprising. As an example, let there
be three citizens. As the government of an autocracy wants to stay in power, it will
ensure the support of the one citizen with the lowest demand hit, so that the opposition
cannot organize a successful uprising, no matter which platform it chooses. Hence, the
Nash, respectively the political, equilibrium is described by the government choosing
the lowest demand for human rights of the three citizens. The median voter theorem
for democracies governed by majority voting is a sub-case of our general model. In the
median-voter model, we have π = 1/2 and the government competes with the opposition
in electoral competition.6 The Nash, respectively political, equilibrium of the model is
then the median human rights demand hmediant . Therefore, we generalize the median
voter model and state that, irrespective of regime type and decision rule, there exists a
pivotal citizen whose bliss point represents the dominant platform, that is, the political
equilibrium.
Having described the political equilibrium of our basic model, we now turn to the
issue how terror attacks affect this equilibrium outcome. Obviously the subjective prob-
abilities of terror attacks are updated when terror attacks occur in period t, because such
events represent signals and new evidence that have to be accounted for. We assume
that individuals update their subjective probability applying Bayesian inference. That
is, citizens who observe terror attacks in period t update, respectively newly infer, their
subjective probability of terror attacks in period t + 1, given the new evidence that a
terror attack occurred in period t. Hence, the newly inferred subjective probability is
given by pit+1 = P
i (terrort+1 |terrort ) ∈ [0, 1].
6Applied to the median-voter model, there are (at least) two competing parties: one party prefers a
low level of human rights and higher human rights involve costs, and another party, which prefers high
levels of human rights and lower levels of human rights involve costs.
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It is clear that if the subjective probabilities of all citizens remain unchanged, the
same is true for the political equilibrium level of human rights, and terror attacks do
not affect the political equilibrium. However, if some or all subjective probabilities
are changed, the political equilibrium level of human rights is likely to change as well,
depending on the bliss point of the pivotal citizen after Bayesian updating took place.
If the updated subjective probability of the new pivotal citizen is increasing, she/he
evaluates security relative to the level of human rights higher, and consequently demands
a lower level of human rights: hpivotalt+1 decreases. Thus, in response to terror attacks,
the citizens of society endogenously change their behavior and claim for more safety
at the expense of lower human rights. Politicians in democracies and autocracies alike
compete with each other and follow this shift of perception of the citizens, so that the
governments will try to increase security by eroding human rights in equilibrium.
Applied to U.S. policy in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), for instance,
U.S. citizens were shocked by the attacks. They significantly increased their expected
probability of a terror attack in the U.S. and thus gave security higher weight in their
preferences. Consequently, as their security perception was basically extinguished, they
were willing to accept, respectively demanded, a lower level of human rights to increase
security. In polls, president Bush received approval rates of 60 to 90 percent when
his administration “engineered the biggest expansion in executive power since the days
of Franklin Roosevelt” with the Patriot Act, comprising, e.g., the right of monitoring
telephone calls without explicit approval from the courts, reading private e-mails, prying
into library records and establishing military tribunals (The Economist, 2006a, pp.20-
21). The threat of terror led to a situation in which national security became the major
political topic in elections. Similar developments can be observed all over the Western
World – though only few countries, such as Great Britain, acted as strictly as the U.S.
Furthermore, this pattern of behavior already existed prior to 9/11: after the 1993
bombings of the World Trade Center and the federal building in Oklahoma City the
Antiterrorism Act of 1996 was passed. Cole and Dempsey (2002, p.117) rank the Act as
“some of the worst assaults on civil liberties [prior to the 2001 antiterrorism measures].”
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However, as pit represents the utility elasticity of individual i referring to security
and 1−pit the one referring to the level of human rights, citizens could also update their
subjective preference parameter mixture between security and human rights respect
in the other direction, namely such that they evaluate human rights respect in the
aftermath of a terror attack higher than before, for disrespect of human rights can
provoke terror attacks and thus reduce security. A potential example is the human rights
disaster at Abu Ghraib, which may have increased the importance of human rights in
the preferences of citizens. Considering the threat of terror in the context of the Basque
or Northern Ireland conflict, where the Spanish and British governments eventually
decided to improve the human rights situation after a period of confrontation, because
they – or rather the majority of voters – realized that what occurred was a vicious
circle of violence. That is, it is also possible that the pivotal citizen, here the median
voter, believes that stricter human rights increase security, so that the importance of the
good “security” in the preference function is reduced. The Palestinian issue saw both
developments, human rights improvements and more frequent human rights violations.
In our model, both developments can occur. Which reaction is more relevant in practice
has to be tested by empirical analysis in the next sections.
Note that the trade-off relevant for political outcome is the subjectively perceived
link between human rights and terror, and not necessarily the “actual” trade-off between
respect for human rights and terrorism.7 In the U.S., for instance, not a single terrorist
was found by rounding up hundreds of foreigners, most of them Muslims, after 9/11 and
holding them without charge, sometimes for months (The Economist, 2006b). Hence,
citizens may have adaptive expectations and learn that at least some anti-terrorist mea-
sures do not improve national security.8 In the next section, we explicitly formulate the
two major hypotheses derived from our model, which we are going to confront with data
further below.
7Empirical research suggests an inverted U-shape relationship between political rights and terrorism
(Eubank and Weinberg, 2001; Abadie, 2006).
8However, recent polls in Britain and the US suggest that most voters still feel their governments
are not doing enough to counter terrorism (The Economist, 2006b).
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5.3 Hypotheses
Overall, it seems reasonable to expect that the relationship between terrorism and hu-
man rights is negative. Governments seem to react to an increase in terrorism by con-
straining the freedom and privileges of their citizens, and our model suggests that this
reaction may be based on the demand for security of the majority of citizens. Stricter
surveillance and control makes it harder to exchange secret information and (radical)
ideas. As stricter controls impair terrorists’ ability to plan attacks, the public is more
willing to accept them in times of increased threat. Citizens may correct their subjective
probabilities of a terror attack in their country upwards when the country has experi-
enced an attack. Consequently, they are more willing to accept a decrease in the level
of human rights in order to enhance security. Moreover, terrorists might take successful
attacks as an indicator of the government’s weakness, in turn improving their confidence
to be able to effectively threaten or even overthrow the government. Consequently, the
government has an incentive to decrease human rights respect in order to be better able
to monitor terrorist activity. The illustrative example of President Bush initially ob-
jecting to a bill prohibiting the torture and inhumane treatment of detainees anywhere
in the world because it would negatively affect the possibility of obtaining information
(Amnesty International, 2006) demonstrates that even fundamental human rights and
values are put into perspective if they are expected to reduce national security. Based
on this reasoning we expect:
Hypothesis 5.1. An increase in the level of terrorist activity leads to a reduction in
the level of human rights.
Although this reasoning appears straight forward, one can also argue, however, in
the opposite direction. In our model, it is equally possible that the pivotal citizen be-
lieves the increase in human rights to improve national security. Terror attacks might
be perceived as reactions to bad human rights situations (all over the world).9 Hence,
citizens increase their evaluation of human rights respect in their preferences. Govern-
ments thus might give in to terrorism that pretendedly aims at improving the human
9For a discussion of unilateral vs. multilateral actions of terrorists and states see Sandler (2005).
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rights situation. Of course, giving in to kidnapping and other forms of blackmailing may
be time-inconsistent, as one becomes vulnerable to further attempts. However, states
did give in to kidnapping events in the past. In October 1972, for instance, Germany
released the three Palestine survivors of the terror attacks at the Olympic Games in
Munich after an airplane had been hijacked. In March 1975, Germany released five
prisoners from the terror scene after the politician Peter Lorenz had been kidnapped.
Although the German government does not give in to political demands anymore, it is
still willing to pay money in exchange for the release of kidnapped citizens – and other
countries do the same. Therefore, the probability of states giving in to political demands
is greater than zero. Consequently, Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003) find, analyzing a sur-
vey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy Research in 2001, that a majority of
Palestinians living in the West Banks and Gaza Strip believe that they would not have
achieved their current status by negotiations alone. Our examples regarding the Basque
and Northern Ireland conflict also suggest that terror is a means that might, eventually,
improve human rights levels at particular places. In our model, it is equally well possible
that the pivotal citizen believes that human rights respect improves national security.
Hence, we state the counter-hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.2. An increase in terrorist activity leads to an increase in the level of
human rights.
Obviously, Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2 might to some extent be valid at the same time,
especially taking into account that every terrorism problem has its own specific origin.
While we cannot empirically distinguish between them, what we can do is estimating
which of those effects dominates. In other words, what we estimate is the average net
effect potentially resulting from two opposing effects. This is what we turn to below.
5.4 Measuring Human Rights and Terror
Our definition of citizens’ human rights follows Cingranelli and Richards (1999). Their
Human Rights Dataset (CIRI, Cingranelli and Richards, 2006) provides quantitative
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information on government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights, on
an annual basis and for almost all countries of the world. Cingranelli and Richards focus
on actual human rights-related actions of governments, including all government agents
such as police and military. Their database draws from two sources, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and from the Amnesty
International Report, offering detailed descriptions of human rights practices.
In particular, the CIRI data refer to extrajudicial killings, people who have disap-
peared for political reasons, torture, political imprisonment, freedom of speech, freedom
of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly and association, political partici-
pation, worker’s rights, women’s political rights, women’s economic rights, and women’s
social rights. Each variable is coded on an ordinal scale, ranging between 0-2 and, de-
pending on the variable considered, 0-4, where higher values reflect better ratings in the
respective human rights dimension.
In this chapter we mainly focus on two composite indicators proposed in Cingranelli
and Richards (1999) and Richards, Gelleny and Sacko (2001). The first composite index
refers to physical integrity rights – it is the additive of absence of torture, extrajudi-
cial killings, political imprisonments, and disappearance, on a scale from 0-8 (so-called
“negative rights”). The second composite refers to empowerment rights and comprises
the freedom of movements, freedom of speech, workers’ rights, political participation,
and freedom of religion indicators, ranging from 0-10 (“positive rights”).
The upper line in Figure 5.1 shows the time path of the unweighted average of the
physical integrity index for the OECD countries over the years 1981-2004. The lower line
represents the average for low income countries,10 while the unweighted world average
is shown in the middle. The number of countries covered rises from 125 in 1981 to 179
in 2004. The figure shows that the mean of the world index was fairly constant over
time at a value of around 5 with, however, a substantial drop around 1990. The average
for the OECD countries is also rather constant over time, at a higher level of around
7. Figure 5.1 shows that there is some variation in physical integrity for developing
10Countries with low income are those with 2004 GNI per capita of a maximum of 825 US$, according
to the definition of the World Bank (2006).
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countries, with a substantial negative trend. The level of physical integrity peaked in
1981 at 5, fell to a low point of 3.2 in 1990, rose to 4 in 1995, and after declining again
until 2000 is slightly below 4 in 2004.
Figure 5.1: Development of physical integrity rights over time
Figure 5.2 shows the development of empowerment rights. As can be seen, the
average level of empowerment rose steadily over the period of observation, with similar
developments in developing and OECD countries. The most substantial increase in
empowerment was experienced in 1990, in particular in low income countries.11 The
index mean is 4.6 for low income countries, more than 9 in OECD countries, and 5.9 for
the world sample. Since 1996 we observe a negative trend in low-income countries. The
world sample contains 130 countries in 1981, and 181 in 2004.
As a third proxy for human rights we employ the civil liberties indicator provided by
Freedom House (2006). The survey based index combines four subcategories: freedom of
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
and individual rights. The rule of law subcategory measures whether equal treatment,
11The apparent increase in low income countries from 1990 to 1991 is mainly driven by Mali, The
Democratic Republic of Congo and Togo (increases of 4, 5 and 9 points, respectively).
112 5. Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data
Figure 5.2: Development of empowerment rights over time
police control and absence of torture prevails. To some extent, the index thus combines
empowerment and physical integrity rights.12 We rescale the original index so that a
value of seven indicates greatest freedom while one is the lowest score.
Figure 5.3 shows the development of civil liberties over time. Clearly, all three
groups of countries display a positive trend. In the early 1990ies, the index peaks, in
particular in low-income countries. In these countries, the increase has been particularly
pronounced over the years 1987 to 1992, with an index score of roughly 4.5. In 1993, in
all three groups the civil rights index returned to its longer term trend.
Turning to our measure of terrorist activity, we employ data provided in the MIPT
Terrorism Knowledge Base.13 The Terrorism Knowledge Base integrates data from
the RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident databases, the
12The correlation between physical integrity and empowerment is 0.51, while it is 0.59 between
integrity and civil liberties, and 0.82 between empowerment and civil liberties.
13Available at: http://www.tkb.org/.
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Figure 5.3: Development of civil liberties over time
Terrorism Indictment database, and DFI International’s research on terrorist organiza-
tions.14
The Terrorism Knowledge Base defines terror as “violence, or the threat of violence,
calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm.” The focus of terror is to dis-
courage opposition from acting at their free will. The motives for engaging in terror are
political while the acts themselves are generally conducted in a way that will achieve
maximum publicity. Moreover, terrorist acts are mostly intended to create more than
immediate physical damage – a long-time situation of fear and intimidation. For an
extensive summary on the various effects of terrorism see Frey et al. (2007).
We extract the number of terror events for each country and year as our variable
of main interest.15 We also employ the number of suicide attacks and the number of
people killed in a certain year and country. Suicide attacks are likely to be perceived as
particularly threatening. They might be more effective from the terrorists’ point of view
14There are also different sources for terrorism data. We choose MIPT because it combines various
sources. For a detailed discussion on measurement of terrorism we refer to Frey and Luechinger (2005).
15Territories are assigned to the country formally governing the territory. Kashmir and the Persian
Gulf are excluded as it is not obvious to which country they should be assigned to.
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as it is hard to fight someone who is explicitly willing to sacrifice the own life. Suicide
attacks might thus provoke particularly harsh reactions by the government concerned.16
The same is likely to be true when the attacks are more severe, i.e., when more people are
killed. Given that the database covers the whole world, we assign zeros to all countries
and years without data.
Figure 5.4: Development of terror over time
Figure 5.4 shows how terror has evolved over time. OECD countries experience
the highest amount of terror while low income countries encounter the lowest value.17
Particularly noteworthy is the rise across all country groups in the recent past.18
16For a summary of studies on suicide bombing see, e.g., Sandler (2003).
17For time-series studies on the occurrence and distribution of terrorism see Enders and Sandler
(2005, 2006).
18The increase is driven in part by the explicit inclusion of domestic terror in the dataset from 1998
onward. We discuss this issue in section 5.7.
5.5 Empirical Method 115
5.5 Empirical Method
We estimate pooled time-series cross-section (panel data) regressions. The data extend
to a maximum of 111 countries and cover the years 1973-2002. Since some of the data
are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number
of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables.
To test our hypotheses we estimate equations of the following form:
RIGHTSi,t = αRIGHTSi,t−1 + βTerrori,t + γZi,t−1 + ui,t, (5.4)
where RIGHTS i,t represents our measure of human rights, and Terror i,t is the respec-
tive measure of terrorist attacks in country i at year t (i.e., the number of events, the
number of suicide attacks and, respectively, the number of people killed). Z is a vector
of control variables as introduced below. Note that we also include the lagged depen-
dent variable, as human rights develop only slowly over time and the lagged dependent
variable turns out to be highly significant (see, e.g., Dreher et al. 2006a). Following the
previous literature, we estimate our model employing ordered probit, with clustering at
the country level and robust standard errors. All regressions include dummies for each
year, which are highly significant.
The ordered probit model is related to the multinomial probit model but takes into
account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Just as in the binomial probit
model, a latent dependent variable is assumed to underlie the empirical setup with
a normally distributed error term. The cutoff points for the different categories are
estimated with the coefficients of the model.
In selecting our control variables, we follow the robustness analysis in Dreher et
al. (2006a). Based on a general-to-specific approach and extensive robustness tests
employing extreme bounds analysis, Dreher et al. suggest the following variables as
robust predictors of a country’s level of physical integrity rights: the logarithm of a
countries’ population, its degree of democracy, dummies for income, and dummies for
legal origin.
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Our measure of democracy is from the Polity IV database as provided by Gurr et
al. (2003). It represents the difference between a country’s democracy and autocracy
score running from -10 to 10 with higher numbers indicating higher levels of democracy.19
Population is taken from the World Bank’s (2006) World Development Indicators, legal
origin follows Easterly and Sewadeh (2001), while the income classification is according
to the World Bank (2006). For a complete description of the variables used and their
sources we refer to Table 5.1 while the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 5.2. The
next section reports the results.
5.6 Results
Column 1 of Table 5.3 replicates the baseline model of Dreher et al. (2006a) for the
physical integrity index. As can be seen, the quantitative variables are significant at the
one percent level. The sets of dummy variables indicating income and, respectively, legal
origin, are both jointly significant at the one percent level. According to the results,
government respect for human rights is higher with smaller population and greater
democracy. The former finding is consistent with the notion that lower surveillance
costs, e.g., because of a smaller population, allow the government to allocate more
human rights. Moreover, higher levels of democracy reduce the government’s possibility
to increase security by restraining rights.
Relative to Scandinavian legal origin – the omitted variable – respect for human
rights is smaller among all other categories – it is lowest in countries with German legal
origin. As compared to low income countries, respect for human rights is greater in
countries with upper middle income and in high income OECD countries.
Columns 2 and 3 report the same specification for the other two dependent variables,
generally confirming the previous results. The exception is the dummies for legal origin
which are not jointly significant at conventional levels.
19The index is based on competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and
regulation of political participation, and constraints on chief executives.
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Table 5.1: Variables – definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Physical integrity Additive of torture, extrajudicial killings, po-
litical imprisonments, and disappearance, (0
= no rights; 8 = full rights).
Cingranelli and
Richards (2006)
Empowerment index Additive of freedom of movements, freedom of
speech, workers rights, political participation,
and freedom of religion indicators, (0 = no
rights; 10 = full rights).
Cingranelli and
Richards (2006)
Civil liberties Index combining (a) Freedom of Expression
and Belief, (b) Associational and Organiza-
tional Rights, (c) Rule of Law, and (d) Per-
sonal and Individual Rights (1= no rights; 7
= full rights).
Freedom House
(2006)
Imprisonment Absence of political imprisonments (0 = no
rights; 2 = full rights).
Cingranelli and
Richards (2006)
Torture Absence of tortures (0 = no rights; 2 = full
rights).
Cingranelli and
Richards (2006)
Disappearences Absence of disappearances (0 = no rights; 2
= full rights).
Cingranelli and
Richards (2006)
Kills Absence of extrajudicial killings (0 = no
rights; 2 = full rights).
Cingranelli and
Richards (2006)
Terror events Number of terror events in respective country
and year.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Suicide attacks Number of suicide attacks in respective coun-
try and year.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Terror fatalities Number of people killed in respective country
and year.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Terror events, dummy Taking on the value 1 if at least one terror
event occurred in respective country and year.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Severe terror events Number of terror events in which at least one
person was killed or injured.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Domestic terror
events
Number of terror events in which both the
attacker and the target were domestic.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
International terror
events
Number of terror events in which either the
attacker or the target was from abroad.
MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Democracy Polity IV democracy indicator (-10 = low; 10
= high).
Gurr et al. (2003)
Population (log) ln (total population). World Bank (2006)
Income, dummies The groups are: low $825 or less; lower mid-
dle, $826-3,255; upper middle, $3,256-10,065;
and high (OECD), $10,066 or more.
World Bank (2006)
Legal origin, dummies Dummies for British, French, Socialist, and
German legal origin.
Easterly and Se-
wadeh (2001)
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Table 5.2: Variables – descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
Physical integrity 4.86 0 8 2.37
Empowerment index 5.88 0 10 3.28
Civil liberties 4.10 1 7 1.95
Imprisonment 1.09 0 2 0.85
Torture 0.80 0 2 0.75
Disappearences 1.65 0 2 0.65
Terror events 2.68 0 858 18.44
Suicide attacks 0.05 0 72 1.23
Terror fatalities 3.49 0 2987 50.32
Terror events, dummy 0.27 0 1 0.44
Severe terror events 0.97 0 551 8.68
Domestic terror events 1.39 0 611 15.09
International terror events 1.29 0 247 5.62
Kills 1.32 0 2 0.78
Democracy 0.22 -10 10 7.58
Population size (log) 15.15 9.89 20.98 2.10
Lower middle income 0.26 0 1 0.44
Higher middle income 0.19 0 1 0.39
High income OECD 0.12 0 1 0.32
High income 0.15 0 1 0.36
British legal origin 0.34 0 1 0.47
French legal origin, dummy 0.48 0 1 0.50
Socialist legal origin, dummy 0.10 0 1 0.30
German legal origin, dummy 0.04 0 1 0.20
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Columns 4 to 6 add the number of terror events in a particular year and country.
As the results show, physical integrity rights are restricted as a consequence of terror,
strongly supporting our Hypothesis 5.1, and the same is true for civil rights measured
by the Freedom House index. The former coefficient is significant at the one percent
level, while the latter is significant at the five percent level. Empowerment rights do not
seem to be affected by the number of terror events.
Table 5.4 replicates the analysis substituting the number of terror events by the
number of suicide attacks and, respectively, the number of people killed in a certain
country and year. Again, the results show some impact of terror on human rights. At
the one percent level of significance, suicide attacks restrict human rights as measured
by the physical integrity index (column 1) and the civil liberties index (column 3).
Empowerment rights, to the contrary, are not significantly affected by suicide attacks
(column 2). Turning to the number of people killed, there is a highly significant (and
negative) impact on physical integrity rights (column 4), while empowerment rights and
civil liberties are not significantly affected.
As our dependent variables are ordinal, quantitative interpretation of these results
is not straightforward. One way of evaluating the magnitude of the estimated effect
is to compare it to the estimated cutoff points. The estimated coefficients allow the
calculation of the latent human rights variable. A shift in the observed index value
will occur if the corresponding (estimated) cutoff point for the respective category will
be exceeded. The smallest difference between two cutoff points in our case is 0.66,
representing the difference for the upper and lower limit of an observed index value of 2.
To quantify the impact of terror attacks, assume a shock of one standard deviation (i.e.,
18.44, see Table 5.2). This would change the latent variable by 18.44·(−0.003) = −0.055,
ceteris paribus. This value represents roughly 1/10th of the value needed to induce a
change in the observed index score. To get a better grasp for the magnitude of the effect
of terror, we calculate the marginal effects for the significant coefficients of the terror
variables of Tables 5.3 and 5.4 (at the mean of all independent variables), as shown in
Table 5.5. Due to the ordinal setup, the calculation and interpretation of the marginal
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Table 5.3: Results terror events – dependent variable: human rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PI ER CL PI ER CL
Lagged dependent 0.540 0.538 1.827 0.536 0.538 1.825
(23.67)∗∗∗ (20.54)∗∗∗ (17.38)∗∗∗ (23.44)∗∗∗ (20.56)∗∗∗ (17.33)∗∗∗
Income lower middle -0.034 -0.067 0.094 -0.033 -0.067 0.097
(0.42) (0.83) (1.37) (0.39) (0.83) (1.42)
Income upper middle 0.249 0.016 0.296 0.256 0.016 0.300
(2.32)∗∗ (0.15) (2.99)∗∗∗ (2.36)∗∗ (0.15) (3.03)∗∗∗
Income high OECD 1.102 0.580 1.398 1.134 0.580 1.419
(6.68)∗∗∗ (2.74)∗∗∗ (7.80)∗∗∗ (6.91)∗∗∗ (2.75)∗∗∗ (7.96)∗∗∗
Income high 0.031 -0.377 -0.017 0.078 -0.377 0.007
(0.20) (3.47)∗∗∗ (0.15) (0.56) (3.37)∗∗∗ (0.06)
Legal origin British -0.909 -0.359 -0.285 -0.887 -0.359 -0.270
(4.80)∗∗∗ (1.04) (0.73) (4.70)∗∗∗ (1.04) (0.69)
Legal origin French -1.009 -0.316 -0.400 -0.979 -0.316 -0.379
(5.04)∗∗∗ (0.90) (1.03) (4.92)∗∗∗ (0.90) (0.97)
Legal origin Socialist -0.704 -0.464 -0.413 -0.682 -0.464 -0.402
(3.08)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.01) (3.00)∗∗∗ (1.22) (0.98)
Legal origin German -1.135 -0.490 -0.572 -1.141 -0.490 -0.571
(3.71)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.33) (3.71)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.32)
Population (log) -0.202 -0.101 -0.080 -0.198 -0.101 -0.076
(9.16)∗∗∗ (4.04)∗∗∗ (4.37)∗∗∗ (8.99)∗∗∗ (3.98)∗∗∗ (4.18)∗∗∗
Democracy 0.016 0.076 0.045 0.018 0.076 0.046
(2.79)∗∗∗ (10.23)∗∗∗ (5.27)∗∗∗ (3.09)∗∗∗ (10.22)∗∗∗ (5.34)∗∗∗
Terror events -0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(4.73)∗∗∗ (0.05) (2.43)∗∗
Observations 2,217 2,219 3,218 2,217 2,219 3,218
Countries 111 111 111 111 111 111
Years 21 21 31 21 21 31
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.37 0.65 0.31 0.37 0.65
Notes: PI refers to the physical integrity rights indicator, ER to the empowerment rights indicator and
CL to the civil liberties indicator. The former two are taken from Cingranelli and Richards (2006)
while the latter stems from Freedom House (2006). The results are derived by running ordered probit
regressions with clustering at the country level and including annual time dummies.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; robust absolute z-statistics are given in paranthe-
ses.
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Table 5.4: Results alternative terror measures – dependent variable: human rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PI ER CL PI ER CL
Lagged dependent 0.539 0.538 1.826 0.540 0.538 1.827
(23.63)∗∗∗ (20.55)∗∗∗ (17.37)∗∗∗ (23.57)∗∗∗ (20.54)∗∗∗ (17.37)∗∗∗
Income lower middle -0.036 -0.067 0.094 -0.033 -0.067 0.094
(0.44) (0.83) (1.37) (0.40) (0.83) (1.38)
Income upper middle 0.249 0.016 0.296 0.252 0.016 0.296
(2.31)∗∗ (0.15) (2.99)∗∗∗ (2.33)∗∗ (0.15) (2.99)∗∗∗
Income high OECD 1.102 0.581 1.398 1.113 0.579 1.399
(6.66)∗∗∗ (2.75)∗∗∗ (7.80)∗∗∗ (6.66)∗∗∗ (2.74)∗∗∗ (7.81)∗∗∗
Income high 0.057 -0.382 -0.010 0.039 -0.375 -0.015
(0.39) (3.41)∗∗∗ (0.08) (0.26) (3.41)∗∗∗ (0.13)
Legal origin British -0.910 -0.359 -0.285 -0.899 -0.359 -0.284
(4.79)∗∗∗ (1.04) (0.73) (4.71)∗∗∗ (1.04) (0.73)
Legal origin French -1.010 -0.316 -0.401 -1.004 -0.317 -0.399
(5.04)∗∗∗ (0.90) (1.03) (4.98)∗∗∗ (0.90) (1.03)
Legal origin Socialist -0.705 -0.464 -0.414 -0.700 -0.465 -0.413
(3.07)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.01) (3.05)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.01)
Legal origin German -1.137 -0.490 -0.573 -1.141 -0.491 -0.573
(3.71)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.33) (3.72)∗∗∗ (1.22) (1.33)
Population (log) -0.202 -0.101 -0.080 -0.199 -0.100 -0.079
(9.10)∗∗∗ (4.04)∗∗∗ (4.35)∗∗∗ (9.01)∗∗∗ (3.96)∗∗∗ (4.37)∗∗∗
Democracy 0.017 0.076 0.046 0.017 0.076 0.045
(2.92)∗∗∗ (10.21)∗∗∗ (5.27)∗∗∗ (2.84)∗∗∗ (10.26)∗∗∗ (5.27)∗∗∗
Suicide attacks -0.031 0.006 -0.013
(3.31)∗∗∗ (0.73) (3.35)∗∗∗
Terror fatalities -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(4.47)∗∗∗ (0.32) (0.74)
Observations 2,217 2,219 3,218 2,217 2,219 3,218
Countries 111 111 111 111 111 111
Years 21 21 31 21 21 31
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.37 0.65 0.31 0.37 0.65
Notes: PI refers to the physical integrity rights indicator, ER to the empowerment rights indicator and
CL to the civil liberties indicator. The former two are taken from Cingranelli and Richards (2006)
while the latter stems from Freedom House (2006). The results are derived by running ordered probit
regressions with clustering at the country level and including annual time dummies.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; robust absolute z-statistics are given in paranthe-
ses.
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effects is not straight forward.20 Note that because of the assumed normal distribution
the sign of the marginal effect changes. For all index values below the mean the marginal
effect will have the opposite sign as the estimated coefficient, while all values above will
have the same signs. Only for the mean value itself the effect is a priori undetermined.
The following example illustrates the interpretation of Table 5.5. The rows “prob-
ability at mean” represent the expected probabilities of obtaining a given index score
when all independent variables are assigned their mean value. Therefore, the proba-
bility to obtain an index value of six is 26.69 percent. An increase in the amount of
terror attacks by one standard deviation would, ceteris paribus, result in a reduction of
the probability of 0.74 percent (i.e., (−0.0004 · 18.44) · 100). While this number is far
from being negligible, the result also implies that the reduction in human rights is not
dramatic. As can be seen, the marginal effects are always significant at the one percent
level.
Table 5.5 also shows the marginal effects of suicide attacks and the number of persons
killed. According to the results, the pattern is quite similar as compared to those of
the number of events. As anticipated, the magnitude of the marginal effect of suicide
attacks is substantially larger than those of a “normal” terror event (almost tenfold).
One additional person killed reduces the probability of obtaining an index value of six
(or seven) by 0.01 percent.
Regarding civil liberties, an increase of terror events by one standard deviation causes
a reduction of the probability to obtain an index value of five by 1.29 percent.21 However,
while five marginal effects are significant at the five percent level, three are not significant
at conventional levels. As before, the marginal effect of suicide attacks is much larger.
Table 5.6, finally, presents the results for the individual components of physical in-
tegrity – the dimension that turned out to be most clearly affected by terror attacks. As
the individual dimensions vary from 0-2 only, variation among high income countries is
extremely low. As a consequence, the results for those countries are completely deter-
20As Greene (2003, p.739) puts it, “without a fair amount of extra calculation, it is quite unclear
how the coefficients in the ordered probit model should be interpreted.”
21The probability of obtaining an index score of five is 43.9 percent (at the mean of all independent
variables).
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Table 5.5: Results marginal effects – dependent variable: human rights
Index value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 E[y]
Physical integrity rights
Probability at mean 0.0004 0.0032 0.0175 0.0587 0.1962 0.2972 0.2669 0.1427 0.0171 5.22
Terror events
Marginal effect 3.7E-06 2.6E-05 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0034
p-value 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Suicide attacks
Marginal effect 4.1E-05 0.0003 0.0012 0.0030 0.0058 0.0018 -0.0046 -0.0062 -0.0013 -0.0379
p-value 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Terror fatalities
Marginal effect 9.8E-07 7.0E-06 3.0E-05 0.0001 0.0001 4.4E-05 -0.0001 -0.0001 -3.2E-05 -0.0009
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Civil liberties
Probability at mean 1.1E-09 0.0001 0.0438 0.5179 0.4309 0.0073 1.1E-07 4.40
Terror events
Marginal effect 1.3E-11 4.2E-07 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0007 -3.8E-05 -1.1E-09 -0.0010
p-value 0.57 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.45 0.02
Suicide attacks
Marginal effect 8.9E-11 2.9E-06 0.0012 0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0003 -7.9E-09 -0.0066
p-value 0.56 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.43 0.00
Notes: This table depicts the marginal effects of the significant coefficients from Tables 5.3 and 5.4. “Probability at mean” gives the probability
of observing a given index value when all independent variables are set to their corresponding sample mean. All marginal effects are calculated
by assigning all independent variables the respective sample mean. The corresponding p-values are given below the coefficient. “E[y]” represents
the expected value of human rights in the “probability at mean”-row and the marginal effect at that index value in the “marginal effect”-row.
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mined in the ordered probit regressions, and some of the regressions do not converge.
We therefore opted to exclude high income countries from the regressions. The dummy
for legal German origin also had to be omitted. Note, however, that the main results
are unchanged by the omission of high income countries.
Which dimensions drive the results? According to Table 5.6, almost all individual
dimensions of physical integrity rights are negatively affected by terror. At least at the
ten percent level of significance, the number of terror events increases the number of
people disappearing, extrajudicial killings, and tortures. Governments restrict physical
integrity rights among all dimensions as a consequence of suicide attacks, also at least
at the ten percent level of significance. Again, the magnitude of the effect is much larger
for suicide attacks. The number of people killed by terrorists increases the number of
people disappearing, with a coefficient significant at the five percent level.
To summarize, there is clear evidence that – on average – governments respond to
terrorism by restricting those very rights they want to protect in the first place. The next
section tests whether the impact of our main variables of interest on physical integrity
rights and civil liberties is robust to the inclusion of additional variables, the method of
estimation, and sample period.
5.7 Tests for Robustness
We pursue various strategies to test the robustness of the impact of terror events on
physical integrity rights and civil liberties. First, we replicate the regression with a
dummy for the occurrence of terror in a given country and year in place of the number
of terror events. Our results might be driven by the linear relationship we impose for
the effect of the number of terror events on physical integrity rights. By assigning the
value of one in cases when at least one terror event occurred we circumvent this problem.
This comes at the cost of reduced information, however.
As our second test for robustness, we exclude those terror events that can be consid-
ered to be marginal. We excluded all events in which no person was physically harmed.
More precisely, we excluded events in which the number of persons killed and the num-
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Table 5.6: Results disaggregation – dependent variable: physical integrity subcomponents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
disa kill impr tort disa kill impr tort disa kill impr tort
Lagged dpn. 1.061 1.121 1.108 0.904 1.076 1.133 1.106 0.914 1.070 1.131 1.108 0.915
(15.04)∗∗∗(17.47)∗∗∗(16.10)∗∗∗(15.17)∗∗∗(15.06)∗∗∗(17.93)∗∗∗(16.01)∗∗∗(15.49)∗∗∗(15.06)∗∗∗(17.92)∗∗∗(16.04)∗∗∗(15.45)∗∗∗
Inc. lwr mid -0.071 0.053 -0.102 -0.104 -0.074 0.039 -0.100 -0.133 -0.073 0.040 -0.101 -0.124
(0.60) (0.50) (0.92) (0.84) (0.64) (0.37) (0.91) (1.06) (0.62) (0.38) (0.91) (0.99)
Inc. upr mid 0.248 0.353 0.127 0.253 0.239 0.334 0.135 0.234 0.231 0.330 0.128 0.232
(2.01)∗∗ (2.62)∗∗∗ (1.08) (1.64) (2.00)∗∗ (2.53)∗∗ (1.14) (1.49) (1.90)∗ (2.50)∗∗ (1.07) (1.48)
L.o. British -0.224 -0.235 -0.290 0.009 -0.238 -0.285 -0.240 -0.289 0.005
(1.07) (1.49) (1.51) (0.05) (1.51) (1.50) (1.51) (1.50) (0.03)
L.o. French -0.404 -0.354 -0.391 -0.059 -0.196 -0.375 -0.396 -0.093 -0.196 -0.373 -0.393 -0.084
(2.16)∗∗ (2.48)∗∗ (2.07)∗∗ (0.38) (1.75)∗ (2.60)∗∗∗ (2.09)∗∗ (0.83) (1.69)∗ (2.59)∗∗∗ (2.07)∗∗ (0.53)
L.o. Socialist 0.223 -0.000 0.223
(1.08) (0.00) (1.07)
Pop. (log) -0.177 -0.190 -0.264 -0.198 -0.184 -0.200 -0.263 -0.211 -0.178 -0.198 -0.262 -0.208
(5.58)∗∗∗ (7.70)∗∗∗ (5.54)∗∗∗ (6.16)∗∗∗ (5.89)∗∗∗ (8.42)∗∗∗ (5.57)∗∗∗ (6.52)∗∗∗ (5.70)∗∗∗ (8.14)∗∗∗ (5.49)∗∗∗ (6.47)∗∗∗
Democracy -0.001 -0.007 0.050 0.016 -0.002 -0.008 0.051 0.015 -0.002 -0.008 0.050 0.014
(0.16) (1.05) (6.77)∗∗∗ (2.06)∗∗ (0.30) (1.19) (6.77)∗∗∗ (1.85)∗ (0.29) (1.20) (6.74)∗∗∗ (1.85)∗
Terror events-0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.017
(1.76)∗ (3.30)∗∗∗ (0.28) (2.42)∗∗
Suicide attacks -0.141 -0.131 -0.183 -1.020
(1.96)∗ (2.66)∗∗∗ (2.86)∗∗∗ (1.80)∗
Terror fatalities -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(2.47)∗∗ (1.35) (0.94) (1.28)
Observations 1,650 1,641 1,646 1,648 1,650 1,641 1,646 1,648 1,650 1,641 1,646 1,648
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
Years 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.24
Notes: This table shows results for the four subindicators of the physical integrity rights indicator: “disa” is disappearances, “kill” is kills,
“impr” is imprisonment and “tort” is torture. “Inc.” represents income, “L.o.” legal origin, “Pop.” population and “dpn.” the endogenous
variable. The results are derived by running ordered probit regressions with clustering at the country level and including annual time dummies.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; robust absolute z-statistics are given in parantheses.
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ber of persons injured were both zero and/or missing. Of course, it is debatable which
threshold constitutes a severe event. We choose the lowest threshold possible. While
this is the most objective threshold from our point of view, we are clearly aware that
events in which no one is physically harmed may still have a major impact, e.g., the
London bombings of July 21, 2005.
Third, we distinguish between domestic and international terror. A domestic incident
is defined as an event in which both the target and the attackers are domestic. To
some extent, the consequences of these forms of terrorism might be different. A priori,
domestic terror might be more likely to increase governments’ respect for human rights
(Hypothesis 5.2), while there is no reason to expect the same for international terror.
To the contrary, when it comes to international terrorism, Hypothesis 5.1 seems more
likely to hold.
Fourth, we split our sample in two sub-periods and investigate whether the negative
impact of terror events holds. As Figure 4 shows, terrorism increased markedly after
1997. We choose this year as cut-off. The increase is to some extent driven by the
explicit inclusion of domestic events from 1998 onwards as noted in the definitions of
the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. However, domestic terror events are also reported
for several cases prior to 1998.
To some extent, fifth, our result might be due to reversed causality. When people
engage in terrorist activities as a consequence of the human rights situation in their
country, low human rights might not be the consequence of terror, but its cause. Tests
for endogeneity show, however, that the exogeneity of terror can not be rejected at
conventional levels of significance. In choosing instruments for terror, we follow Dreher
and Gassebner (2007) showing that countries voting in line with the US in the United
Nations General Assembly and countries with more fractionalized governments are more
frequently the target of terrorist attacks. When we lag terror events by one year instead
of using contemporaneous values, the results also remain unchanged. Still, we deal
with the issue of potential endogeneity in some detail and report results estimated with
2SLS (where terror is instrumented with voting behavior in the General Assembly and
government fractionalization) below.
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Given that our estimation setup includes the lagged dependent variable, 2SLS esti-
mations may, however, suffer from dynamic panel bias. Therefore, we employ the GMM
estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in
addition. We present results employing the two-step estimator implemented by Rood-
man (2006) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. We treat
the lagged dependent variable and the terror events as endogenous and the additional
covariates as strictly exogenous. As before, we include time dummies in the regression.
We report results of the Sargan-Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used
(amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates), and the Arellano-Bond test
of first and second order autocorrelation. While autocorrelation of first order has to be
present in order for the estimator to be consistent, second-order autocorrelation must
be absent. In order to minimize the number of instruments in the regressions we col-
lapse the matrix of instruments as suggested in Roodman (2006). Doing so reduces the
instruments to 85 (physical integrity) and, respectively, 94 (civil liberties).22
In empirical research, an important difficulty is that several models may all seem
reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about the parameters of in-
terest. Hence, as our final test for robustness, we employ the so-called extreme bounds
analysis (EBA) to examine to what extent the number of terror events in a country is
a robust determinant of physical human rights. The EBA has been widely used in the
economic growth literature and became recently one of the standard tools for robustness
analysis in the political economy literature.23 The EBA aims to examine how sensitive
the estimation results are to the inclusion of additional variables. We estimate equations
of the following general form:
RIGHTSi,t = αMi,t + βFi,t + γZi,t + ui,t (5.5)
where M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest; Z
is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and Renelt, 1992) possible additional
22It is necessary to limit the number of instruments because the power of the Sargan-Hansen test is
low when many instruments are used (see Bowsher, 2002).
23For instance, de Haan and Sturm (2000), Sturm et al. (2005) and Inklaar et al. (2007).
128 5. Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data
explanatory variables, which according to the literature may be related to the dependent
variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test as suggested by Leamer (1983)
for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for β – i.e., the lowest value for
β minus two standard deviations – is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β
– i.e., the highest value for β plus two standard deviations – is positive, the variable
F is not robustly related to Y . In our case, the variable of interest is the number of
terror events in a certain year and country. The M vector contains the base variables
as introduced above. In the Z vector, we include the 52 variables suggested in the
robustness analysis of Dreher et al. (2006a). Among them is a dummy for years of war,
political variables like the ICRG indicator of political risk, and economic variables like
trade and government revenue. Table 5.10 in the Appendix lists all variables with their
definitions and sources.
It is rare in empirical research that we can say with certainty that some model
dominates all others in all possible dimensions. In these circumstances, it makes sense
to check how sensitive the findings are to alternative modelling choices. The EBA
provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly this. We report the percentage of
the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from
zero at the 5 percent level as well as the outcomes of the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) test. The CDF test as proposed by Sala-i-Martin (1997) is based on the fraction
of the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the
larger of the areas under the density function either above or below zero; in other words,
regardless of whether this is CDF(0) or 1-CDF(0). So CDF(0) will always be a number
between 0.5 and 1.0. We consider a variable to be robust if the CDF(0) test statistic >
0.95, following Sturm and de Haan (2005).24
24Recently, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) proposed a so-called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates
(BACE) approach to check the robustness of different explanatory variables in growth regressions. This
approach builds upon the approach as suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997) in the sense that different
specifications are estimated (by OLS) to check the sensitivity of the coefficient estimate of the variable
of interest. The major innovation of BACE as compared to Sala-i-Martin’s approach is that there is no
set of fixed variables included and the number of explanatory variables in the specifications is flexible.
The biggest disadvantages of the BACE approach are the need of having a balanced data set, i.e., an
equal number of observations for all regressions (due to the chosen weighting scheme), the restriction of
limiting the list of potential variables to be less than the number of observations and the computational
burden. For a recent application see Lamla (2007).
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Turning to the results of our robustness tests, Table 5.7 shows that the impact
of terror on physical integrity rights is extremely robust as to how terror events are
measured, and the same is true regarding the choice of sample period. In all cases terror
reduces governments’ respect for human rights at the one percent level of significance
(columns 1 to 6). We see that splitting among the time dimension and differentiating
between domestic and international terror does not qualitatively change the previous
results. Furthermore, the significantly smaller (at the one percent level) coefficient of
domestic terror gives mild support to our conjecture that Hypothesis 5.2 is “more” valid
for domestic forms of terror. Note, however, that the net effect is still negative.
Column 7 shows the 2SLS results. Our instruments – voting in line with the US in the
United Nations General Assembly and government fractionalization – are not rejected
by the Sargan-Hansen test at the five percent level of significance (while they are at
the ten percent level). The first stage F-test indicates the power of these instruments,
as they easily pass the threshold of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). As can
be seen, the (negative) impact of terror on human rights remains significant at the ten
percent level.
Column 8 reports results from the GMM estimator. Again, the results remain quali-
tatively unchanged, with the impact of terror being significant at the one percent level.25
Both the Sargan-Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test do clearly not reject the spec-
ification. We take this as evidence that endogeneity is not an issue here and that our
previous results are valid. The GMM approach facilitates the interpretation of the co-
efficient as compared to the ordered probit specifications. An increase in terror attacks
by one standard deviation reduces the physical integrity index by 0.1.
Table 5.8 replicates the analysis for civil liberties. According to the estimates, the
impact of terror on civil liberties is less robust as compared to those on physical integrity
rights. Still, the impact stays significant in the two sub-samples. The same is true when
we focus on severe terrorism only, and distinguish domestic from international terror.
In the instrumental variables and GMM regressions, and when employing a dummy for
25We also estimated the GMM setup for the number of suicide attacks and the number of people
killed. All previous findings remain unchanged.
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Table 5.7: Results tests of robustness – dependent variable: physical integrity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 2SLS GMM
Lagged dependent 0.532 0.536 0.538 0.531 0.532 0.495 0.644 0.306
(23.17)∗∗∗ (23.41)∗∗∗ (23.60)∗∗∗ (22.98)∗∗∗ (22.02)∗∗∗ (9.77)∗∗∗ (27.59)∗∗∗ (6.29)∗∗∗
Income lower middle 0.001 -0.033 -0.034 -0.028 -0.008 -0.034 -0.019 -0.128
(0.02) (0.40) (0.41) (0.34) (0.09) (0.24) (0.24) (0.50)
Income upper middle 0.280 0.252 0.253 0.257 0.226 0.466 0.252 0.483
(2.70)∗∗∗ (2.31)∗∗ (2.35)∗∗ (2.31)∗∗ (1.94)∗ (2.65)∗∗∗ (2.60)∗∗∗ (1.65)
Income high OECD 1.170 1.112 1.118 1.172 1.158 1.501 1.024 2.060
(7.30)∗∗∗ (6.76)∗∗∗ (6.75)∗∗∗ (7.42)∗∗∗ (6.57)∗∗∗ (5.96)∗∗∗ (6.84)∗∗∗ (7.64)∗∗∗
Income high 0.125 0.077 0.051 0.165 0.143 0.267 0.370 0.352
(0.86) (0.56) (0.35) (1.27) (1.22) (1.39) (1.77)∗ (1.14)
Legal origin British -0.897 -0.903 -0.898 -0.859 -0.782 -0.999 0.046 0.299
(5.02)∗∗∗ (4.76)∗∗∗ (4.74)∗∗∗ (4.66)∗∗∗ (3.36)∗∗∗ (3.61)∗∗∗ (0.26) (1.70)∗
Legal origin French -0.979 -1.002 -0.996 -0.929 -0.835 -1.074 0.035 0.035
(5.16)∗∗∗ (5.01)∗∗∗ (4.96)∗∗∗ (4.81)∗∗∗ (3.44)∗∗∗ (3.82)∗∗∗ (0.20) (0.19)
Legal origin Socialist -0.695 -0.701 -0.694 -0.650 -0.603 -0.711 0.387 0.837
(3.21)∗∗∗ (3.07)∗∗∗ (3.03)∗∗∗ (2.93)∗∗∗ (2.25)∗∗ (2.26)∗∗ (1.94)∗ (2.53)∗∗
Legal origin German -1.126 -1.143 -1.140 -1.133 -1.040 -1.496 -0.387 -0.403
(3.65)∗∗∗ (3.72)∗∗∗ (3.71)∗∗∗ (3.68)∗∗∗ (3.16)∗∗∗ (3.40)∗∗∗ (1.55) (1.16)
Population (log) -0.186 -0.198 -0.200 -0.195 -0.177 -0.270 -0.229 -0.446
(8.49)∗∗∗ (8.97)∗∗∗ (9.08)∗∗∗ (8.74)∗∗∗ (7.55)∗∗∗ (6.71)∗∗∗ (8.75)∗∗∗ (8.22)∗∗∗
Democracy 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.023 0.016 0.020 0.033
(3.34)∗∗∗ (3.09)∗∗∗ (2.92)∗∗∗ (3.61)∗∗∗ (4.10)∗∗∗ (1.80)∗ (3.19)∗∗∗ (2.81)∗∗∗
Terror events, dummy -0.188
(2.80)∗∗∗
Severe terror events -0.007
(3.69)∗∗∗
Domestic terror events -0.002
(2.99)∗∗∗
International terror events -0.019
(4.86)∗∗∗
Terror events -0.025 -0.003 -0.014 -0.005
(5.62)∗∗∗ (4.73)∗∗∗ (1.80)∗ (4.58)∗∗∗
Observations 2,217 2,217 2,217 2,217 1,676 541 1,846 2,217
Countries 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111
Years 21 21 21 21 16 5 21 21
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.72
Sargan test (p-value) 0.07 0.55
First stage F-statistic 24.87
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.00
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.33
Notes: This table shows results for the physical integrity rights indicator. Columns 1 to 8 are derived
by running ordered probit regressions with clustering at the country level. Column 7 results from a
two stage least squares regression with government fractionalization and percentage of votes cast in line
with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly as the instruments. Column 8 is obtained by running the
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. All regressions include annual year dummies.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; robust absolute z-statistics are given in paranthe-
ses.
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terror events, however, the impact of terror is no longer significant at conventional levels.
To some extent this is not surprising. The civil liberties index is sometimes used as an
indicator of democracy. Our results also support Abadie (2006) showing democracy
to influence terror. If civil liberties also capture democracy and causality runs from
democracy to terror, it is not surprising that the correlation between terror and civil
liberties does not hold in the instrumental variables regression.
Table 5.9 reports the results of the extreme bounds analysis. As can be seen in
the upper part of the table, the CDF(0) of the three base variables easily exceeds the
threshold of 0.95 when we focus on physical integrity rights. Lagged physical integrity
and population size have a CDF(0) of almost one, while that of democracy is 0.95. The
former two variables are significant at the five percent level in almost all of the approx.
23,000 regressions run; democracy is significant in 80 percent of these regressions. Turn-
ing to our variable of main interest – the number of terror events in a given country
and year – the table shows that the CDF(0) also easily exceeds the critical threshold of
0.95. At the five percent level of significance, the number of terror events is significant
in 96 percent of the regressions run. We conclude that our result is indeed robust to the
inclusion of other variables suggested in the human rights literature.
Turning to civil liberties, the lower part of the table shows that there is no robust
impact of terror. While the results for the other variables are more or less similar to
those described above, the number of terror events exert a significant impact on civil
liberties in only 58 percent of the regressions run. The CDF(0) of 0.88 confirms that the
impact of terror events on civil liberties can not be considered to be completely robust
according to standard criteria.
5.8 Conclusions
We analyzed the link between terror and human rights. Our theoretical model points to
the subjectively perceived danger of a terror attack and the trade off between security
and human rights as major determinants of the level of human rights. Experiencing
an increased threat of terror, citizens update their subjective probability of a terror
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Table 5.8: Results tests of robustness – dependent variable: civil liberties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 2SLS GMM
Lagged dependent 1.827 1.825 1.826 1.825 1.724 2.779 0.836 0.819
(17.41)∗∗∗ (17.34)∗∗∗ (17.35)∗∗∗ (17.33)∗∗∗ (15.86)∗∗∗ (296)∗∗∗ (61.57)∗∗∗ (8.28)∗∗∗
Income lower middle 0.088 0.097 0.095 0.101 0.103 0.172 0.030 0.084
(1.25) (1.41) (1.39) (1.48) (1.44) (5.27)∗∗∗ (1.10) (1.28)
Income upper middle 0.292 0.298 0.298 0.303 0.281 0.481 0.092 0.157
(2.95)∗∗∗ (3.01)∗∗∗ (3.01)∗∗∗ (3.03)∗∗∗ (2.68)∗∗∗ (12.64)∗∗∗ (2.73)∗∗∗ (1.62)
Income high OECD 1.390 1.404 1.405 1.452 1.416 1.687 0.262 0.407
(7.61)∗∗∗ (7.85)∗∗∗ (7.81)∗∗∗ (8.42)∗∗∗ (7.82)∗∗∗ (34.30)∗∗∗ (5.33)∗∗∗ (2.28)∗∗
Income high -0.030 0.007 -0.010 0.053 0.037 0.330 -0.018 -0.029
(0.26) (0.06) (0.08) (0.43) (0.30) (9.32)∗∗∗ (0.25) (0.34)
Legal origin British -0.293 -0.280 -0.281 -0.233 -0.201 -4.502 -0.009 0.046
(0.76) (0.72) (0.72) (0.60) (0.49) (147)∗∗∗ (0.16) (1.17)
Legal origin French -0.412 -0.393 -0.395 -0.324 -0.285 -4.618 -0.035 0.010
(1.07) (1.01) (1.01) (0.83) (0.70) (124)∗∗∗ (0.60) (0.25)
Legal origin Socialist -0.419 -0.414 -0.410 -0.370 -0.386 -4.619 0.011 0.024
(1.03) (1.01) (1.00) (0.91) (0.89) (134)∗∗∗ (0.16) (0.22)
Legal origin German -0.580 -0.575 -0.575 -0.535 -0.473 -5.101 0.031 -0.003
(1.35) (1.33) (1.33) (1.24) (1.03) (111)∗∗∗ (0.36) (0.05)
Population (log) -0.083 -0.076 -0.079 -0.070 -0.064 -0.064 -0.039 -0.029
(4.45)∗∗∗ (4.16)∗∗∗ (4.31)∗∗∗ (3.88)∗∗∗ (3.33)∗∗∗ (25.01)∗∗∗ (4.27)∗∗∗ (1.62)
Democracy 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.047 0.073 0.023 0.023
(5.22)∗∗∗ (5.32)∗∗∗ (5.28)∗∗∗ (5.47)∗∗∗ (4.99)∗∗∗ (19.70)∗∗∗ (6.86)∗∗∗ (1.33)
Terror events, dummy 0.027
(0.54)
Severe terror events -0.005
(2.23)∗∗
Domestic terror events -0.001
(1.68)∗
International terror events -0.012
(2.57)∗∗
Terror events -0.013 -0.002 0.002 -0.000
(2.83)∗∗∗ (11.46)∗∗∗ (0.78) (0.51)
Observations 3218 3218 3218 3218 2671 547 2325 3218
Countries 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111
Years 30 30 30 30 25 5 30 30
Pseudo R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.78 0.93
Sargan test (p-value) 0.37 0.13
First stage F-statistic 30.60
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.00
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.10
Notes: This table shows results for the civil liberties indicator. Columns 1 to 8 are derived by running
ordered probit regressions with clustering at the country level. Column 7 results from a two stage least
squares regression with government fractionalization and percentage of votes cast in line with the U.S. in
the UN General Assembly as the instruments. Column 8 is obtained by running the Blundell-Bond
system GMM estimator. All regressions include annual year dummies.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; robust absolute z-statistics are given in paranthe-
ses.
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Table 5.9: Results EBA – dependent variable: human rights
lower upper
Avg. Beta Avg. S.E. % Sign. CDF(0) Bound Bound
Physical integrity
Lagged dependent 0.524 0.043 99.97 0.9999 -9.38 24.93
Population (log) -0.256 0.049 99.36 0.9985 -26.77 27.98
Democracy 0.025 0.011 80.11 0.9549 -28.56 9.06
Number of terror events -0.009 0.005 96.03 0.9861 -9.15 24.08
Civil liberties
Lagged dependent 3.060 0.157 100.0 0.9999 -1.39 735.45
Population (log) -0.074 0.037 92.99 0.9688 -70.35 119.47
Democracy 0.051 0.018 72.71 0.8972 -35.12 32.89
Terror events -0.016 0.003 57.60 0.8795 -6.40 0.64
Notes: This table shows results for the extreme bounds analysis. All results are obtained by running
ordered probit regressions with clustering at the country level and including annual year dummies as
well as dummies for income and legal origin. “Avg. Beta” and “Avg. S.E.” represent the unweighted
averages of the coefficient and the standard error, respectively. “% Sign.” gives the percentage of
regressions in which the coefficient is significant at the five percent level. “CDF(0)” represents the
unweighted average of the CDF. Results for physical integrity (civil liberties) are based on 22,724
(16,877) combinations with 1,140 (1,771) observations, on average. Table 5.10 in the Appendix lists
the 52 variabes employed in the EBA.
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attack, and hence demand more security at the expense of human rights. Politicians
– in competition with each other – follow this shift of perception and restrict human
rights in the aftermath of a terror attack in political equilibrium. Our empirical results
indicate that governments’ answer to terror indeed is – on average – to restrict freedom.
Our study supports anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments – under the threat
of terror – violate those very rights they want to protect from terror in the first place.
Our empirical analysis suggests a rise in the level of terror to significantly reduce
governments’ respect for basic human rights. According to our results, terror increases
the probability of extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. This result
is extremely robust, as extreme bounds analysis for almost 23,000 regressions shows.
However, the magnitude of the effect is rather small. Specifically, an increase of the
number of terror attacks of one standard deviation reduces the probability of obtaining
a physical integrity score of 6 (out of 8) by 0.74 percent. To some extent, civil liberties
(measured by the Freedom House index) are also restricted as a consequence of terrorism.
However, these results are not completely robust to the specification of the model. We
find no effect of terror on “positive rights” such as political participation, freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of movement.26
Which policy conclusions do arise from this? Clearly, if human rights restrictions
really increase security, people might be willing to trade some of their rights for greater
security. However, whether and to what extent human rights violations actually in-
crease security is not at all obvious. This is even more true, as our analysis shows that
governments reduce physical human rights as a consequence of terror, rather than civil
liberties or empowerment rights. According to Frey and Luechinger (2003) and Frey-
tag et al. (2006), restricting human rights in reaction to terror attacks may reduce the
individual opportunity costs of potential terrorists, and thus rather increase terrorism.
Frey and Luechinger argue that there may be superior strategies than deterrence in
fighting terrorism. The same could hold true for restricting human rights as an answer
to terrorism.
26Note that our data do not cover the major time of the “war against terror” in the aftermath of
9/11. The results do thus not depend on this exceptional event.
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Table 5.10: Variables used in the EBA
Variable Description Source
Age of democracy
Defined as: AGE = (2000 - DEM AGE)/200 and vary-
ing between 0 and 1, with US being the oldest democ-
racy (value of 1).
Persson and
Tabellini (2003)
Age of parties Average age of political parties. Beck et al. (2001)
Area Land area (square kilometer). World Bank (2006)
Catholic Share Share of catholics in population. Persson and
Tabellini (2003)
Constituency Indicates whether the constituencies of the senators
are states/provinces.
Beck et al. (2001)
Debt service Public and publicly guaranteed debt service (% of
GNI).
World Bank (2006)
Dominant religion Percent of dominant religion. Alesina et al.
(2003)
Election year, leg-
islative
Dummy for legislative elections. Beck et al. (2001)
Ethnic fractional-
ization
Index of ethnic fractionalization. Alesina et al.
(2003)
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP). World Bank (2006)
Federalism, dummy Dummy for federal states. Elazar (1996)
Fractionalization Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, approximat-
ing the level of lack of ethnic and linguistic cohesion
within a country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to
1 (strongly fractionalized) and averaging 5 different
indexes.
Persson and
Tabellini (2003)
Gap in schooling Difference between years of schooling male and years
of schooling female.
Barro and Lee
(2000)
GDP GDP in current US$. World Bank (2006)
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (in interna-
tional prices, base 1985).
Penn World Tables
Government debt Central government debt, total (% of GDP). World Bank (2006)
Government em-
ployees
Share of government employees in total employment. World Bank (2001)
Government Frac-
tionalization
“The probability that two deputies picked at random
from among the government parties will be of different
parties.”
Beck et al. (2001)
Government trans-
fers
Transfers to sub-national from other levels of Govern-
ment (% of total sub-national revenues and grants).
IMFs Government
Finance Statistics
Growth GDP growth (annual, percent). World Bank (2006)
Human Develop-
ment Indicator
Composite index based on measures of life expectancy,
literacy, education, and standards of living.
UNDP (2005)
IMF program,
dummy
IMF program is at least five months in effect in a given
year.
Dreher (2006b)
Infant mortality Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births). World Bank (2006)
Investment Gross capital formation (% of GDP). World Bank (2006)
continued on next page...
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Variable Description Source
Investment growth Gross capital formation (annual percent growth). World Bank (2006)
Language fraction-
alization
Index of language fractionalization. Alesina et al.
(2003)
Left government,
dummy
Indicates whether the main government party is left-
wing.
Beck et al. (2001)
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total (years). World Bank (2006)
New state, dummy Dummy for new states. Gallup et al. (2001)
Number of human
rights organizations
Number of human rights related NGOs being repre-
sented in a country.
UIA (2000)
Number of wars Number of wars/conflicts in specific year and country. Ghosn et al. (2004)
Political risk Political Risk Rating, annual averages, ranging from
0-100.
International
Country Risk
Guide
Post election, exec-
utive
Share of the year within after 12 months of an execu-
tive election.
Dreher and Vaubel
(2005)
Post election, legis-
lature
Share of the year within after 12 months of a legislative
election.
Dreher and Vaubel
(2005)
Pre-election, execu-
tive
Share of the year within 12 months of an executive
election.
Dreher and Vaubel
(2005)
Pre-election, legis-
lature
Share of the year within 12 months of a legislative
election.
Dreher and Vaubel
(2005)
Primary schooling Average years of primary schooling in the total popu-
lation.
Barro and Lee
(2000)
Protestant share Share of protestants in population. Persson and
Tabellini (2003)
Religious fraction-
alization
Index of religious fractionalization. Alesina et al.
(2003)
Revenue decentral-
ization
Sub-national Revenues (% of total revenues) IMFs Government
Finance Statistics
Special interests Dummy for special interest executive parties. Beck et al. (2001)
Sub-national Tax
Revenue
Sub-national Tax Revenue (% of total sub-national
revenues and grants).
IMFs Government
Finance Statistics
Tiers Number of government tiers. Treisman (2000)
Tiers, average Average area first tier units (thousands square kilo-
meters per unit).
Treisman (2000)
Trade Exports and Imports (% of GDP). World Bank (2006)
Urban population Urban population (% of total). World Bank (2006)
Vertical imbalance Intergovernmental transfers as a share of sub-national
expenditures.
IMFs Government
Finance Statistics
World Bank
projects
Number of World Bank projects at least five months
in effect in a given year.
Boockmann and
Dreher (2003)
Years in office Indicates the number of years the government chief
executive has been in office.
Beck et al. (2001)
Years left Number of years the government chief executive re-
mains in office.
Beck et al. (2001)
Years of indepen-
dence
Ranging from 0 to 250 (the latter value is used for all
non-colonized countries).
Persson and
Tabellini (2003)
Chapter 6
Terrorism and Cabinet Durability:
Empirical Evidence
6.1 Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), there has been increased aca-
demic interest into the consequences of terrorism. By now, there is abundant empirical
evidence indicating that terrorism affects society in many ways – ranging from increased
mental health problems (e.g., Schuster et al., 2001) to sub-optimal macroeconomic out-
comes (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Blomberg et al., 2004; Blomberg and Hess,
2006; Frey et al., 2007).1
However, these consequences are generally beyond the interest of terrorists as they
use violence or the threat of violence primarily to achieve social or political goals. Their
actions – most often directed against randomly chosen civilians – are intended to create
an atmosphere of fear and to make political decision makers respond to their demands
This chapter is an adapted version of Gassebner et al. (2007c).
1There is of course also ample research on the causes of terrorism (e.g., Krueger and Malecˇkova´,
2003; Abadie, 2006; Dreher and Gassebner, 2007) and counter-terrorism (e.g., Enders and Sandler,
1993; Frey and Luechinger, 2003; Frey and Luechinger, 2004; Sandler, 2005).
137
138 6. Terrorism and Cabinet Durability: Empirical Evidence
– or ultimately to topple existing political regimes.2 The chaos and instability that
arises as a result of terrorist attacks is likely to affect the public opinion regarding the
current government and, in particular, its counter-terrorism policies (Downs-Le Guin
and Hoffman, 1993). If the perception of the public changes with respect to the compe-
tence of the incumbent government, then the position of the government may be at risk.
A relevant question to consider, therefore, is whether terrorism affects the duration of
governments.
There are several political economy models that provide guidance why there may be
a relationship between terrorism and cabinet duration. For instance, Lupia and Strøm
(1995) argue that critical events (e.g., terrorism) affect the public opinion causing a
shift in the power distribution of political parties, which may enforce early elections.
However, there is also a popular belief that the electorate starts to ‘rally around the
flag’ when national security is at stake (Mueller, 1970). Thus, whether terrorism affects
the duration of governments remains an empirical question.
We examine the impact of terrorism on the duration of governments using a panel
data set consisting of more than 150 countries over the period 1968-2002. Our measure
for cabinet duration is taken from Databanks International (2005), while we extract
different terrorist indicators from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. We use different
hazard models in our econometric analysis to take duration dependence into account.
Our chapter relates to several studies focusing on the political effects of terrorism.
Chari (2004) studies the impact of the Madrid train bombings on the 2004 parliamen-
tary elections in Spain. Furthermore, Berrebi and Klor (2006) analyze the interaction
between Palestinian terrorist attacks and election outcomes in Israel. Time series evi-
dence is provided by Chowanietz (2007), who examines the presence of rally effects in
five industrialized countries after terrorist attacks.
The paper that comes closest to our work is Gassebner et al. (2007d), who use panel
data to examine the impact of terrorism on the re-election probability of governments.
Contrasting Gassebner et al. (2007d), we are not primarily interested in the reaction
of the electorate in response to terrorist attacks, but aim to address a more general
2See definitions of terrorism by, e.g., Enders and Sandler (2006) or Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007).
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question: can terrorism explain why some governments last longer than others? The
broader perspective of this chapter implies that we do not solely examine election out-
comes. Instead, we examine all years in which a particular government is in power and,
as said, explicitly model duration dependence.
Our main finding is that terrorism decreases the average time in office of cabinets
and hence increases cabinet instability. Although this result is very robust for different
terrorism measures and different model specifications, we find that the effect varies across
sub-samples. That is, terrorism hardly influences cabinet duration in OECD countries,
nor does it in very autocratic countries. Instead, we observe that especially cabinets
in countries that (frequently) switch from democracy to autocracy (and/or vice versa)
are vulnerable in the presence of terrorism. Finally, we find that the effect of domestic
terrorism is larger than the effect of trans-national terrorism.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2 we derive our
main hypothesis using the theoretical literature on cabinet duration. In section 6.3 we
discuss our data and empirical model. Section 6.4 presents our estimation results. The
final section discusses our results and concludes the chapter.
6.2 Related Literature
There are many studies that examine the question why some cabinets last longer than
others. We opt not to discuss this voluminous literature but refer to surveys by Warwick
(1994) and Grofman and van Roozendaal (1997). The latter provide a typology of five
groups of variables which are proposed to be relevant determinants of cabinet stability.
The first category consists of characteristics of party strength in the legislature and
variables measuring attributes of the cabinet related to party balance. Variables that fall
into this category are, for example, party fractionalization, cabinet size or the effective
number of parties in a cabinet. The second category refers to the ideological structure
of party competition and cabinet composition. Ideological polarization between cabinet
members and dominant central parties in a cabinet belong to this category. Thirdly, the
institutional framework in which the political process takes place is dubbed to be impor-
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tant. Institutional features that are particularly relevant are constitutional procedures
and aspects of legislative organization. The fourth group of variables that affect cabinet
instability are time dependent factors external to the cabinet and the legislature. Vari-
ables in this category are inflation and unemployment. Finally, the fifth group consists
of factors related to the anticipated consequences of dissolution such as the probability
of winning the next election.
We argue that terrorist attacks are events external to the cabinet and the legislature.
These external events (also known as critical events) are the focal point of the events
approach proposed by Browne et al. (1984). The events approach contrasts the so-
called structural approach (encompassing the first three categories listed above), since
preferences of cabinet members may well change over time. Lupia and Strøm (1995)
develop a model that relates critical events to cabinet terminations. Their model starts
from the premise that three parties bargain over a cabinet formation. Once a cabinet
is installed, some unexpected event occurs that alters the power distribution in the
coalition through a public opinion shock. If a coalition member perceives the marginal
costs of remaining in the coalition to be higher than the marginal benefits it is optimal
to end coalition participation.3 When one coalition party decides to opt out, several
scenarios are feasible. It is possible that the former coalition partners renegotiate and
form a new coalition. Likewise, it could be that part of the former coalition forms a new
coalition with one or more opposition parties. Finally, it is possible that new elections
are held. In any case, changes in the composition of the cabinet are a likely consequence
of the critical event.
As terrorists strive for maximum publicity and mainly target civilians, it is likely
that the public opinion regarding the current government alters in the aftermath of an
attack (Lerner et al., 2003). However, it is a priori not clear in which direction the public
3Although the Lupia-Strøm model refers to multiparty systems with an explicit cabinet coalition,
we argue that the ruling party in a two-party system consists of implicit coalitions. These implicit
coalitions are the interest groups that operate within the party. Upon a Lupia-Strøm critical event the
power of these interest groups within the party changes. To maintain unity within the party, party
leaders are likely to dissolve the cabinet and/or replace cabinet members according to the demands of
the interest groups whose power has increased after the critical event. Hence, for the purpose of this
chapter we do not need to differentiate between two-party and multi-party systems.
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opinion will shift. The popularity of the incumbent government can be affected either
positively or negatively. Hetherington and Nelson (2003), for instance, document that
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Gallup Poll approval ratings for U.S. President Bush
improved from 51 percent on September 10 to 86 percent on September 15. According
to Mueller (1970), this so called ‘rally around the flag’ phenomenon occurs when events
happen that: (1) are international, (2) involve the United States and in particular the
U.S. President and (3) are specific, dramatic and sharply focused. More recent studies
argue that rally effects are not specific to the United States only, but also occurred in, for
instance, Great Britain (Lai and Reiter, 2005) and Israel (Arian and Olzaeker, 1999).
Although rally effects are mostly observed in cases of international (armed) conflict,
there is some evidence that rally effects may also occur in the aftermath of terrorist
attacks (Chowanietz, 2007).
It is also possible that the public opinion shifts away from the incumbent govern-
ment. Gassebner et al. (2007d) argue that national security is arguably one of the most
important public goods. Hence, the electorate may perceive a successful terrorist attack
as a failure of one of the governments rudimentary processes (Holmes, 2001). This view
can be traced back the models of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), in which the elec-
torate holds the incumbent government accountable for the provision of public goods.
Focusing on cabinet changes in election years, they conclude that the probability that
the government will be ousted from office increases with approximately twelve percent
after a terrorist attack.
It is ex ante not clear whether terrorism affects the tenure of cabinets positively or
negatively. Therefore, we turn to an empirical analysis to establish a definitive answer
on our research question.
6.3 Data and Method
To examine whether terrorism can explain why some governments remain longer in office
than others, we employ time series cross section (TSCS) data for more than 150 countries
over the period 1968-2004. An important issue in the modeling of duration data is to
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take account of temporal dependence. Therefore, we incorporate the suggestions of
Beck et al. (1998) in a conditional fixed effects logit (CFEL) model (see Chamberlain,
1980).4 It turns out that in each specification the inclusion of the duration dependence
parameters are jointly significant at the 1 percent level.5 We thus estimate equations of
the following form:
cit =
∑
j
δjt + αi + βTit + γXit + ǫit (6.1)
where cit is a binary variable equal to 1 if the cabinet of country i is replaced in a
given year t and 0 if the cabinet of country i in year t remains in office.
∑
j δjt takes
the temporal dependence into account and consists of the years since the last cabinet
change and three temporal splines. αi is a country specific effect that accounts for all
characteristics specific to country i. Tit denotes our terror measure. Xit is a vector of
control variables and ǫit is an error term.
Our dependent variable, cabinet duration, is taken from Databanks International
(2005). This source provides data on the number of cabinet changes per year. As the
data limits our analysis to yearly observations, we discard multiple cabinet changes
per year in our analysis and assume that for those years only one cabinet change has
occurred.6 Figure 6.1 shows the empirical distribution of the time in office of the cabinets
in our data set. It shows that there are 5,419 cabinets in our sample of which only 52
percent last more than one year. The average duration of a cabinet is 1.9 years (not
4Our choice for a CFEL conditional fixed effects logit model is based on Hausman tests (Hausman,
1978). We test the null-hypothesis that all country fixed effects equal zero by comparing the estimates
of a conditional fixed effects logit (CFEL) model and the unrestricted (pooled) logit model. The null-
hypothesis of no country specific effects is rejected for all model specifications. Hence, CFEL should
be preferred.
5In addition, we have also estimated other duration models such as a Cox proportional hazard model
with time varying covariates. As these results are very similar to the results presented in the next
section, we exclude them for readability reasons (results are available upon request). For a discussion
on the equivalence of duration models and their solution, see Beck et al. (1998). For a general discussion
of duration models, see Kiefer (1988). For a discussion of using Hazard models in the context of cabinet
duration see Carmignani (2002).
6In our view, this is only of limited influence on our estimates as only 3.5 percent of all cases exhibit
more than one cabinet change per year (208 out of 5,419 observations).
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Figure 6.1: Empirical distribution of cabinet duration
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Notes: The figure gives the empirical distribution of the time in office (measured in years) of the
cabinets for our sample (N=5,419 observations).
shown), while the longest duration observed in our sample is the government of Bhutan,
which remained in office for 27 years (1971-1998).
We construct different indicators measuring terrorism on the basis of information
assembled by the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.7 This source provides data on trans-
national terrorism – cases in which the attacker and/or target are of foreign nationality
– for individual countries over the period 1968-2004.8 Our main indicator is the number
of terror events for each country and year.9 To probe the robustness of our results, we
7Available at: http://www.tkb.org/. The Terrorism Knowledge Base defines terror as “violence,
or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm.” Terror is used to
discourage the adversaries from acting at their free will. The motives for engaging in terror are political
while the acts themselves are generally conducted in a way that will achieve maximum publicity, mainly
by attacking civilians. Moreover, terrorist acts are mostly intended to create more than immediate
physical damage – a long-time situation of fear and intimidation.
8It also provides data on domestic terrorism for the period 1998-2004. We use the data on domestic
terrorism in our robustness analysis.
9Territories are assigned to the country formally governing the territory. Kashmir and the Persian
Gulf are excluded as it is not obvious to which country they should be assigned to.
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also use data on the number of suicide attacks, the number of casualties and the number
of casualties per terrorist attack. The last two measures have the additional advantage
that they allow us to examine whether terrorist attacks with many casualties have a
larger impact on cabinets than terror events without casualties.
Figure 6.2 shows the variation over time for our different terror measures. It shows
an upward trend of terror events in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a steady decline
in the 1990s and – again – a rise from 2001 onwards. Furthermore, it shows that the
number of casualties and suicide attacks have been relatively stable over time, but have
increased sharply since 2001. Besides, terrorism is also a world wide phenomenon. Out
of 208 countries in our dataset, only in 27.4 percent (57) of the countries no terrorist
attack was recorded over our sample period. Whereas large part of the world did face
some terror, however, most attacks have happened in only a few countries. That is, the
top ten countries that had most terrorist attacks account for 48.7 percent of all terrorist
attacks in the world.10
We use an extensive set of control variables in our model. The selection of these
variables is based on Grofman and van Roozendaal (1997). Before discussing these
variables, it is important to note that all our model specifications contain fixed country
effects. This implies that we need not to include variables that have no variation over
time as they are fully absorbed by the country fixed effects.
To proxy for the ideological differences within cabinets we include the polarization
variable of the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) in our regressions.
This variable indicates to which extent government parties have the same ‘political
color.’ From the same data source, we include two proxies for political coherence. That
is we include a fractionalization variable (i.e., the probability that two randomly drawn
members of the cabinet are from the same political party) and a variable that measures
the number of years that the largest party is part of the cabinet. The latter is a proxy
for the stability of coalitions.
10The top ten countries are (number of events in parenthesis): Israel (818), Lebanon (608), France
(537), Germany (471), United States (446), Greece (403), Colombia (379), Iraq (357), Turkey (351)
and Peru (326). The total number of recorded events is 9,624.
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Figure 6.2: Transnational terror events and fatalities
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Notes: The figure visualizes our measures of terror from 1968 to 2004. The left hand scale quantifies
the number of transnational terror events and the number of transnational suicide events. The right
hand scale measures fatalities caused by transnational terror attacks.
We include two variables that proxy for the political regime. That is, we include the
Polity IV score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000) as a measure for democracy.11 The reason
is that cabinets in more democratic settings are more likely to be held accountable
by the electorate than cabinets installed by a dictator. A different reason to include
this variable is that the polity variable is based on criteria that relate to the legislative
organization of elections such as the constraints that are put on the chief executive
(political leaders). In addition to the inclusion of a democracy variable, we include the
number of years the political regime is in place (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). We believe
that cabinets in infant political systems are more likely to fall than cabinets in more
mature systems as new political systems may not have much experience with electoral
processes.
11We have run several models using alternative measures for democracy such as the measure by
Przeworski et al. (2000) and Vanhanen (2000). It turns out that the results are robust for these
alternative measures. All results are available on request.
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In accordance with the literature, we also include variables related to the economic
situation in our model. More specifically, we include the inflation rate as well as the
level and the growth rate of GDP per capita. To ensure that the causality runs from
the economic situation to cabinet changes and not vice versa, we use the lag of these
variables.12
Finally, we include other ‘critical’ events in the model as they are a priori as likely
as terrorism to affect cabinet duration. These variables are: the number of mass (non-
violent) demonstrations, the number of strikes and the number of riots. These three
variables are taken from Databanks International (2005) and reflect mass civil protest
(see Jong-A-Pin, 2006). We use political violence variables like the number of purges the
number of guerrilla warfare attacks (both taken from Databanks International, 2005)
as well as a dummy variable that indicates the presence of a civil war (Gleditsch et
al., 2002). Furthermore, we include different ‘crisis’ variables, i.e., the number of major
government crises (Databanks International, 2005), the presence of a banking crisis
(Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999) and the presence of a currency crisis (Dreher et al., 2006b).
All variables, their exact definition and sources are presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Variables – definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Cabinet change
Replacement of the premier minister and/or the
replacement of at least half of the ministers in the
cabinet.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Terror events Number of terror events per country and year. MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base
Suicide attacks Number of terror events involving suicide attack-
ers.
MIPT
Assassinations Any politically motivated murder or attempted
murder of a high government official or politician.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Terror events
w/o 0
Number of severe terror events. Excluding events
in which neither persons were killed nor injured.
MIPT
Sum of fatalities Number of persons killed by terrorist attacks. MIPT
Fatalities per
event
Number of persons killed divided by the number
of terror events.
MIPT
Terror dummy Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if at least
one transnational terror event occurred.
MIPT
continued on next page...
12The results, however, remain unchanged we use the contemporaneous values in the analysis.
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Variable Definition Source
Major govern-
ment crises
Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to
bring the downfall of the present regime, excluding
situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Currency crisis Dummy variable, 1 if currency index value exceeds
mean by one standard deviation.
Dreher et al.
(2006b)
Banking crisis Dummy variable, 1 if in a period of systemic bank-
ing crisis.
Caprio and Klinge-
biel (1999)
Democracy Polity IV score, represents the difference between a
countries democracy and autocracy score. Ranges
from -10 to 10, higher numbers indicate more
democracy.
Marshall and Jag-
gers (2000)
Regime duration The number of years that a political regime is in
place.
Marshall and Jag-
gers (2000)
Economic growth
per capita
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita
based on constant local currency.
World Bank (2006)
GDP per capita GDP (in constant 2000 US$) divided by midyear
population.
World Bank (2006)
Inflation GDP deflator. World Bank (2006)
Civil war Dummy variable, 1 if at least 1,000 battle related
deaths per year in a conflict between the govern-
ment of a state and internal opposition groups
without foreign intervention.
Gleditsch et al.
(2002)
Purges Number of systematic repressions (or elimina-
tions) by jailing or execution of political opposi-
tion within the rank of the regime or the opposi-
tion.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Guerilla warfare Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried
on by independent bands of citizens or irregular
forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present
regime.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Riots Any violent demonstration or clash of more than
100 citizens involving the use of physical force.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Strikes Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service
workers that involves more than one employer and
that is aimed at national government policies or
authority.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
Demonstrations Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 peo-
ple for the primary purpose of displaying or voic-
ing their opposition to government policies or au-
thority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly
anti-foreign nature.
Databanks Inter-
national (2005)
continued on next page...
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Variable Definition Source
Political fraction-
alization
The probability that two deputies picked at ran-
dom from the legislature will be of different par-
ties.
Beck et al. (2001)
Polarization Maximum polarization between the executive
party and the four principle parties of the legis-
lature.
Beck et al. (2001)
Years of party in
government
Number of years that the party of the chief exec-
utive has been in office.
Beck et al. (2001)
6.4 Empirical Results
Table 6.2 shows our estimation results. As our dataset is unbalanced, we examine in
columns 1-6 the impact of terrorism on cabinet dissolution in the presence of different
explanatory variables. We have clustered the explanatory variables in different groups
and as such the columns show whether the effect of terrorism is robust for the inclusion
of variables from this particular group. We distinguish between variables representing
economic and political crisis, institutional variables, economic variables, indicators of
political violence, indicators reflecting mass civil protest and variables measuring at-
tributes of the incumbent government. It can be seen that no matter what control
group is included in the model, terrorism is always statistically significant at the one
percent level. Furthermore, we find that the coefficient of the terrorism variable is hardly
affected by the different sets of control variables.
Concerning the other explanatory variables, all variables except inflation are of the
expected sign. Here, we briefly comment on their significance. First, we find that the
majority of these variables is significant. In column 1, we find that both major govern-
ment crises and banking crises increase the probability of cabinet dissolution. Currency
crises, however, are not related to cabinet dissolution. In column 2, we find that both
institutional variables are highly significant and of the expected sign: cabinet changes
are more likely in more democratic countries while they occur less frequently in stable
political systems. In the group of economic indicators, we find that low economic growth
in particular is related to cabinet termination. Inflation is also marginally significant.
The negative sign might be a little bit surprising as this means that inflation decreases
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Table 6.2: Results conditional fixed effects logit – dependent variable: cabinet change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Terror events (log) 0.173 0.184 0.223 0.219 0.240 0.196 0.111
(2.68)∗∗∗ (3.30)∗∗∗ (3.85)∗∗∗ (4.01)∗∗∗ (4.47)∗∗∗ (2.72)∗∗∗ (1.78)∗
Major government crises 0.957 0.629
(9.80)∗∗∗ (7.66)∗∗∗
Currency crisis 0.080
(0.72)
Banking crisis 0.278
(2.44)∗∗
Democracy 0.038 0.047
(4.78)∗∗∗ (5.19)∗∗∗
Regime duration -0.013 -0.009
(3.76)∗∗∗ (2.45)∗∗
Lagged economic growth -0.015 -0.013
per capita (2.79)∗∗∗ (2.18)∗∗
Lagged inflation -9.3E-05 -1.1E-04
(1.66)∗ (1.96)∗
Lagged GDP per capita (log) -0.186
(1.44)
Civil War 0.589 0.603
(3.55)∗∗∗ (3.23)∗∗∗
Purges (log) 0.416 0.565
(2.71)∗∗∗ (2.93)∗∗∗
Guerilla warfare (log) 0.269
(2.16)∗∗
Riots (log) 0.239 0.312
(2.62)∗∗∗ (3.56)∗∗∗
Strikes (log) 0.058
(0.45)
Demonstrations (log) 0.328
(4.09)∗∗∗
Political fractionalization 1.270
(5.05)∗∗∗
Polarization 0.008
(0.10)
Years of party in government 0.001
(0.25)
Observations 4,246 4,784 4,789 5,344 5,835 3,170 4,099
Countries 175 157 175 170 191 152 152
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05
Notes: The estimation technique used is conditional fixed effect logit. The Hausman test for
specification rejects a random effects model for all specifications at the 5%-significance level. All
specifications include the years since the last cabinet change and three temporal splines to account for
duration dependence in the data.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute value of z-statistics is given in parentheses.
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the probability of cabinet terminations. This might be driven by a short-run Phillips
curve effect in developing countries. In any case, the effect is very small. In columns
4 and 5, all indicators for political violence and mass civil protest, except the num-
ber of strikes, are significant. Out of the group of variables reflecting attributes of the
incumbent government, only the degree of fractionalization turns out to be significant.
As we have included only one control group in each specification, the results in
columns 1-5 could be biased due to omitted variables. Therefore, we also follow a differ-
ent modeling strategy. That is, we start with the general unrestricted model including
all explanatory variables simultaneously. Next, we drop the least significant variable
from the regression and estimate the model again. We repeat this so-called general-to-
specific procedure until only significant variables remain. Again, most of the covariates
that are significant in columns 1-5 end up in the final model specification. Only the
number of demonstrations, the presence of guerrilla warfare and the fractionalization
measure are not robust. Our measure of terrorism is significant at the ten percent level
and the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than in previous specifications.
To test the robustness of our results further, we replace our terrorism variable for
various alternative terrorism measures. We use the general-to-specific model specifica-
tion of column 7 as our benchmark specification. The results are shown in Table 6.3.
First, we include the lagged number of terrorist attacks as it may take some time before
a cabinet reacts to a critical event.13 This variable is significant at the five percent
level. Next, we include the number of suicide attacks and the number of political assas-
sinations as especially these events are likely to affect the public opinion. We find that
both terror measures are highly significant. To examine whether the intensity of terror
influences the duration of cabinets, we include different indicators related to the number
of victims. We include the number of terror events with at least one person harmed, the
sum of all fatalities due to terrorism in a particular year, the average number of fatalities
per event and a dummy indicating the presence of terror. In our view, a remarkable
pattern stands out. That is, the average number of fatalities and the presence of terror
are insignificant, while all the other variables are significant. This lends support to the
13Including lagged values also mitigates potential endogeneity problems.
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view that it is not the presence of terrorism as such that affects the duration of cabinets.
However, it is the severity of terrorism that matters. In particular, terrorist attacks that
involve relatively many casualties are likely to affect the probability that the cabinet
dissolves.
To get a grasp at the magnitude of our estimated relationships we calculate the
marginal effects for our terror measures. We focus on specification 7 of Table 6.2 and
Table 6.3. The results are displayed in Table 6.4.14 Given our logarithmic set-up one
cannot directly see the effect of one additional terror attack. We therefore calculate the
effect of a one unit change of the respective terror measure.15 The result is that, at the
mean of all variables, one additional terror attack increases the likelihood of a cabinet
change by one percent at a significance level of ten percent. Using lagged terror events
increases both the magnitude of the effect and its significance level. This implies that
it might indeed need some time for the political process to react to terror. Turning to
suicide attacks we can confirm the findings of chapter 5. Again, we find that terrorists
who voluntarily give their life for their cause trigger bigger reactions. Here, we find that
an additional suicide attack increases the probability of a cabinet dissolution by almost
15 percent. When turning to the next three measures, all of which proxy the severity
of terror attacks, we find that more severe attacks increase the likelihood of a cabinet
change. The biggest effect stems from the political assassination variable. But the same
conclusion can be drawn from more severe terror attacks (the marginal effect is doubled
as compared to taking all terror attacks into account) and the number of people killed
by terrorist activity. The sole existence of terror does not matter, however. This is
demonstrated by the insignificance of fatalities per event and a simple terror dummy.
In order to further test the robustness of our findings we re-run our analysis using
different sub-samples. The results of these additional tests of robustness are suppressed
for readability reasons but are available upon request. First we separated OECD and
non-OECD countries. We find that OECD countries do not dissolve their cabinets
14In order to calculate the marginal effect all variables are assigned their mean value and the fixed
effects are set to zero.
15We do so by calculating the marginal effect of the change in logarithms and transfer this effect into
the effect of a one unit change of the underlying variable.
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Table 6.3: Results alternative terror measures – dependent variable: cabinet change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Major government crises 0.637 0.640 0.618 0.628 0.630 0.634 0.635
(7.74)∗∗∗ (7.77)∗∗∗ (7.49)∗∗∗ (7.63)∗∗∗ (7.66)∗∗∗ (7.71)∗∗∗ (7.72)∗∗∗
Democracy 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.048
(5.16)∗∗∗ (5.10)∗∗∗ (5.04)∗∗∗ (5.18)∗∗∗ (5.15)∗∗∗ (5.19)∗∗∗ (5.22)∗∗∗
Regime duration -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(2.40)∗∗ (2.74)∗∗∗ (2.48)∗∗ (2.46)∗∗ (2.57)∗∗ (2.58)∗∗∗ (2.56)∗∗
Lagged economic growth -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
per capita (2.14)∗∗ (2.20)∗∗ (2.08)∗∗ (2.18)∗∗ (2.22)∗∗ (2.22)∗∗ (2.21)∗∗
Lagged inflation -1.2E-04 -1.1E-04 -1.1E-04 -1.1E-04 -1.1E-04 -1.1E-04 -1.1E-04
(2.01)∗∗ (1.93)∗ (1.99)∗∗ (1.93)∗ (1.93)∗ (1.93)∗ (1.94)∗
Civil War 0.584 0.643 0.569 0.602 0.605 0.629 0.640
(3.13)∗∗∗ (3.48)∗∗∗ (3.03)∗∗∗ (3.23)∗∗∗ (3.25)∗∗∗ (3.39)∗∗∗ (3.45)∗∗∗
Purges (log) 0.558 0.567 0.536 0.567 0.568 0.567 0.569
(2.89)∗∗∗ (2.94)∗∗∗ (2.75)∗∗∗ (2.94)∗∗∗ (2.95)∗∗∗ (2.94)∗∗∗ (2.95)∗∗∗
Riots (log) 0.314 0.328 0.284 0.316 0.321 0.323 0.323
(3.59)∗∗∗ (3.75)∗∗∗ (3.22)∗∗∗ (3.62)∗∗∗ (3.68)∗∗∗ (3.70)∗∗∗ (3.70)∗∗∗
Terror events (log), t-1 0.166
(2.66)∗∗∗
Suicide attacks (log) 1.038
(2.47)∗∗
Assassinations (log) 0.388
(3.43)∗∗∗
Terror events w/o 0 (log) 0.204
(2.35)∗∗
Sum of fatalities (log) 0.113
(2.10)∗∗
Fatalities per event (log) 0.088
(1.10)
Terror dummy 0.006
(0.06)
Observations 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099
Countries 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Notes: The estimation technique used is conditional fixed effect logit. The Hausman test for
specification rejects a random effects model for all specifications at the 5%-significance level. All
specifications include the years since the last cabinet change and three temporal splines to account for
duration dependence in the data. ‘w/o 0’ indicates that all terror events in which neither fatalities nor
injuries occurred are excluded.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute value of z-statistics is given in parentheses.
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Table 6.4: Marginal effects of terror – dependent variable: cabinet change
Variable Marginal Effect p-value Mean
Terror events 0.010 0.073 0.497
Terror events, t-1 0.014 0.007 0.496
Suicide attacks 0.149 0.013 0.007
Assassinations 0.050 0.001 0.114
Terror events w/o 0 0.023 0.018 0.234
Sum of fatalities 0.012 0.035 0.262
Fatalities per event 0.011 0.270 0.131
Terror dummy 0.001 0.953 0.114
Notes: The table contains the marginal effects of terror based on a one unit change of the respective
measure. It utilizes the conditional fixed effects logit regressions of specification (7) of Table 6.2 (Terror
events) and Table 6.3. The marginal effect is calculated for the value of each independent variable set
to its mean and the fixed effect set to zero. The column ‘Mean’ reports the mean of the respective
terror variable that is used to calculate the marginal effect. ‘w/o 0’ indicates that all terror events in
which neither fatalities nor injuries occurred are excluded.
as a result of terror. Our findings for the overall sample are mainly driven by the
non-OECD countries. Digging deeper in this matter we distinguish between political
stable countries and unstable countries. We measure political stability by changes in
the Przeworski et al. (2000) democracy dummy. We find that stable autocracies, i.e.,
countries that never score the value of one on the democracy dummy, do not react to
terror. This means that rulers of such countries obviously have obtained the knowledge
to withstand all forms of uprising. As our final test of robustness we turn to domestic
rather than transnational terror. This has the disadvantage of a very short time span
(from 1998 onwards). Keeping that caveat in mind we find that reactions to domestic
terror are more pronounced. Domestic terror is most likely caused by factors specific to
each country. It is probable that discontent with the political landscape is among these
factors.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the impact of terrorism on cabinet durability for a panel of more
than 150 countries for the period between 1968 and 2002. We employ conditional fixed
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effect logistic regression to analyze the factors influencing the probability of a cabinet
change to occur. We find that terrorism and political violence in general greatly under-
mines the stability of governments. This implies that governments are highly aware of
critical events that change the political force field and that they react to these events by
reforming the cabinet. Besides terrorism and political violence we find that economic
success in the past significantly enforce the position of governments in office. Further-
more, the institutional setup of the political system greatly affects cabinet stability. We
test the sensitivity of our findings by replicating our analysis using different sub-samples.
We find that terror provokes cabinet dissolutions mainly in non-OECD countries and in
political unstable societies.
Given that our methodology allows for the analysis of time varying events, a whole
new field of possible critical events may be studied. One could think of economic and
social crises and so on. Another interesting field of research from a political perspective
would be to analyze whether the cabinets that follow those ousted out of office more
closely follow government policies that abide to the terrorists wishes or that a terrorist
attack literally backfires.
Chapter 7
Terrorism and Electoral
Accountability: One Strike, You’re
Out!
7.1 Introduction
After examining the effect of transnational terror on cabinet durability in general, we
now turn our focus to a more specific question: does terror influence election outcomes?
The motivation for this analysis is taken from the recent past. On March 11, 2004
several bombs exploded in four commuter trains around Madrid killing almost two-
hundred people. Only three days later general elections were held in which the Aznar
administration was replaced. While both events could have been driven separately by
the Spanish participation in the Iraq war, we argue that there is a systematic linkage
between terrorism and electoral accountability. Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) show
that the electorate holds the government accountable for the provision of public goods.
As national security is arguably one of the most important public goods, terrorist attacks
This chapter is an adapted version of Gassebner et al. (2007d).
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are likely to affect the government’s re-election probability.1 We examine the relationship
between terrorism and electoral accountability using a conditional fixed effects logit
model and a dataset containing more than 800 elections in 115 countries.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the ensuing section derives our hypothesis. Sec-
tion 7.3 provides our estimation results. Section 7.4 concludes.
7.2 Theoretical Background
The political economy literature provides two different entries to investigate the effect
of terrorism on the probability of government replacement. These are the literature on
electoral accountability originating in the work of Barro (1973) and the game theoretical
approach on coalition termination by Lupia and Strøm (1995).
The electoral accountability approach of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) is based
on the idea that incumbent governments face a trade-off between rent extraction and
public goods provision. In order to obtain enough votes at the next election, the incum-
bent needs to provide a minimal amount of public goods to appear competent in the eyes
of the electorate. If this minimal amount of public goods is not provided, the incumbent
is judged to be incompetent and will be replaced at the next election. Regarding terror-
ism, the electorate generally does not observe how much public good is provided. That
is, voters do not, or at least not completely, observe the counter terrorism activities of
the government. However, they do observe the number of terror events that material-
ize. As the number of terror events is believed to be decreasing in both the amount
of resources spent by the government on terror protection and the competence of the
government, the amount of terrorism provides a signal about the competence of the in-
cumbent. If the electorate believes that the level of terror under the current government
is too high (relative to the expected level of terror under a different government), the
incumbent government is more likely to be ousted from office.
1While election outcomes and cabinet changes are mainly of interest to political scientists, recent
studies find evidence that changes in government affect macroeconomic outcomes such as economic
growth (Jones and Olken, 2005) and inflation (Aisen and Veiga, 2006).
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The game theoretical approach of Lupia and Strøm (1995) explains why single events
might cause the fall of a cabinet. Their model starts from the premise that three
parties have bargained about a cabinet coalition. After the government was formed, an
unexpected event (such as a terrorist attack) occurs that alters the power distribution
within the coalition through a public opinion shock. After the shock it may become
beneficial for one of the coalition members to opt out of the coalition to enforce early
elections. As a consequence of the public opinion shock, it is very likely that a different
coalition will be installed after the elections.
Both theoretical approaches lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7.1. Terrorism increases the probability that the incumbent government is
replaced at the next election.
7.3 Empirical Analysis
We examine the effect of terrorism on the probability of government replacement using
a conditional fixed effects logit model as proposed by Chamberlain (1980). We focus
on more than 800 elections in about 115 countries over the period 1969-2002. Our
terrorism indicators are from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
(MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base (2006).2 Our main terrorism indicator is the yearly
number of total terror events in a country. As a test for robustness, we also present
results using alternative indicators based on the number of casualties as well as various
dummy variables. The pairwise correlation coefficients between all used indicators are
shown in Table 7.1.
Our regression model is as follows:
cit = αi + δt + βTit + γXit + ǫit (7.1)
2The MIPT defines an act of terror as “violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and
alarm.” Terror is used to discourage others from acting at their free will. The motives for engaging
in terror are political while the acts themselves are generally conducted in a way that will achieve
maximum publicity, mainly by attacking civilians. Moreover, terrorist acts are mostly intended to
create more than immediate physical damage – a long-time situation of fear and intimidation. See
http://www.tkb.org/.
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Table 7.1: Correlation matrix terror indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Transnational terror event 1.00
(2) Transnational terror event, t-1 0.75 1.00
(3) Transnational terror event dummy 0.83 0.58 1.00
(4) Transnational terror event w/o 0 0.84 0.65 0.63 1.00
(5) Transnational terror event w/o 0 dummy 0.76 0.55 0.73 0.87 1.00
(6) Fatal transnational terror event dummy 0.30 0.18 0.58 -0.12 -0.13 1.00
(7) Transnational terror event dummy, no bodily harm 0.69 0.52 0.63 0.82 0.86 -0.11 1.00
(8) Sum of fatalities 0.65 0.49 0.51 0.81 0.70 -0.09 0.81 1.00
(9) Fatalities per event 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.52 0.59 -0.08 0.68 0.86 1.00
(10) Fatalities per event w/o 0 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.12 1.00
Notes: Correlation coefficients are based on all available observations (N=7488). We use the logarithm of the variables that are based on events
to mitigate the effect of outlying observations. ‘w/o 0’ indicates that all terror events without fatalities or injuries are excluded. Terror event
dummy no bodily harm is a dummy taking on the value of 1 if at least one terror attack occurred but no person was killed or injured and 0
otherwise. Fatal terror event dummy is a dummy taking on the value of 1 if at least one fatal terror attack occurred and zero otherwise.
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where cit is a binary variable equal to 1 if the cabinet of country i is replaced in an
election year t and 0 if the cabinet of country i in year t remains in office after elections.3
Data on elections and cabinet changes are taken from Databanks International (2005).
αi is a country specific effect that accounts for all characteristics specific to country i and
δt is a time fixed effect that accounts for all variation common to year t.
4 Tit denotes our
terror measure. Xit is a vector of control variables and ǫit is an error term. We control
for a broad set of variables, which have been suggested to affect cabinet change (see
Grofman and van Roozendaal, 1997, for an extensive overview). These variables can be
categorized as follows: (i) macroeconomic variables, (ii) crises variables (both economic
and political), (iii) political regime variables, (iv) indicators of political violence and (v)
variables capturing mass civil protest.5
Our estimation results are reported in Table 7.2. The terror indicator is included in
each regression. Columns (1)-(5) contain the estimates when the different sets of control
variables are included. In column (6) all control variables are included simultaneously.
As this specification decreases our sample and many of the controls are insignificant,
we subject our model to a general-to-specific procedure in which we dropped the least
significant variable at every stage of the test-procedure until only significant variables
remain. The result of this analysis is displayed in column (7). In the remainder of our
analysis we use this parsimonious model specification.6
Our main finding is that the number of terror events is significant at the 5%-level
in all specifications. The positive sign indicates that the presence of terror increases
3A cabinet change is defined as the replacement of the premier and/or the replacement of at least
50 percent of the ministers in cabinet.
4Using Hausman tests, we checked for the inclusion of common effects as well as random effects.
Both types of effects are rejected at the 5 percent significance level for all specifications. The presence
of time effects are examined using Wald tests. The null-hypothesis of no time effects is rejected for all
specifications.
5The economic variables are taken from the World Bank (2006). The data on critical political events
are from Databanks International (2005). The political regime variables are from the Polity IV dataset
of Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The data on banking crises are from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and
currency crises data are from Dreher et al. (2006b).
6We also conducted the extreme bounds analysis of Sala-i-Martin (1997), in which the same variables
turn out to be robustly related to cabinet changes. The results of both test procedures are available
upon request.
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Table 7.2: Results conditional logit – dependent variable: cabinet change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Transnational terror 0.434 0.476 0.366 0.409 0.474 0.389 0.439
events (log) (2.68)∗∗∗ (2.40)∗∗ (2.32)∗∗ (2.64)∗∗∗ (3.16)∗∗∗ (1.68)∗ (2.75)∗∗∗
Lagged inflation 7.1E-05 0.002
(0.25) (1.35)
Lagged economic growth -0.029 -0.016
p.c. (1.55) (0.50)
Lagged GDP p.c. -0.620 0.226
(1.59) (0.31)
Major government crises 0.539 0.604
(1.87)∗ (1.76)∗
Currency crises 0.350 0.304
(0.85) (0.62)
Banking crises 0.374 0.517
(0.96) (1.04)
Democracy 0.091 0.136 0.120
(2.91)∗∗∗ (2.79)∗∗∗ (4.41)∗∗∗
Regime duration -0.019 -0.015
(1.72)∗ (0.91)
Purges (log) 1.468 2.371 1.767
(2.38)∗∗ (1.86)∗ (2.89)∗∗∗
Civil War 0.940 1.118 1.075
(1.69)∗ (1.37) (1.96)∗∗
Assassinations (log) 0.393 -0.098
(1.24) (0.23)
Guerrilla warfare (log) 0.451 0.504
(1.04) (0.62)
Riots (log) -0.267 -0.760
(1.04) (1.99)∗∗
Demonstrations (log) 0.290 0.482
(1.29) (1.47)
Strikes (log) 0.209 -0.026
(0.53) (0.05)
Observations 824 624 814 930 1,017 479 842
Countries 120 104 113 125 140 78 115
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.24 0.17
Note: The results are based on conditional fixed effect logit regressions. Time dummies are included in
all specifications. We use the logarithm of the variables that are based on events as well as for GDP per
capita to mitigate the effect of outlying observations. Due to data availability the number of countries
per specification differs.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute value of z-statistics is given in parentheses.
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the probability of a cabinet change at the election. Furthermore, it can be seen that
the estimated coefficient of our terror measure is hardly affected by the different sets of
control variables.
Concerning our control variables, we find that only the level of democracy, the num-
ber of purges and the presence of civil war are robustly related to electoral change. All
three variables increase the likelihood of a cabinet change. The duration of the political
regime and major government crises only marginally affect the probability of a change
of the cabinet.
Table 7.3 shows the results when each of the other terror measures is included in
specification (7) of Table 7.2. Here, we also report the marginal effect of each indicator
on the likelihood of a cabinet change after the election. First, we include lagged terror
events to examine our imposed direction of causality.7 Second, we include a dummy
equal to 1 if there was at least one act of terror and 0 otherwise. Although inclusion
of this indicator comes at the cost of not utilizing all available information, it gives
the estimated marginal effect a clear interpretation.8 That is, the presence of at least
one terror event increases the likelihood of a cabinet change after the election with 12.0
percent. Third, we include the number of terror events again, but exclude cases without
casualties or injuries, since such terror events are expected to have less impact on the
public opinion. Similarly, we construct three dummy variables to differentiate between
the severity of different terrorist attacks. We make a distinction between events with at
least one injury or casualty, events without any injuries or casualties and events with
at least one casualty. The estimated marginal effects (12.4 percent, 3.8 percent and
18.0 percent, respectively) show that the probability of a cabinet change depends on
the severity of the terrorist attack. While terrorist attacks without casualties or injuries
hardly affect the probability of a cabinet change, the impact drastically increases when
only terrorist attacks with casualties (and injuries) are considered. Finally, we further
test the robustness of our results using several terror measures based on the number
7We also examined terror events at t− 2 and find that they do not influence the election outcome.
This result suggests that the electorate is short-sighted with respect to its voting behavior.
8This also mitigates the effect of outliers in the terror variable.
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Table 7.3: Results tests of robustness – dependent variable: cabinet change
marginal
Variable coefficient z-stat effect
Transnational terror events 0.439 2.75∗∗∗ 0.109
Transnational terror events, t-1 0.395 2.17∗∗ 0.097
Transnational terror event dummy 0.489 2.13∗∗ 0.120
Transnational terror events w/o 0 0.399 1.66∗ 0.097
Transnational terror event w/o 0 dummy 0.501 1.85∗ 0.124
Transnational terror event dummy, no bodily harm 0.153 0.61 0.038
Fatal transnational terror event dummy 0.728 2.38∗∗ 0.180
Sum of fatalities 0.452 2.43∗∗ 0.111
Fatalities per event 0.538 1.96∗∗ 0.134
Fatalities per event w/o 0 0.547 2.26∗∗ 0.137
Note: The table contains point estimates and marginal effects of specification (7) of Table 6.2. The
marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all explanatory variables with the fixed effects set to
0. For all indicators (apart from the dummy variables) we use the logarithm to mitigate the effect of
outlying observations. ‘w/o 0’ indicates that all terror events without fatalities or injuries are excluded.
‘No bodily harm’ is a dummy taking on the value of 1 if at least one terror attack occurred but no
person was killed or injured and 0 otherwise. ‘Fatal transnational terror event dummy’ is a dummy
taking on the value of 1 if at least one fatal terror attack occurred and 0 otherwise.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level.
of casualties. We include the sum of all casualties per year, the number of casualties
per event and the casualties at the median event. The alternative measures confirm
our findings above. Terrorism significantly increases the likelihood of a cabinet change,
while this likelihood is positively affected by the severity of the terrorist attack.
7.4 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the impact of terrorism on the probability of government re-
placement. We find strong evidence that terrorist attacks increase the probability that
the cabinet will be replaced after an election. Furthermore, we find that the magnitude
of this effect increases with the severity of a terrorist attack. Our empirical evidence
supports both the electoral accountability model of Barro (1973) as well as the Lupia
and Strøm (1995) critical events model. As recent studies find that government changes
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affect macroeconomic variables such as economic growth (Jones and Olken, 2005) and
inflation (Aisen and Veiga, 2006), our results indicate that terrorism indirectly influences
economic outcomes.
Chapter 8
Does political proximity to the U.S.
cause terror?
8.1 Introduction
After starting this work with the determinants of democracy we conclude the circle by
analyzing the determinants of terror. America is in the midst of a “War on Terror.”
The determinants of terror, however, have not yet been fully understood. Economists, in
particular, started researching this topic only very recently. Still, first evidence exists.1
Absence of political rights, high inequality and fractionalization have been identified as
causes of terror, while low GDP per capita does not seem to determine terror (Krueger
and Malecˇkova´, 2003; Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2006).
However, the literature so far relied on cross-sectional analysis only. Results are thus
potentially driven by fixed factors that correlate with the variables of interest. This is
the first gap in the literature that this paper fills. For the first time, the relevance of the
variables most prominently suggested to determine terror is analyzed in a panel context
This chapter is an adapted version of Dreher and Gassebner (2007).
1Note that most previous studies analyze the sources of terrorism and thereby focus on the country
where terror originates. A recent exception is Piazza (2006). Frey et al. (2007) survey the literature on
the economic effects of terrorism.
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– employing a new database on terrorism drawing from a multitude of sources. In doing
so, we focus on the targets of transnational events of terror.
As our second – and main – contribution, we examine the effects of a country’s
political proximity to the U.S. on the frequency and severity of terror in that country.
We employ the standard measure of political proximity, the share of roll call votes cast
in line with the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly.2 To anticipate our results,
countries voting in line with the U.S. are indeed victims of more and deadlier terror.
The next section motivates our main hypothesis. Section 8.3 presents the data and
estimation method, while the results are shown in the final section.
8.2 Hypothesis
“What worries people around the world above all else is living in a world shaped and
dominated by one country – the United States” (Zakaria 2004). While U.S. dominance
seems to alienate people across the globe, most Western countries are still on good terms
with the U.S., and so is the majority of their citizens. To the contrary, in some countries
with mostly Muslim population, terror groups have emerged, aiming at destroying U.S.
culture and dominance. However, not only the U.S. itself became the target of terrorism
– its allies have also been hit by severe attacks. Arguably, terror in these countries might
also indirectly target U.S. dominance and culture. Friends of the U.S. might thus be
more prone to terror than other countries, all else equal.
As one example, consider America’s recent “War on Terror” in Iraq. Following
their participation, the UK and Spain – among the closest allies of the U.S. – suffered
major terror attacks themselves. These attacks can be linked directly to these countries’
support of the U.S. in Iraq: the two London bombings in July 2005 and the Madrid
bombing in March 2004 were declared to be retaliation for participation in the U.S.-led
war.
We expect this pattern to hold more generally. Our considerations imply:
Hypothesis 8.1. Political proximity to the U.S. increases terror.
2See, e.g., Thacker (1999), Barro and Lee (2005), Kilby (2006), Dreher and Jensen (2007).
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8.3 Data and Method
We employ panel data for 116 countries over the period 1975-2001.3 Since some of the
data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the
number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. As the data on
terror events are strongly skewed to the right and display significant overdispersion we
estimate our regressions employing the fixed effects Negative Binomial estimator.4
The equations take the following form:
terrorjit = α+ β1USit + β
′
2Xi,t−1 + λt + εit, (8.1)
where terrorjit represents our j
th measure of terror for country i in period t, and USit
measures political proximity to the United States. Xi,t−1 is the vector of (lagged) control
variables, λt are fixed time effects, while εit represents the disturbance.
Next, we need to establish how to measure political proximity to the U.S. We follow
the bulk of literature and employ data on voting coincidence in the UN General Assembly
as provided by Voeten (2004). In particular, we follow Thacker (1999), coding votes in
agreement with the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences
as 0.5. The resulting numbers are then divided by the total number of votes in each
year. This results in a variable ranging from zero to one, with zero indicating total
disagreement with the U.S., and one showing full agreement.
Our terror measures are taken from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, integrat-
ing data from various sources. For each country and year we employ the number of
transnational terror events as our main variable of interest.5 In addition, we use the
3Available data extends to 2002. However, due to the special effects of September 11, we exclude
the year 2002 from the analysis. Estimating the full sample yields similar results. The exception is
column 1 of Table 1 where the coefficient for the UN voting variable becomes marginally insignificant
(p-value = 0.11).
4The results reported below are qualitatively unchanged when estimated with OLS, while the quan-
titative impact of UN voting on terror is substantially larger. Random effects Negative Binomial
regressions also show similar results.
5A transnational terror event is an event in which either the attacker and/or the target is foreign.
Including domestic events does not change the main results.
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median as well as the average number of persons killed per attack in a given country
and year, and the number of suicide attacks.6
Note that our analysis focuses on the targets of terrorism rather than its sources. In
choosing our control variables, we thus mainly follow Piazza (2006) who also analyzes
the targets of terror. We employ GDP per capita (measured in constant 2000 US$).
On the one hand, richer countries are more attractive targets for terrorists, as terror
creates more attention. On the other hand, richer countries have stronger police and
intelligence agencies, potentially being able to prevent terror. The impact of GDP is
thus not obvious a priori.
A second variable suggested to be important for terror is political freedom. The
relation between political freedom and terrorism is also ambiguous a priori. Repressive
states could foster terrorism (as foreign minorities might conceive terror as the only
“effective communication device” against state repression) or be detrimental to it (as
repressive states might be better able to suppress terrorism). In line with Piazza (2006),
we include both the level of and changes in freedom.
Third, we include population size, as more potential victims promise to create more
news in case of successful attack. Furthermore, the costs of state surveillance might rise
with population size (Piazza 2006).
Finally, we include government fractionalization. According to Piazza (2006), the
number of parties in power to some extent proxies “social cleavage,” potentially giving
rise to terror. Conflicting political interests might in particular extend to the foreign
based population.
Data for per capita GDP and population are taken from World Bank (2006). Gov-
ernment fractionalization is from Beck et al. (2001) and measures the probability that
two randomly drawn members from among the government are of different parties. The
level and change in political freedom are based on the average of political rights and civil
liberties from Freedom House (2005). We transform the original scales of both indices,
so that higher values represent more liberty, on a scale from 1 to 7.
6Territories are assigned to the country formally governing the territory. Kashmir and the Persian
Gulf are excluded as it is not clear to which country they should be assigned.
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8.4 Results
Table 8.1 reports first results for the number of transnational terror events. Overall, our
results mirror those reported in Piazza (2006). The number of terror events increases
with greater government fractionalization, at the one percent level of significance. At
the ten percent level, countries with larger population and decreasing political freedom
are struck by terror more frequently. GDP per capita and the level of freedom have no
significant impact on terror. With respect to our variable of primary interest, terror is
more frequent with greater voting coincidence with the U.S. in the General Assembly.
An increase in voting coincidence from zero to one implies approximately one additional
terror attack.
Table 8.1: Results Negative Binomial estimation – dependent variable terror events
(1) (2) (3)
GDP per capita, t-1 -7.50E-06 -6.98E-06 -7.17E-06
(0.60) (0.55) (0.57)
Political freedom, t-1 0.018 0.022 0.013
(0.49) (0.59) (0.36)
Political freedom, change -0.116 -0.120 -0.119
(1.65)∗ (1.69)∗ (1.69)∗
Population, t-1 1.84E-09 1.92E-09 1.83E-09
(1.86)∗ (1.90)∗ (1.87)∗
Government fractionalization, t-1 0.433 0.436 0.424
(2.98)∗∗∗ (2.98)∗∗∗ (2.92)∗∗∗
Voting with U.S. 0.968 0.951 0.948
(1.89)∗ (1.84)∗ (1.85)∗
Economic growth, t-1 -0.009
(1.45)
Population growth, t-1 -0.025
(0.79)
Countries 116 116 116
Observations 2,263 2,250 2,262
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Results in this table are derived using Negative Binomial fixed effects estimations. Annual year
dummies are included in all regressions. The voting with U.S. variable measures the voting behavior in
the UN General Assembly. It follows the definition of Thacker (1999), coding votes in agreement with
the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute value of z-statistics is given in parentheses.
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In columns 2 and 3, we test for the stability of our results by including two additional
variables that have been suggested in Piazza (2006). Column 2 adds economic growth,
while population growth is included in column 3. As the results show, the coefficient of
voting coincidence remains virtually unchanged, while both variables are not significant
at conventional levels.7
Table 8.2 replicates the analysis with our three alternative dependent variables. As
can be seen, voting with the U.S. increases the average and the median number of
people killed in a single terror attack at the one and, respectively, five percent level of
significance. To the contrary, suicide attacks are not more frequent in countries voting
in line with the U.S. (a result based on data for 17 countries only, however). According
to the estimates, changing voting behavior from voting fully against to completely in
line with the U.S. increases the average number of people killed by 3 and the number of
fatalities in the median attack by 2.6.
8.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze determinants of terror. In particular we focus on the effect of
political proximity to the U.S. Our results show that voting in line with the U.S. in the
UN General Assembly is costly in terms of additional terror, both regarding frequency
and severity of attacks. With respect to other determining factors our findings are in line
with the existing literature. GDP per capita is not a good predictor of the occurrence of
terror. More populous countries experience excess terror. Last but not lease, political
factors play an important role in determining terror attacks. Political fractionalization
and reforms that restrict political freedoms trigger more frequent and more severe terror
attacks. This concludes the main part of this work. In the next chapter we summarize
all contributions.
7As additional tests for robustness, we excluded observations with extreme values. Our results are
qualitatively unchanged. We also tested for the endogeneity of UN voting to terror, using the number
of new International Monetary Fund programs concluded in a certain country and year. While IMF
programs have been shown to be highly correlated with UN voting (e.g., Thacker, 1999), they are
not significantly related to terror. Note that there is no support for the endogeneity of UN General
Assembly voting according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
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Table 8.2: Results alternative terror measures – dependent variable terror
(1) (2) (3)
Average Kills Median Kills Suicide Attacks
GDP per capita, t-1 3.03E-05 2.96E-05 -3.91E-05
(1.50) (1.29) (0.28)
Political freedom, t-1 0.075 0.027 0.949
(1.47) (0.40) (1.18)
Political freedom, change -0.255 -0.246 -0.605
(2.21)∗∗ (1.71)∗ (0.87)
Population, t-1 1.80E-10 6.10E-10 -1.07E-08
(0.50) (1.38) (1.11)
Government fractionalization, t-1 0.409 0.352 3.979
(1.80)∗ (1.21) (2.47)∗∗
Voting with U.S. 3.057 2.610 5.176
(3.96)∗∗∗ (2.54)∗∗ (0.96)
Countries 86 79 17
Observations 1,762 1,588 319
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Results in this table are derived using Negative Binomial fixed effects estimations. Annual year
dummies are included in all regressions. The voting with U.S. variable measures the voting behavior in
the UN General Assembly. It follows the definition of Thacker (1999), coding votes in agreement with
the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The different dependent
variables are presented in the table header.
∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10/5/1-% level; absolute value of z-statistics is given in parentheses.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This final chapter briefly summarizes the findings of this work. This thesis analyzes two
central concepts of political economy: democracy and terror. Our analysis focuses on a
wide array of topics. We examine the driving forces behind both phenomena, we analyze
their effects on the economy and, finally, we focus on their interrelationship. After
concluding our analysis we can confirm the importance of studying both democracy and
terror. We have expanded the knowledge of the political economy literature in several
dimensions.
We find that predicting the emergence of democracy is not as straight forward as
the abundant literature proposes. Only five variables out of 55 survive our extensive
robustness analysis for the emergence of democracy while just four do so for the survival
of democracy. The policy conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis is that if one
wants to foster democratization processes, the attention should be turned to poor coun-
tries that have recently experienced a democratic regime change. We engage the dispute
between modernization theorists, claiming GDP per capita to cause democratization,
and the group of scholars spearheaded by Adam Przeworski from the New York Univer-
sity, objecting this finding. Our analysis strongly supports the latter group. Increases
in wealth does increase the probability of remaining democratic, however.
Examining the effect of democracy on macroeconomic outcomes, we can confirm
its relevance. Analyzing the influence of the political system on trade flows, we find
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strong evidence for the detrimental effects of autocracies. We demonstrate this effect
by deriving two new theoretical channels: an accountability channel and a bureaucracy
channel. The former furthermore demonstrates the importance of holding political lead-
ers accountable for their actions (e.g., via elections) while the latter shows how the
political-institutional setup shapes human behavior which ultimately determines eco-
nomic outcomes. Both theoretical channels are shown to be highly relevant empirically.
We also clarify the driving forces of a specific policy agenda. Exploring the deter-
minants of environmental policy we find a potential “silver-lining” with respect to two
phenomena which are present in most modern day developed economies: inequality and
de-industrialization. Both turn out to be fostering more stringent environmental policies
which in turn reduce pollution. Our finding is rooted in theoretical considerations of
the policy formation process. Parties with more weight shape the policy outcome.
The interrelationship between democracy and terror is demonstrated in chapter 5 of
this thesis. On the one hand, we find that democratic countries show great respect for
human rights. Again, political accountability might be the key issue for this finding.
On the other hand, we find that governments reduce the human rights of their citizens
in response to terror attacks. In a way, they reduce parts of the very rights they
want to protect in the first place. However, this response is quantitatively relatively
minor. Furthermore, the effect is not present for empowerment rights such as freedom
of movement, religion, etc.
In chapters 6 and 7 we strengthen the examination of the interrelation of democracy
and terror even further. We analyze whether and to what extent terrorism affects one
of the core actors of most societies: cabinets. In particular we focus on the question
whether terror attacks affect the durability of cabinets. We find evidence that terror acts
increase instability. In the presence of terror, cabinets are more frequently dissolved.
We find a moderate effect for a general setup. However, the truly noteworthy finding
is achieved for election years. Again we find support for the electoral accountability
hypothesis: voters hold politicians accountable for not providing them the most basic
public good, namely security. As the presence of terror gives rise to the speculation that
incumbents are incompetent, they are voted out of office.
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Examining the determinants of terror rounds of this analysis. In particular we look
at the repercussions of political proximity to the U.S. with respect to terror in the own
country. We find that friendship to the U.S. is costly as it increases the amount and
severity of terror attacks. Finally, we see once more the close relationship of democracy
and terror: political reforms that reduce democracy trigger additional terror attacks.
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